Iran: Die „Revolutionäre“ verhaften Arbeiter

Der 1. Mai im Iran
Am 1. Mai 2012 war der Internationale Tag der Arbeit, der in vielen Ländern Feiertag ist und daran erinnert, mit welchen Mühen die Arbeiterbewegung sich ihre Rechte erkämpft und noch immer darum kämpfen muss. Im Iran wurde er erstmals 22 Jahre nach seiner Verkündung durch linke Gruppen gefeiert.
Nach der Revolution von 1979, bei der der Schah stürzte und Ajatollah Chomeini die Macht im Iran ergriff, hat dieser 1. Mai einige Wandlungen durchgemacht. Am 1. Mai 1979, also im Jahr der Revolution, war das Volk noch frei und es kam zu einer riesigen Demonstration mit Millionen von Teilnehmern zu diesem Tag. Aber für die islamische Geistlichkeit war dieser Tag ein rotes Tuch. Denn er war Symbol sozialistischer Ideale, und damit für sie genauso verwerflich wie der „Kapitalismus“.

Vom Festtag der Arbeiter zum Trauertag
Am 1. Mai 1979 wurde Ajatollah Motahari angeblich von einer islamistischen Gruppe, die sich „Forghan“ nannte, aber in Gegnerschaft zu Ajatollah Chomeini stand, ermordet. Im Volk kursierten damals allerdings auch Gerüchte, dass Ajatollah Motahari, der eine politisch gemäßigte Position vertrat und selbst ein Gegner von Ajatollah Chomeini war, in Wirklichkeit von Handlangern Chomeinis ermordet wurde, der dann die Mitglieder der Gruppe „Forghan“ als Sündenböcke präsentierte und verurteilen ließ. Die Wahrheit wird man wohl erst erfahren, wenn die Islamische Republik Geschichte geworden ist.
Ajatollah Chomeini nutzte diesen Mord an Ajatollah Chomeini, um im folgenden Jahr, also 1980, den 1. Mai in einen Trauertag zum Gedenken an den „Märtyrer Motahari“ umzuwandeln. Die Arbeiter sollten nicht mehr feiern, sondern trauern.

tehranbureau: Google Pulls Blog Revealing 3 Million Bank Account Numbers

Google has taken down the blog of Iranian security researcher Khosrow Zarefarid after he posted the account and pin numbers of three million customers from 22 banks across Iran.

They have not, however, revoked Zarefarid’s overall privileges to blog on the Google platform, Blogger, where he maintains the site Banking Problems in Iran.

Zarefarid states on his Facebook page that he lives in Tehran. Before publishing the private banking information he hacked, Zarefarid sent a letter to the banks’ CEOs waning them of the flaws in their security. Upon receiving no response, he set out to prove his point. Apparently, he didn’t take any money while accessing citizens’ accounts.

The Central Bank of the Islamic Republic (CBI) is urging customers to change their pin numbers. In a country with an extremely centralized banking system, the sheer number of banks compromised in this hack are likely to stir panic among private citizens whose worries already include high inflation, fluctuation in interest rates and the ripple effect of international economic sanctions.

News of this latest computer hack in Iran comes as the government advances plans to cut Iranians off from the World Wide Web and to offer a “halal” or “clean internet” in its place. The government currently blocks access to Facebook, Gmail, Google Reader and millions of other sites. Though many question the government’s practical ability to do so, plans for a national intarnet would prevent Iranians from accessing all but preapproved information vetted by the government.

Source: Tehran Bureau

tehranbureau: Getting Recognized the Right Way: What Iranian Americans Can Learn

From the “clown phase” to “The Godfather,” other immigrant experiences have a lot to teach.

Amir Bagherpour leads a public policy research initiative at the Public Affairs Alliance of Iranian American (PAAIA). He is cofounder of PAAIA NexGen, a group dedicated to developing the next generation of Iranian American leaders. The first Iranian-born graduate of West Point, he recently completed his Ph.D. at Claremont Graduate University in political science with a focus in international relations.

Establishing an identity that is part of the broad American mainstream does not take place overnight. Assimilation rarely happens without significant challenges for the first- and second-generation members of immigrant communities. Iranian Americans follow here in the footsteps of many other successful immigrants such as the Italian, Irish, and Hispanic Americans, each of whom are now woven into the cultural tapestry of this country.

The way these communities are depicted in the mass media is a measure of their assimilation into American society. In a widely cited analysis published in 1969, communications scholar Cedric C. Clark argued that minority groups go through four stages of representation in the media:

* non-recognition — in which the group’s existence is not acknowledged by the dominant media;

* ridicule — in which certain minority characters are portrayed as being lazy, silly, irrational, or simply laughable;

* recognition — in which certain minority characters are portrayed as being dominant or enforcers of the group’s norms; and

* respect — in which the minority group is portrayed in the same manner as any other group

According to Clark, these stages are part of a minority population’s overall evolution within American culture.

Communication scholars often point to the 1972 release of the film version of The Godfather as a pivotal moment in Italian Americans’ achievement of recognition and eventual respect. The film thrust the Italian American experience into the American mainstream. Director Francis Ford Coppola transformed a story about organized crime, with all its deplorable facets, into a film that captures the beauty of Italian culture through the journey of an Italian family striving to attain the American Dream. According to film analyst Tom Santopietro, “The Godfather was a turning point in American cultural consciousness. With its emphasis on proud ethnicity, it changed not just the way Italian Americans saw themselves, but how Americans of all background viewed their individual and national self-identities, their possibilities, and attendant disappointments.”

Recognition of Iranian Americans has not yet occurred as it did it for Italian Americans with The Godfather. But they are on their way. With its caricaturization of Iranian Americans as shallow self-absorbed dilettantes, Bravo’s reality show Shahs of Sunset provides mainstream America a new image of Iranians: not as crazed revolutionary Islamists, but as harmless buffoons. Iranian Americans have effectively entered Clark’s ridicule stage of representation — more colloquially known as the “clown phase” of the immigrant experience — a period in which the group’s members are no longer feared by mainstream America as untrustworthy and potentially dangerous, but are instead ridiculed and humiliated for others’ amusement.

In actuality, of course, Iranian Americans fit neither the religious zealot nor the ignorant clown stereotype. In spite of the fact that Iran is currently ruled by a theocratic government, Iranian Americans are significantly less religious than the broader American public. The PEW Research Center study on religion indicates that only 5 percent of Americans are either agnostic or atheist; according to polls conducted by Zogby Research Services for the Public Affairs Alliance of Iranian Americans (PAAIA), the analogous rate among Iranian Americans is double that. They are also among the most successful and well-educated populations in the United States, with numerous individuals highly regarded for their contributions to American business and culture.

Nonetheless, according to one PAAIA-commissioned Zogby survey, one third of Americans were not familiar with an Iranian American; indeed, more Americans indicated that they were familiar with the Iranian government than with someone of Iranian origin. This suggests that their impressions are in large part formed by media reports on Iran. Until recently, Iranian Americans were rarely if ever represented on television in anything other than news-driven shows. Iranian American actors have often been cast as Middle Eastern characters from other countries. And the few Iranian American characters who have appeared in movies such as House of Sand and Fog were largely unsympathetic. 

Calais – Letzte Station vor der Insel (England)

Die nordfranzösische Hafenstadt Calais liegt an der engsten Stelle des Ärmelkanals und somit nur 30 km von Großbritannien entfernt. Deshalb dient diese Stadt als Transitstation vieler Hundert Flüchtlinge, die sich quer durch Europa mit dem Ziel Großbritannien bewegen. Sie halten sich “illegal” in Europa auf und müssen sich deswegen durch das Sicherheitsnetz der britischen Grenzkontrollen schmuggeln. So schleichen sie sich Nacht für Nacht auf LKWs und Züge, in der Hoffnung nicht entdeckt zu werden. Bis dieser Versuch jedoch gelingt vergehen oft mehrere Monate, während denen die Flüchtenden starker Polizeirepression ausgesetzt sind.

Broschüre – Trying for England – Download

Quelle: Calais Migrant Solidarity

Iran Factbox

Land borders Afghanistan – 585 miles Armenia – 22 miles Azerbaijan-Nakhchivan exclave – 112 miles Azerbaijan – 270 miles Iraq – 911 miles Pakistan – 568 miles Turkmenistan – 620 miles Turkey – 312 miles

2010 population: 74.5 million   Ethnic divisions: Persian 51 percent Azeri 24 percent Gilaki and Mazandarani 8 percent Kurd 7 percent Arab 3 percent Lur 2 percent Baloch 2 percent Turkmen 2 percent Other 1 percent   Religious divisions[1]: Muslims 98 percent: Shiite 89 percent Sunni 9 percent Other significant minorities-based on varying estimates: Baha’i – 300,000-350,000 Jews – 20,000-30,000 Christians (mainly Assyrian and Armenian churches) – 300,000 Zoroastrians – 35,000 to 60,000   Bordering bodies of water: Caspian Sea – 462 miles Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman – 1,525 miles   [1] According to U.S. State Department’s “International Religious Freedom Report 2006.”

Gulf Considers Political Union to Handle Iran and Arab Spring

Caroline Crouch

The six oil-rich sheikhdoms of the Persian Gulf are now considering political federation to unify their foreign and defense policies. The move, originally proposed last December by Saudi King Abdullah, is a response to growing regional challenges over the past 18 months, including from Iran, Sunni-Shiite tensions in little Bahrain, and the Arab uprisings.

On April 28, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al Faisal said the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)–Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain and Oman—will discuss details of a “federation” at a May 14 summit in Riyadh.  The first step reportedly may be a federation between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.

“Cooperation and coordination between the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council in its current format may not be enough to confront the existing and coming challenges, which require developing Gulf action into an acceptable federal format,” the Saudi foreign minister said in a speech delivered on his behalf at a GCC youth event.

The GCC was created in 1981 in response to the 1979 Iranian Revolution and outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in 1980. Its original goals were greater cooperation in defense, finance, trade and scientific research.  But deep divisions among the GCC sheikdoms have often undercut unity projects. In 2009, a proposal to create a common currency failed when the United Arab Emirates withdrew its support.

F. Gregory Gause is chair of the University of Vermont’s political science department and author of The International Relations of the Persian Gulf.  The following is an interview in which he analyzed the motives, impact and obstacles to a GCC federation:

Why are the six sheikhdoms in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) talking about a political union or federation?  And why now?

 This is clearly a reaction to the events of the Arab Spring more generally and the upheaval in Bahrain specifically.  It can be seen in a general context of GCC fears about the growth of Iranian power in the wake of the Iraq War, but the real driver here is Bahrain specifically and the upheavals of 2011 generally.  We should note that all six are not talking with equal enthusiasm about the idea of union or federation.  This is very much a Saudi-driven idea and the Bahraini government is its most enthusiastic supporter.  The other states do not seem as committed.

How feasible is a political union, given the history of differences among the Gulf countries?  What are the obstacles? And what is the proposed timeframe—given that the GCC was formed in 1981 and still is not completely coordinated on defense capabilities?

It is very unlikely that the governments of Kuwait, Qatar, the UAE or Oman would give up any real sovereign power, even if they agreed to a federation.  The most likely “constitutional” change would be a coordinating foreign and defense policy committee, with an eye (by the Saudis) to replicating the European Union experiment of a “common foreign and defense policy” and a single representative (like Lady Ashton, but it would be a man) of that policy.

But the EU has had its own problems here, and the GCC would too.  Each state has a bilateral relationship with its most important security partner, the United States, and that would not change.  Qatar’s leaders are unlikely to give up their regional ambitions and submerge them in a Saudi-led effort for long.  Right now, all the GCC states are basically on the same page — worried about Iran, supportive of regime change in Syria, looking for a soft landing in Yemen.  But that might not last forever.

It is entirely possible that there will be some announcement about a federation or union plan at the next GCC meeting, but actual implementation would be far down the road.  The organization is having lots of trouble coordinating on a common currency.  It would have equal troubles implementing a real common foreign and defense policy.

What would a political union or federation look like? Is there a model elsewhere in the world? Is this potentially an equivalent of the European Union?  How might a Gulf union differ from other regional alliances, such as the Arab League and OPEC?

It would differ from the Arab League in that there would be fewer members and thus it would be easier to reach unanimity and take actions.  It would be different from OPEC in that it would tackle a range of issues, and not be concentrated on just one.  I think that the supporters of the notion really do have the EU in mind as a model of economic and political integration, but I doubt that the political circumstances are such that any of the smaller state governments except Bahrain would be willing to submerge their sovereign powers to Saudi Arabia, which is what, in effect, such a union would be.  Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE do not need Saudi money and do not need Saudi security forces.

What difference would a Gulf political federation make in either individual countries or the Gulf region? What would it change as far as regional dynamics with Iran?

I’m not sure there would be much change at all, except in Bahrain, where any hope for political reconciliation would go out the window.  There is already a common GCC policy on a number of issues with Iran, including the UAE islands, and a common perception that Iran is their biggest security issue.  There is already GCC cooperation on internal security issues, most notably manifested in the sending of troops to Bahrain to support the government by not just Saudi Arabia, but also (more symbolically) by Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE.

 There might be some better coordination on defense issues — early warning systems, inter-operability on radars and the like, more joint military planning, more intelligence sharing.  But since the confrontation with Iran is more political and less military, these would not be centrally important in the current context.

How much of the Saudi proposal was spurred by fears of Iran? And how much was spurred by Sunni-Shiite sectarian differences, particularly the rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran?

 For the Saudis, there is little difference right now between fear of Iran and Sunni-Shiite tensions.  The Saudis see the Iranians behind the Iraqi government and Bahrain protests.  The Saudi leadership sees Iran primarily in balance-of-power terms, not in sectarian terms.  As recently as 2005-06, Riyadh was willing to engage Iran much more directly.

But the struggle for influence with Iran is played out in the domestic politics of weak states and divided societies — Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq, Yemen (to a lesser extent), now Syria — where the Saudis usually find Sunni allies and the Iranians find Shiite allies (some exceptions, to be sure). So the sectarian struggle and balance-of-power politics are now conflated.  The Saudis believe they have the upper hand here, given the majority status of Sunnis in the Muslim world.  But such an emphasis on sectarian identity pushes Arab Shiite in Iraq, Bahrain and elsewhere toward Iran, if they are not allied with Iran already.

Quelle:  UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

U.S. to Punish Sanctions Evaders

On May 1, the White House issued a new Executive Order targeting foreign sanctions evaders. The following is a fact sheet on the Executive Order. Full links to the Executive Order and the letter to Congress are provided below.

FACT SHEET: New executive order targeting foreign sanctions evaders

Today the President signed an Executive Order (E.O.), “Prohibiting Certain Transactions with and Suspending Entry into the United States of Foreign Sanctions Evaders with Respect to Iran and Syria,” providing the U.S. Treasury Department with a new authority to tighten further the U.S. sanctions on Iran and Syria.

This E.O. targets foreign individuals and entities that have violated, attempted to violate, conspired to violate, or caused a violation of U.S. sanctions against Iran or Syria, or that have facilitated deceptive transactions for persons subject to U.S. sanctions concerning Syria or Iran. With this new authority, Treasury now has the capability to publicly identify foreign individuals and entities that have engaged in these evasive and deceptive activities, and generally bar access to the U.S. financial and commercial systems.

“The foreign sanctions evaders E.O. provides Treasury additional means to impose serious consequences on foreign persons who seek to evade our sanctions and undermine international efforts to bring pressure to bear on the Iranian and Syrian regimes. Whoever tries to evade our sanctions does so at the expense of the people of Syria and Iran, and they will be held accountable,” said Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen.

Upon Treasury’s identification and listing of a foreign sanctions evader, U.S. persons will generally be prohibited from providing to, or procuring from, the sanctioned party goods, services, or technology, effectively cutting the evader off from the U.S. marketplace. This provides Treasury with a powerful new tool to prevent, deter, and respond to the risks posed by sanctions evaders to the U.S. and global financial system. It also will help prevent U.S. persons from unwittingly engaging in transactions with foreign individuals and entities that pose a particular risk of running afoul of U.S. sanctions concerning Iran or Syria.

The foreign sanctions evaders E.O. is the latest in a broad-based and escalating series of steps taken by the United States and its international partners targeting the governments of Iran and Syria with respect to their abuse of human rights, support for terrorism, and proliferation and development of weapons of mass destruction. The foreign sanctions evaders E.O. follows by one week the Executive Order Blocking The Property And Suspending Entry into the United States of Certain Persons with Respect to Grave Human Rights Abuses by the Governments of Iran and Syria via Information Technology (the “GHRAVITY E.O.”), which targeted the provision and use of information and communications technology to facilitate computer or network disruption, monitoring, or tracking that could assist in or enable serious human rights abuses by or on behalf of the Government of Iran or the Government of Syria.

The United States has already blocked (i.e., frozen) property and interests in property of the Government of Iran, its agencies and instrumentalities, and all Iranian financial institutions, including the Central Bank of Iran. In all, the Treasury Department has announced over 400 Iran-related designations and identifications of individuals and entities supporting various illicit actions of the Government of Iran, including human rights abuses, support for terrorism, and WMD proliferation. For more information, please see http://www.treasury.gov/ofac.

Similarly, the Administration has blocked the property and interests in property of the Government of Syria and its agencies and instrumentalities, including the Central Bank of Syria. The Treasury Department also has designated major Syrian financial institutions, including the Commercial Bank of Syria. In all, the Treasury Department has designated more than 60 individuals and entities supporting Syria’s human rights abuses and other repressive policies. For more information, please see http://www.treasury.gov/ofac.

Quelle:  UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE