Archiv der Kategorie: Aktionen

Afghanische Ortskräfte in Berlin – Positive Bilanz

Im Zuge der Aufnahme afghanischer Ortskräfte (“Local workers”) sind inzwischen 168 Betroffene mit 377 Angehörigen nach Deutschland eingereist. Insgesamt hätten 937 Ortskräfte einen Antrag auf Aufnahme gestellt, sagte ein Sprecher des Verteidigungsministeriums. Bisher seien 908 Anträge bearbeitet und 313 davon bewilligt worden.

Davon sind bisher in Berlin 11 Ortskräfte angekommen, mit insgesamt 12 Familienangehörigen. Die meisten von ihnen besuchen bereits den Integrationskurs. Weitere Aufnahmen in Berlin folgen in den nächsten Wochen. Betreut werden all diese afghanischen Staatsbürger durch die Flüchtlingshilfe Iran e.V.. Wenn möglich werden sie bereits bei der Ankunft am Flughafen, Tegel oder Schönefeld, abgeholt und in die zuständige Unterkunft gebracht. Danach geht die persönliche Betreuung erst los.

Ein ausgesuchtes Spezialisten-Team der Flüchtlingshilfe Iran übernimmt die komplette Betreuung. Ärztliche Hilfe, Hilfe bei der Antragstellung in den Behörden, die Abwicklung bei der Berliner Ausländerbehörde, Wohnungssuche, wie auch die Suche nach dem geeigneten Integrationskurs, die Suche nach einer Schule für die Schulkinder, sind nur ein Bruchteil dieser Betreuung, die den afghanischen Neuankömmlingen zuteilwird.

Ein großes Erlebnis für die meisten dieser ehemaligen Ortskräfte war der Besuch der Fan-Meile, am Brandenburger Tor, während der Fußball-Weltmeisterschaft. Natürlich wurden die Familien in Afghanistan immer über die eigenen Aktivitäten via Facebook unterrichtet. Weitere Highlights werden folgen.

Die Flüchtlingshilfe Iran e.V. ist schon seit 2010 im Bereich der persönlichen Betreuung für insbesondere iranische Flüchtlinge – Sonderaufnahmen auf Grundlage des § 22.2 und § 23.2 des Aufenthaltsgesetzes – in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland tätig. Mehr als 100 Flüchtlinge aus dem Iran konnten seit dem im Betreuungs-Programm der Flüchtlingshilfe Iran aufgenommen werden und erfolgreich betreut werden. Zahlreiche dieser Flüchtlinge studieren mittlerweile an deutschen Universitäten und konnten, trotz mancher Probleme bei der Studienzulassung, erfolgreich integriert werden.

Five Ahwazi Arab shot dead and ten seriously wounded by the Iranian regime police security forces

According to Human Rights Activists News Agency (Harana) and reliable sources inside Qasem Island, the police …

1

Ahwazna

According to Human Rights Activists News Agency (Harana) and reliable sources inside Qasem Island, the police had clashed with the indigenous Ahwazi Arab people living in the village “Kaweh” in Qeshm Island which resulted in death of five people and wounding ten others including women and children.

After the discovery of smuggled fuel in “Kaweh” village, five Ahwazi Arab men were killed and at least ten others were fatally injured during shooting by the police. In addition, a ship at the village beach was set ablaze by the police security forces. This ship had contained smuggled fuel owned by the local people.

The police forces also confiscated all the properties belonging to those local smugglers who have been killed and wounded. Qeshm Island is the largest Island in the Arabian Gulf and is located a few kilometers south coast opposite the port of the city of Jamberoon (Bandar Abbas).

The island has over 1,491 km2 area, 135 km length and 40 km width and has a population around 113,846 (2010). However, in recent years the Iranian authorities begun to change the demographic of the Island by bringing massive number of settlers from different part of Iran to the Island.

In images sent by eyewitnesses show residential places which the police claimed where used as locations for storing smuggled fuel were bulldozed completely.

The indigenous Ahwazi Arab people living in Qeshm Island are mostly relying on fuel smuggling due to the abject poverty and severe economic condition which they suffer from.

The names of those who were killed and injured in the incident are not known as yet and the Iranian police website has not reported the incident since the protest sparked by the local Arab people against the barbaric killing and oppressing carried out by the regime occupying forces.

The Ahwazi Defence for Human Rights organisation strongly condemned the death of 5 Ahwazi from Qeshm Island by regime forces and said occupying regime must be held accountable for its nameless crimes which perpetrated against Ahwazi Arab people.

Note: Due to the explicit details of human pain and suffering, the contents contained in this news are not recommended for anyone under the age of 18, and/or those suffering from emotional disorders.

Queen Rania at a press conference on Gaza – Stop the war against humans!

Queen Rania makes an urgent plea on behalf of all the civilians living in Gaza for a “humanitarian ceasefire” and for the international community to do all it can to help alleviate the suffering.

This video ist from 2009, but it is the true about the situation today in Gaza. Stop the war against humans!

“All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”… Article 1, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

“Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person”… Article 3, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

Over the past 41 years, the people of Gaza have been living under occupation. Over the past 18 months, they have been living under siege. And for the past 10 days, the people of Gaza have been subject to a cruel and continuous military attack.

Either the declaration is not so universal, or the people of Gaza are not human beings, worthy of the same “universal” rights. This is the message the world is sending out today.

Extent of the crisis
Today, I am here with representative members of the UN family, to share with you the extent of the humanitarian crisis that is Gaza.

But not only is there a humanitarian crisis in Gaza – there is a crisis in our global humanity. Nelson Mandela once said that “our freedom is incomplete without the freedom of the Palestinians.” Today, I tell you, our humanity is incomplete without theirs. It is incomplete. It is not universal.

This is the message I am sending world leaders: Our humanity is incomplete when children, irrespective of nationality, are victims of military operations.

More than 70 dead children. Close to 600 injured. What does the world tell to their mothers? To the Palestinian mother who lost five daughters in one day? To the mothers watching their children cry in pain, huddle in fear, and deal with more trauma than any of us will experience in an entire lifetime?

That they are collateral damage?
That their lives don’t matter?
That their deaths don’t count?
That the children of Gaza do not have “the right to life, liberty and security”?

What do we tell them?!

Push for a ceasefire
It is imperative that every nation acts to end the fighting and open all crossings, especially Karni, to permit the uninterrupted passage of wheat, fuel, medicine and other vital supplies.

At the very least, we must push for a ceasefire, a humanitarian ceasefire, a ceasefire for children, to help the wounded, to look for those buried under the rubble, to tend to the sick and elderly trapped in their homes, and to bring in vital medical supplies, equipment and staff.

At the very least, governments should, governments must, contribute to UNRWA’s emergency appeal for $34 million to meet the immediate needs of Gaza’s innocent civilians.

The children of Gaza, the dead and the barely living … their mothers … their fathers … are not acceptable collateral damage; their lives do matter, their loss does count. They are not divisible from our universal humanity. No child is, no civilian is.

SOURCE

25 Jahre nach den Wiener Kurdenmorden – Eine Schande für Österreich

Vor 25 Jahren haben die Wiener Kurdenmorde Österreich erschüttert. Am 13. Juli 1989 wurden der Chef der Kurdischen Demokratischen Partei/Iran, Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou und zwei weitere Kurden bei einem Geheimtreffen mit der Teheraner Führung ermordet. Bis heute sind die Morde ungeklärt.

Die Tatverdächtigen tauchten nach der Tat in einer Privatwohnung in Wien-Landstraße in der iranischen Botschaft unter und konnten nach Interventionen der iranischen Regierung unbehelligt ausreisen; einer von ihnen wurde sogar unter Polizeischutz zum Schwechater Flughafen geleitet.

Kurdenmorde

(APA/Jäger) Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou

Ahmadinejad an Tat beteiligt

Nach Darstellung des grünen Parlamentariers Peter Pilz, der sich jahrelang mit dem Fall beschäftigte, saß zumindest ein Akteur von damals in höchster Position: Der frühere iranische Präsident Mahmoud Ahmadinejad höchstpersönlich sei „dringend verdächtig“, an der Ermordung der drei Kurdenführer in Wien beteiligt gewesen zu sein. Möglicherweise habe er selbst geschossen, dies lasse sich allerdings nicht mehr eindeutig eruieren.

Laut Aussage eines deutschen Waffenhändlers aus dem Jahr 2006, so Pilz, habe es in der ersten Juliwoche 1989 ein Treffen in der iranischen Botschaft gegeben. Bei diesem Treffen sei auch ein „gewisser Mohammad“, welcher „später Präsident der iranischen Republik wurde“, anwesend gewesen. Zweck dieses Treffens seien laut Protokoll illegale Waffenlieferungen gewesen.

Große Empörung in Österreich

In Österreich war die Empörung über die Morde groß. Der damalige Außenminister Alois Mock (ÖVP) sprach im Zusammenhang mit den Tötungen von einer „Schweinerei“, am Ballhausplatz war von „erpresserischen Methoden der Iraner“ die Rede.

Der damalige Chef der Politischen Sektion des Außenamts, Botschafter Erich Maximilian Schmid, sagte im April 1997 nach seiner Pensionierung in einem TV-Interview, der iranische Botschafter habe „mit ziemlicher Klarheit“ zu verstehen gegeben, dass „es gefährlich werden könnte für die Österreicher im Iran“, sollten die Tatverdächtigen in Österreich vor Gericht gestellt werden. Über die iranischen Drohungen war nach Angaben Mocks auch der damalige Außenamts-Generalsekretär und spätere Bundespräsident Thomas Klestil informiert.

Iran setzte Österreich unter Druck

Am 30. November 1989 sagte Innenminister Franz Löschnak (SPÖ) nach einem Treffen mit dem Chef der Terrorbekämpfungsabteilung im US-Außenamt, Morris Busby, dass Haftbefehle gegen die Tatverdächtigen erlassen worden seien. Allerdings hatte der Generaldirektor für die Öffentliche Sicherheit, Robert Danzinger, am Vortag per Weisung die Überwachung der iranischen Botschaft „reduzieren“ lassen.

Kurdenmorde

(APA/Jäger)  - Eine Leiche wird abtransportiert

Im August 1991 erklärte der in Frankreich im Exil lebende Ex-Präsident Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, Teheran besitze ein Druckmittel gegen Österreich, nämlich die Unterlagen über die illegalen österreichischen Waffenlieferungen im irakisch-iranischen Golfkrieg. In der Noricum-Affäre war eine Woche vor dem Attentat eine Voruntersuchung gegen die SPÖ-Politiker Altbundeskanzler Fred Sinowatz, Ex-Außenminister Leopold Gratz und Ex-Innenminister Karl Blecha eingeleitet worden.

Bis heute nicht aufgeklärt

Am 17. August 1992 wurde Ghassemlous Nachfolger Sadegh Charafkandi nach einer Tagung der Sozialistischen Internationale (SI) mit drei Mitarbeitern im Restaurant „Mykonos“ in Berlin ermordet, der Lokalbesitzer lebensgefährlich verletzt. Charafkandi hätte am darauffolgenden Tag nach Wien kommen sollen.

Österreichische Beamte sagten im deutschen „Mykonos“-Prozess aus, dass sich der Iran für die mutmaßlichen Attentäter von Wien eingesetzt hatte. Die deutsche Justiz warf dem Iran Staatsterrorismus vor. Nach ihren Erkenntnissen wurden auch die Wiener Morde von der obersten iranischen Führung angeordnet. Das „Mykonos“-Urteil veranlasste die EU-Staaten, ihre Botschafter 1997 vorübergehend aus Teheran abzuziehen.

Täter nie bestraft

Im November 1992 wurde die Amtshaftungsklage der Ghassemlou-Witwe in Wien in dritter Instanz abgewiesen; die Republik Österreich bescheinigte ihren Organen, dass es „keinerlei schuldhaftes und rechtswidriges Verhalten“ gegeben habe. Grüne und Liberale scheiterten 1997 mit ihrer Forderung nach einem parlamentarischen Untersuchungsausschuss zur Aufklärung möglicher Vertuschungsversuche am Widerstand der Koalitionsparteien SPÖ und ÖVP.

Von einem „bösen, brutalen und vorbereiteten Verbrechen“ sprach der damalige Nationalratspräsident und heutige Bundespräsident Heinz Fischer bei einer Gedenkfeier zu Ehren von Ghassemlou. Es sei „bitter und traurig“, dass die Aufklärung im Einzelnen und die Bestrafung der Täter nicht zustande gekommen seien.

Quelle: ORF.at – Studio Wien

Berlin| Bildung für Flüchtlinge – LehrerInnen & Unterstützung in allen Bereichen gesucht!

Ein wichtiger Teil der Integration von Flüchtlingen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist, das Erlernen der deutschen Sprache. Hierzu benötigen wir noch Unterstützung.

Da wir derzeit viele afghanische Flüchtlinge betreuen – suchen wir speziell für Teile dieser Flüchtlinge TrainerInnen für Alphabetisierungskurse.

 

Flüchtlingshilfe Iran e.V. 2010

 sucht dringend…

  • Ehrenamtl. TrainerInnen für Alphabetisierungskurse

Die Schulungen werden im Bereich Berlin, Tempelhof-Schöneberg, stattfinden. Praktisch wäre es daher, Menschen aus diesem Bezirk zu finden. Natürlich kann auch jeder andere helfen. Wir möchten nur lange Anfahrten vermeiden.

Interessierte wenden sich bitte an:

Flüchtlingshilfe Iran e.V. 2010

Telefon: 030/2236 1830 – Email: sprachkurse@fluechtlingshilfe-iran.de

Frankfurt| Uraufführung: Goethes „Hegire“ – gesungen in persischer Sprache

Zum Abschluss der Ausstellung „Goethes Hidschra. Reisen in den Orient. Reisen in Texte“ findet am Freitag (11. Juli) um 18 Uhr in der Rotunde des IG-Farben-Hauses ein ungewöhnliches persisches Konzert statt: Auf dem Programm der öffentlichen Finissage steht die Uraufführung von Goethes ‚Hegire’, gesungen in persischer Sprache und begleitet von persischen Instrumenten.

Außerdem hält Dr. Saeid Edalatnejad, der in Teheran lehrt und auch Fellow am Wissenschaftskolleg in Berlin war, einen Vortrag über Dialogformen auf dem Gebiet der Enzyklopädie: „The Dialogue between West and East: The Phenomenon of Enzyclopaedia“. Dabei geht es um die Systematisierung des Wissens über islamische Kulturen und die Besonderheiten der neuen Enzyklopädie über den schiitischen Islam und iranische Studien, die in Teheran derzeit erarbeitet wird.

Das persische Orchester ‚Saba’ tritt unter der Leitung von Firouz Mizani auf; außerdem wirken mit: Mahyar Bahrami (Tombak – Trommel), Sadegh Naee (Ney – Flöte aus Bambus), Farhad Anusch (Oud – Laute und Gesang), Aref Ebrahimpour (Kamanche – Kniegeige), Farhad Danai (Santur – eine Art Zither). Neben Goethes „Hegire“ sind auch Werke der persischen Dichtkunst und Mystik zu hören. Die Hamburger Musiker werden zudem ihre Instrumente vorstellen und einige Erklärungen zu den Besonderheiten der Vertonungen und der Aufführungspraxis geben.

Goethe schrieb das Gedicht „Hegire“ 1814, also genau vor zweihundert Jahren. Er wählte die französische Übersetzung des arabischen Wortes „Hidschra“, das auf die Auswanderung des Propheten Muhammads von Mekka nach Medina weist, zur Eröffnung für seinen West-östlichen Divan. Goethe eignete sich den Orient durch Texte, Dichtung, aber auch kalligrafische Übungen an. Das Projekt „Goethes Hidschra“ unter Leitung der Frankfurter Religionswissenschaftlerin Prof. Dr. Catherina Wenzel stellt Goethes Beschäftigung mit den Religionen und das interkulturelle Potenzial des Divans zum „Doppeljubiläum“ von Hegire (1814) und Gründung der Goethe-Universität (1914) in den Mittelpunkt.

Die Schriftkunstausstellung, die zunächst im Frankfurter Goethe-Haus und seit dem 22. Juni in der Rotunde auf dem Campus Westend zu sehen ist, zeigt sowohl die schriftkünstlerische Auseinandersetzung der Gruppe „lettera“ mit Texten von Goethe und Hafis als auch Arbeiten des iranischen Kalligrafen Jamshid Sharabi zur persischen Übersetzung von Goethes „Hegire“. Die Übersetzung, die auch als Grundlage für die Uraufführung am Freitag verwandt wird, stammt von Dr. Hossein Khadjeh Zadeh, der auch am Freitag anwesend ist. Er studierte in Teheran und Deutschland, lehrt gegenwärtig in Deutschland und hat sich als Übersetzer von deutscher Literatur und Dichtung ins Persische einen Namen gemacht.

Auch diese Veranstaltung wurde in Kooperation mit der Professur für Religionswissenschaften der Goethe-Universität und dem Projekt „Kunst baut Brücken – Morgenland trifft Abendland“ konzipiert und organisiert. Zu dem gesamten Veranstaltungszyklus „Goethes Hidschra“ gehören neben der Ausstellung und mit ihrem Rahmenprogramm auch Seminare und Vorlesungen: So hielt im letzten Wintersemester die Literaturwissenschaftlerin und Direktorin des Frankfurter Goethe-Hauses, Prof. Dr. Anne Bohnenkamp-Renken ein Seminar zu Goethes „West-östlicher Divan“; Prof. Dr. Catherina Wenzel eine Vorlesung zu „Christlich-islamische Begegnungen in Europa, Konflikte, Apologetik, Dialoge“. In diesem Sommersemester haben Prof. Dr. Fateme Rahmati, Zentrum für Islamische Studien, und Prof. Dr. Catherina Wenzel gemeinsam ein Seminar zu „Goethes Beschäftigung mit dem Islam und der Religion Zarathustras“ angeboten.

Die Ausstellung und die Veranstaltungsreihe werden überwiegend finanziert aus den zentralen Mitteln für das Universitätsjubiläum, weitere Sponsoren und Kooperationspartner sind die Kulturabteilung der iranischen Botschaft in Deutschland, die Hafis-Gesellschaft Verein für Kulturdialog, das Frankfurter Goethe-Haus und die Freunde und Förderer der Universität.

Informationen: Prof. Dr. Catherina Wenzel, Professur für Religionswissenschaften, Fachbereich Evangelische Theologie, Campus Westend, ca.wenzel@em.uni-frankfurt.de, (069) 798-32755

Quelle: idw

Wiener Kurdenmorde erschütterten Österreich: 25 Jahre nach der Tat – Ahmadinejad beteiligt

Die Wiener Kurdenmorde erschütterten vor 25 Jahren ÖsterreichDie Wiener Kurdenmorde erschütterten vor 25 Jahren Österreich - © APA (Archiv)
Am 13. Juli 1989 wurden in einer Wiener Privatwohnung der Chef der Kurdischen Demokratischen Partei/Iran, Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, sein Stellvertreter Abdullah Ghaderi-Azar und der in Österreich eingebürgerte Kurde Fadel Rasoul bei einem Geheimtreffen mit Emissären der Teheraner Führung ermordet.

Die Tatverdächtigen tauchten in der iranischen Botschaft unter und konnten nach Interventionen der iranischen Regierung unbehelligt ausreisen; einer von ihnen wurde sogar unter Polizeischutz zum Schwechater Flughafen geleitet.

Wiener Kurdenmorde vor 25 Jahren

Nach Darstellung des grünen Parlamentariers Peter Pilz, der sich jahrelang mit dem Fall beschäftigte, saß zumindest ein Akteur von damals in höchster Position: Der frühere iranische Präsident Mahmoud Ahmadinejad höchstpersönlich sei “dringend verdächtig”, an der Ermordung der drei Kurdenführer in Wien beteiligt gewesen zu sein. Möglicherweise habe er selbst geschossen, dies lasse sich allerdings nicht mehr eindeutig eruieren.

Laut Aussage eines deutschen Waffenhändlers aus dem Jahr 2006, so Pilz, habe es in der ersten Juliwoche 1989 ein Treffen in der iranischen Botschaft gegeben. Bei diesem Treffen sei auch ein “gewisser Mohammad”, welcher “später Präsident der iranischen Republik wurde”, anwesend gewesen. Zweck dieses Treffens seien laut Protokoll illegale Waffenlieferungen gewesen.

Erschütterung in Österreich

In Österreich war die Empörung über die Morde groß. Der damalige Außenminister Alois Mock (V) sprach im Zusammenhang mit den Tötungen von einer “Schweinerei”, am Ballhausplatz war von “erpresserischen Methoden der Iraner” die Rede. Der damalige Chef der Politischen Sektion des Außenamts, Botschafter Erich Maximilian Schmid, sagte im April 1997 nach seiner Pensionierung in einem TV-Interview, der iranische Botschafter habe “mit ziemlicher Klarheit” zu verstehen gegeben, dass “es gefährlich werden könnte für die Österreicher im Iran”, sollten die Tatverdächtigen in Österreich vor Gericht gestellt werden. Über die iranischen Drohungen war nach Angaben Mocks auch der damalige Außenamts-Generalsekretär und spätere Bundespräsident Thomas Klestil informiert.

Druckmittel gegen Österreich

Am 30. November 1989 sagte Innenminister Franz Löschnak (S) nach einem Treffen mit dem Chef der Terrorbekämpfungsabteilung im US-Außenamt, Morris Busby, dass Haftbefehle gegen die Tatverdächtigen erlassen worden seien. Allerdings hatte der Generaldirektor für die Öffentliche Sicherheit, Robert Danzinger, am Vortag per Weisung die Überwachung der iranischen Botschaft “reduzieren” lassen.

Im August 1991 erklärte der in Frankreich im Exil lebende Ex-Präsident Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, Teheran besitze ein Druckmittel gegen Österreich, nämlich die Unterlagen über die illegalen österreichischen Waffenlieferungen im irakisch-iranischen Golfkrieg. In der Noricum-Affäre war eine Woche vor dem Attentat eine Voruntersuchung gegen die SPÖ-Politiker Altbundeskanzler Fred Sinowatz, Ex-Außenminister Leopold Gratz und Ex-Innenminister Karl Blecha eingeleitet worden.

Das “Mykonos”-Urteil

Am 17. August 1992 wurde Ghassemlous Nachfolger Sadegh Charafkandi nach einer Tagung der Sozialistischen Internationale (SI) mit drei Mitarbeitern im Restaurant “Mykonos” in Berlin ermordet, der Lokalbesitzer lebensgefährlich verletzt. Charafkandi hätte am darauffolgenden Tag nach Wien kommen sollen. Österreichische Beamte sagten im deutschen “Mykonos”-Prozess aus, dass sich der Iran für die mutmaßlichen Attentäter von Wien eingesetzt hatte. Die deutsche Justiz warf dem Iran Staatsterrorismus vor. Nach ihren Erkenntnissen wurden auch die Wiener Morde von der obersten iranischen Führung angeordnet. Das “Mykonos”-Urteil veranlasste die EU-Staaten, ihre Botschafter 1997 vorübergehend aus Teheran abzuziehen.

Rede von “bösen, brutalen Verbrechen”

Im November 1992 wurde die Amtshaftungsklage der Ghassemlou-Witwe in Wien in dritter Instanz abgewiesen; die Republik Österreich bescheinigte ihren Organen, dass es “keinerlei schuldhaftes und rechtswidriges Verhalten” gegeben habe. Grüne und Liberale scheiterten 1997 mit ihrer Forderung nach einem parlamentarischen Untersuchungsausschuss zur Aufklärung möglicher Vertuschungsversuche am Widerstand der Koalitionsparteien SPÖ und ÖVP.

Von einem “bösen, brutalen und vorbereiteten Verbrechen” sprach der damalige Nationalratspräsident und heutige Bundespräsident Heinz Fischer bei einer Gedenkfeier zu Ehren von Ghassemlou. Es sei “bitter und traurig”, dass die Aufklärung im Einzelnen und die Bestrafung der Täter nicht zustande gekommen seien.

 

Hintergrund zu dem Opfer:

QĀSEMLU, ʿABD-AL-RAḤMĀN

Qāsemlu became interested in politics in the early 1940s, when the Allied forces invaded Iran and the nascent Kurdish nationalist movement was revived during the occupation of the two Azerbaijan provinces by the Soviet forces.

QĀSEMLU (Ghassemlou), ʿABD-AL-RAḤMĀN (b. Urmia, 22 December 1930; d. Vienna, 13 July 1989; Figure 1), Kurdish political leader, who as secretary general of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), led the Kurdish nationalist struggle for autonomy and democracy in Iran. (The original name of the party was Kurdish Democratic Party [KDP]. The word “Iran” was added to the title in parentheses during the party’s third congress in 1973.)

Early life. Qāsemlu’s father, Moḥammad Qāsemlu, was a well-known Kurdish nationalist feudal lord from the Šekāk tribe. At the end of the 19th century, the shah gave him the title of Woṯuq-e divān (Krulich, p. 21). Qāsemlu’s mother, the third wife, was a Christian Assyrian converted to Islam. ʿAbd-al-Raḥmān Qāsemlu received his early education in Urmia, and by the time he was a teenager, he could speak several languages, including Sorani Kurdish, Persian, Azeri Turkish, Arabic, and Assyrian (Randal, 1986, apud, Prunhuber, pp. 141, 143). Later on he would learn French, Russian, Czech, and English.

Qāsemlu became interested in politics in the early 1940s, when the Allied forces invaded Iran and the nascent Kurdish nationalist movement was revived during the occupation of the two Azerbaijan provinces by the Soviet forces.

The Kurdistan Democratic Party was founded on 16 August 1945 by Qāżi Moḥammed (1893-1947; Eagleton, pp. 62-63; Roosevelt, pp. 245-55, 260-63) and attracted many young people to its ranks. On 22 January 1946, the short-lived Republic of Mahabad was publicly announced (Roosevelt, p. 257; Ghassemlou, pp. 118-22) with Qāżi Moḥammed as president. But the Soviet troops retreated from northwestern Iran in the fall of 1946, leaving him without military and economic aid. Border conflicts with neighboring Azerbaijan and growing internal dissension further weakened the republic (van Bruinessen, p. 176). In December, the Iranian army regained the region, and the Republic of Mahabad fell (Roosevelt, pp. 266-67). When the repression against the Kurds intensified following the fall of the republic, Qāsemlu was sent to Tehran to finish school. In 1947, Qāsemlu left for France.

Student in Europe. After an assassination attempt against Moḥammad-Reżā Shah in 1949 at the University of Tehran, Iranian students in Paris organized a demonstration against the shah. Qāsemlu gave a speech at the event. The Iranian embassy put him under surveillance. His father was not allowed to send him any more funding, so Qāsemlu, through his contacts with the International Students Union, which was controlled by the communists, received a scholarship to study in Czechoslovakia (Randal, 1986, apud Prunhuber, p. 167; Krulich, p. 27).

In 1949 Qāsemlu entered the School of Political and Economic Science of Prague. It was the beginning of the Cold War, and the Stalinist regime was now gripping the country. As a young student and dogmatic Marxist-Leninist, Qāsemlu considered himself a Stalinist. He was elected president of the student union and participated in youth festivals in the International Congress of Students of Prague in 1950, and later in Berlin in 1951 (Randal, 1986, apud Prunhuber, pp. 167-68). He also met Helene Krulich, whom he would marry in 1952. They had two daughters Mina (1953) and Hiva (1955).

Political life. Qāsemlu returned to Iran in 1952 when he graduated from the School of Economics and Political Science (Krulich, p. 27). He started his clandestine political activities in the country by revitalizing the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (KDP), which was then an appendage of the Tudeh party (McDowall, pp. 249-50). According to Qāsemlu (pp. 128-29), the Tudeh communists would neither support nor defend the aspirations of the Kurdish nationalist party in Iran. After the collapse of the Republic of Mahabad, the party’s organization was in such disorder that the KDP “became reliant upon its relationship with the Tudeh Party” (Ahmadzadeh and Stansfield, p. 15). In 1955, the KDP cut organizational ties with the Tudeh.

In 1959, Qāsemlu stayed to Iraq for a year. Back in Prague, he completed his doctorate in economics and political science in 1962. He also taught the theory of economic growth and long-term planning at the School of Economics at the University of Prague (Randal, 1986, apud Prunhuber, p. 179). He publishedKurdistan and the Kurds in Slovak, depicting the Kurdish world from a Marxist-Leninist perspective. The book was later translated into four languages.

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, which led to purges, witch-hunts, and sentences, ended Qāsemlu’s identification with communism and led him towards social democracy (Prunhuber, pp. 94-95, 158-59. He returned to Iraq in 1970, where he worked as an advisor to the Ministry of Economic Planning (Chris Kutschera, in Prunhuber, p. 181). In 1973 he was elected secretary general of the KDP (Iran), a position he held until his assassination in 1989 (McDowell, p. 254).  During his leadership, he initiated the modernization of the party, drafted a new political program, and established its core political concept: “democracy for Iran, autonomy for Kurdistan” (Ghassemlou, p. 132).

Qāsemlu and the Kurdish problem in Iraq. Qāsemlu followed closely the politics of the Iraqi Kurds (Korn, 1994; Kissinger, pp. 576-92). Following negotiations over Kurdish autonomy, the Iraqi Kurds and Ṣaddām Ḥosayn signed their first agreement on 11 March 1970. Talks continued for another four years with no agreement on the situation in Kirkuk and other oil-producing areas (McDowall, pp. 327-35). Qāsemlu, whose presence had been requested by the Iraqi authorities, attended the last meeting between the Kurdish delegation, headed by Edris Bārzāni, and the state representatives (Randal, 1986, apud Prunhuber, p. 184).

Qāsemlu left Iraq and returned to Prague in 1974. Two years later he was deported from Czechoslovakia, presumably due to the Tudeh party interference. In 1968, at an unscheduled meeting of the party, Qāsemlu had not approved the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia; moreover, the party disapproved of Qāsemlu’s views regarding the Kurdish issue (personal communication with Krulich, February 2012). In 1976 he left Czechoslovakia to reside in Paris, where he worked as an assistant professor of Kurdish at the School of Oriental Languages (Blau, 1991, apud Prunhuber, p. 187). While in Paris, he developed relationships with politicians and journalists, which augmented public interest on the Kurdish question.

Qāsemlu returned to Iran in 1978 as the revolution unfolded. He went to visit Ayatollah Ḵomeyni in Neauphle-le-Château, but the Ayatollah did not receive him (Hélène Krulich-Qāsemlu, in Prunhuber, p. 36). He, however, supported Ayatollah Ḵomeyni, because he believed that the Ayatollah, the symbol of opposition, would eventually overthrow the shah (Randal, 1986, apud, Prunhuber, p. 36). In Iran, he surreptitiously began to rejuvenate the debilitated party, many members of which were in prison, exiled, or had been executed. He set the ideological and practical foundation of the party, created secret committees, updated the cadres, and incorporated younger activist members (Šarafkandi, apud Prunhuber, p. 40).

In March 1979, the KDP (Iran) officially announced the resumption of its political activities, putting an end to thirty years of clandestine functions. At the end of that month, Qāsemlu held his first political meeting in Mahabad. During this first celebratory political demonstration of the KDP (Iran), Qāsemlu “declared that his party was ready to cooperate with the new regime if the rights of the Kurds were guaranteed” (Ahmadzadeh and Stansfield, p. 17). He announced the political agenda of the KDP (Iran) and asked the Tehran government to accept the Kurds’ autonomy demands, thus emerging as the political leader of the Kurds.

During the turbulent early 1979, Qāsemlu was building the armed resistance of thepešmergas (Kurdish fighters; lit. “those who face death”) and, at the same time, working to reach an agreement with the central government. Although he was meeting with the authorities from Tehran and also went to visit Ayatollah Ḵomeyni twice, he considered that the government was biding time (Randal, 1986, apud, Prunhuber, p. 63). He publicly declared that the Kurds would support the government as long as it clearly promoted democracy for Iran and autonomy for Kurdistan (Shams, p. 175).

After his first meeting with Ḵomeyni, it was clear to Qāsemlu that the Ayatollah had no intention of respecting the Kurds’ demands (Randal, 1986, apud, Prunhuber, pp. 62-63). Elections for the Assembly of Experts (Majles-e ḵobragān) were held on 3 August 1979 with the goal of drafting a new constitution for the Islamic Republic. The Kurds participated in this election, and Qāsemlu was elected with more than 80 percent of the votes as the representative of the city of Urmia. He was one of two secular politicians elected to the Assembly who did not belong to an Islamic current (Moin, p. 219). For Qāsemlu it was imperative to attend the Assembly sessions in order to oppose the clerical monopolization of power that was certain to thwart the liberties of the Iranians (Randal, 1986, apud, Prunhuber, p. 73).

A few days prior to the opening session of the Assembly of Experts, armed Kurds defeated the regime’s troops in Kurdistan. Ḵomeyni threatened to punish “in a truly revolutionary way the incompetent and corrupt government forces” (Le Monde, 1 July 1979), if they did not crush the Kurdish revolt. Qāsemlu did not attend the opening session of the Assembly of Experts, during which Ḵomeyni publicly condemned Qāsemlu (Schriazi, p. 32) and banned the KDP (Iran) as “the party of Satan, corrupt and the agent of foreigners” (McDowall, p. 272).

Towards the end of the summer of 1979, the pešmergas controlled a part of Kurdistan. Qāsemlu’s goal was “to achieve some kind of tolerance and a national equilibrium that would permit a strengthening of the Iranian state.” He was convinced that autonomy could be negotiated, because the Kurds already had created an autonomous zone. He thought this was the moment for dialogue “for the peaceful resolution of the Kurdish issue” (Kravetz, in Prunhuber, p. 75). Several delegations of the KDP (Iran) met with Iranian authorities, trying to avoid armed conflict, but the regime launched a fierce offensive and, by the end of August, almost all the Kurdish cities held by the rebels were controlled by the government forces. Qāsemlu led the resistance in very harsh conditions from the mountains. After what is known as “Three-Month War,” Qāsemlu returned to Mahabad on 20 October 1979 and declared that the revolt would continue as a guerrilla campaign (Ghareeb, p. 19)

By December, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards had strengthened their military presence and retaken Kurdistan, while the pešmergas of the KDPI—the official name became the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran In early 1980—withdrew even further into the mountains. Between 1981 and 1982, the Kurds controlled a major portion of Iranian Kurdistan, excluding the towns. The military and political situations were propitious to them, as the KDPI had become a strong organization with clear objectives. Qāsemlu established a military administrative structure within the region. Eventually the KDPI settled in Kurdish territory on the Iraqi side of the border, where they have remained since 1984 (Prunhuber, p. 89).

Relations with the Iraqi regime. Although he had a close relationship with the Iraqi government, Qāsemlu always maintained his independence. Trapped by the geopolitical situation of Kurdistan, he lived and worked in Iraq off and on, while maintaining contact with the Iraqi regime. Yet he never collaborated militarily with Baghdad against Iran during the Iraq-Iran War (Ṭālabāni, in Prunhuber, p. 245; McDowall, pp. 273-74).

When the Iraq-Iran War (see IRAQ vii. IRAN-IRAQ WAR) began in 1980, the Iraqi government invited Qāsemlu to declare the formation of a Kurdish state in Iran and offered him money and weapons. Even the budget for the future Kurdish government would be provided by the Iraqis, who would officially recognize it. However, Qāsemlu responded that what he wanted was democracy and autonomy within the Iranian state (Ṭālabāni, in Prunhuber, p. 245). He was in a difficult position regarding Iraq. In private, he spoke about the horrors of the Iraqi regime, yet publicly he was obliged to be discreet. Nonetheless, he openly criticized the chemical bombings of the Kurds by the Iraqi regime in an interview with an Arab magazine (Hassanzadeh, in Prunhuber, p. 39).

Political vision. Even though he led an armed struggle against the Iranian regime, his party opposed popular terrorist methods (Actualités du Kurdistan, 1988, p. 5). Qāsemlu believed in equality between men and women and tried to have women’s rights implemented within the Kurdish community. This included putting an end to polygamy among party members and integrating women into the party ranks. For the first time within Kurdish society in Iran, women joined the KDPI on their own and as individuals equal to men (interview with Maryam Alipour, KDPI activist, KDPI Tishk TV [Paris], 6 July 2010).

Unity among the Kurds was of prime importance for Qāsemlu, and he was tormented to see the division among the Kurds, which often turned into violence among conflicting parties. He worked to put an end to the in-fighting among the Kurds. Komala (the Revolutionary Organization of the Toilers of Kurdistan of Iran) considered the KDPI as its main enemy in its class struggle and accused them of “collaborating with feudal elements” (van Bruinessen, p. 18) and “resented the KDPI’s presumption as representative of the Kurdish people” (McDowall, p. 265). The KDPI suffered several internal divisions (Ahmadzadeh and Stansfield, p. 15; McDowall, pp. 273, 275-76). In 1988, members of a socialist, doctrinaire faction within the party accused Qāsemlu of “turning the KDPI from socialism to social democracy” and rejected his reasoning for dialogue with the regime. This faction left the party and “attracted a substantial following of KDPI leftists and others who resented what they considered Qāsemlu’s undemocratic methods” (McDowall, p. 276). Following Qāsemlu’s death, there was another schism in the KDPI, further weakening the Kurdish cause in Iran.

Qāsemlu considered the Kurds’ desire for full independence unrealistic. His plan was pragmatic; he would consent to a federal union if the rest of the minorities wanted it. But he remained adamant about local autonomy. Recorded on tapes found by the Austrian police during his discussion with the Iranian emissaries in Vienna prior to his murder, Qāsemlu clearly stated that there were only three solutions to the national problem: independence, federalism, and autonomy (Actualités du Kurdistan, pp. 3-4).

During his ten years of leadership in the Kurdish movement following the Iranian revolution, he mainly resorted to peaceful dialogue and was mindful of the fact that the Kurdish problem in Iran cannot be exclusively resolved through military actions (Institut Kurde de Paris, pp. 11-12). In 1988, when the war between Iran and Iraq was over, Qāsemlu feared that both governments would agree to crush the Kurdish rebellions in their respective countries, as had happened in 1975 following the Algiers Agreements (Actualités du Kurdistan, p. 2). Therefore, he thought that the time was ripe for sitting down and negotiating (Gueyras, Le Monde, 6 June 1989; McDowall, p. 276)

Murder in Vienna. Through Jalāl Ṭālabāni (Iraqi Kurdish leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan [PUK]), Tehran proposed a dialogue with the KDPI. The party accepted it, and Qāsemlu traveled to Vienna to meet the Iranian representatives in December 1988 and January 1989. Ṭālabāni organized the meetings with extreme security measures. The meetings were supposed to continue in March, but the Iranians interrupted the negotiations with the excuse of Ḵomeyni’s sickness and the opposition of hardliners against these talks. They also sidelined Ṭālabāni from any future meetings, alleging that his men had broken confidentiality and spoken about the gatherings (Ṭālabāni, in Prunhuber, pp. 217-22).

According to Abu’l-Ḥasan Bani Ṣadr (in Prunhuber, p. 286), this was part of the Iranian plan to plot Qāsemlu’s murder. The first set of meetings with the Iranians was to create confidence in Qāsemlu about the negotiations (Bani Ṣadr, in Prunhuber, pp. 285-86). Once Ṭālabāni was sidelined, the Iranians found a dispensable intermediary in Fāżel Rasul, an Iraqi Kurdish intellectual with connections to the Iranian regime (Ṭālabāni, in Prunhuber, p. 204). Rasul contacted Qāsemlu and invited him to meet once more with the Iranian delegation in Vienna in July. Qāsemlu accepted and did not inform the party, which no longer believed in the negotiations (Prunhuber, pp. 8, 16, 221). He mistakenly believed that Iran, weakened by eight years of war with Iraq, needed to resolve the Kurdish problem after Ḵomeyni (Ben Bella, in Prunhuber, p. 210; McDowall, p. 276) and that Akbar Hāšemi Rafsanjāni, speaker of the Majlis and candidate for the Iranian presidency, was pragmatic enough to wish to resolve the Kurdish issue (IHRDC, 2008, p. 26).

Qāsemlu and Abdullah Gadheri-Azar KDPI’s representative in Europe, attended the first meeting in an apartment in Vienna on 12 July 1989 with Fāżel Rasul. Qāsemlu did not take any security measures. Iran’s emissaries were Moḥammed-Jaʿfar Ṣaḥrārudi, head of the Kurdish affairs section of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence, Ḥāji Moṣṭafawi, head of the secret service for West Azerbaijan Province (Kurdistan), and Amir Manṣur Bozorgiān, bodyguard and agent of the Iranian secret police (Institut Kurde de Paris, p. 2)

On 13 July, during a second meeting with the Iranians, Qāsemlu, Ghaderi-Azar, and Rasul were mortally shot and Ṣaḥrārudi was hit in the arm by a stray bullet. Moṣṭafawi disappeared. Ṣaḥrārudi and Bozorgiān were detained by the Austrian police. Oswald Kessler, head of the Austrian Special Anti-Terrorism Unit said, “We’ve got dead Kurds and surviving Iranians. The matter is clear. The rest will be politics” (Danninger; IHRDC, 2008, p. 28).

Bozorgiān was released from police custody and allowed to return to the Iranian embassy. Ṣaḥrārudi was released from the hospital and escorted by the Austrian police to the airport to leave the country. Three months later, in November 1989, the Austrian public prosecutor issued arrest warrants for the three men. Ṣaḥrārudi was later promoted to the rank of Brigadier General in the Revolutionary Guards and became the head of the Qods Forces Intelligence Directory (IHRDC, 2008, p. 28)

The release of the only witnesses angered the Austrian public and media. The Austrian daily Arbeiter Zeitung, responding to a Foreign Ministry official’s remark that Iran had threatened reprisals if its nationals were taken into custody, wrote: “This kowtowing to Iran will protect Austria for a while from the mullahs’ wrath. But it’s an invitation saying, ‘Austria’s pretty; come here to kill’” (Randal, 1989).

In 1991, Qāsemlu’s widow, Helene Krülich, initiated legal proceedings against the Austrian state for not pursuing an investigation of the murder, releasing the assassins, and allowing them to leave the country. In 1992, the Austrian high court dismissed the case (IHRDC, 2008, p. 29).

Qāsemlu and Ghaderi-Azar were buried in Paris at the Père Lachaise cemetery. With Qāsemlu’s death, the Iranian Kurdish movement suffered a severe blow, which impacted the progress for an autonomous Kurdish nation.

 

Bibliography:

Hashem Ahmadzadeh and Gareth Stansfield, “The Political, Cultural, and Military Re-Awakening of the Kurdish Nationalist Movement in Iran,” The Middle East Journal 64/1, 2010, pp. 11-27.

Martin van Bruinessen, “The Kurds between Iran and Iraq,” Middle East Report, July-August 1986, pp. 14-27.

Idem, “A Kurdish State,” in Susan Meiselas, Kurdistan: In the Shadow of History, New York, 1997.

Sissy Danninger, “Dr. Qāsemlu, Twenty Years after the Assassination in Vienna: A Tale about the Power of Cowardice and the Weakness of Media Power,” paper presented at international symposium, “Homage to Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou,” Paris, 17 July 2009; online at KurdishMedia.com (http://www.kurdmedia.com/article.aspx?id=15870; accessed 24 October 2011).

William Eagleton Jr., The Kurdish Republic of 1946, London, 1963.

C. J. Edmonds, “Kurdish Nationalism,” Journal of Contemporary History 6/1, 1971, pp. 87-107.

Edmund Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question in Iraq, Syracuse, N.Y. 1981.

Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, Kurdistan and the Kurds, Prague, 1965.

Idem, “Kurdistan in Iran,” in Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou and Gerard Chaliand, eds.,People without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan, London, 1980.

Jean Gueyras, “La mort de Khomeiny et le problème kurde en Iran,” Le Monde, Paris, 15 June 1989.

Fred Halliday, “Interview with KDP’s Qassemlu: The Clergy Have Confiscated the Revolution,” Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP) Middle East Report no. 98, July-August 1981.

Abdullah Hassanzadeh, Un demi siècle de lutte pour la liberté I, PDKI, 1995 (in Kurdish).

Kak Homer, “The Mockery of the Kurdish Autonomous Region,” Kurdistan Times,no. 1, Winter 1990.

Institut Kurde de Paris, Bulletin de liaison et d’information, Special Issue, July-August 1989.

IHRDC (Iran Human Rights Documentation Center), Murder at Mykonos: Anatomy of a Political Assassination, New Haven, 2007.

Idem, No Safe Haven: Iran’s Global Assassination Campaign, New Haven, CT, 2008.

Wadie Jwadieh, The Kurdish National Movement: Its Origins and Development, Syracuse, N.Y., 2006.

KDPI (Democratic Party of Iranian Kurdistan), Fifth Congress Report, Kurdistan of Iran, 6-9 December 1981.

Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal, New York, 1999.

Farideh Koohi-Kamali, The Political Development of the Kurds in Iran: Pastoral Nationalism, New York, 2003, passim.

Hélène Krulich, Une Européenne au pays des Kurdes, Paris, 2011.

Chris Kutschera, Le mouvement national Kurde, Paris, 1979.

David A. Korn, “The Last Years of Mustafa Barzani,” Middle East Quarterly 1/2, June 1994 (consulted online at Middle East Forum, http://www.meforum.org/220/the-last-years-of-mustafa-barzani; accessed 4 January 2012).

Chris Kutschera, Le mouvement national Kurde, Paris, 1979.

David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, London, 1997.

Baqer Moin, Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah, New York, 2000.

Carol Prunhuber, The Passion and Death of Rahman the Kurd: Dreaming Kurdistan, Bloomington, 2010, containing interviews with: Abu’l-Ḥasan Bani Ṣadr 2009 (pp. 285-86); Joyce Blau, 1991; Abdullah Hassanzadeh, 2010 (pp. 39, 220); Marc Kravetz, 2010 (p. 75); Hélène Krülich-Qāsemlu, 2008 (p. 36); Chris Kutschera, 2010 (p. 181); Šarafkandi, 1991 (see Šarafkandi); Jalāl Ṭālabāni, 1991 (pp. 204, 217-22, 245).

Carol Prunhuber and Gabriel Fernandez, interview of Ahmed Ben Bella, 1991, in Carol Prunhuber, 2010, p. 210.

Jonathan Randal, interview of ʿAbd-al-Raḥmān Qāsemlu, Paris, 1986; excerpts in Carol Prunhuber, pp. 36, 62-3, 73, 141, 167-68, 180, 184.

Idem, “The Hostage Drama; Austria Said to ‘Kowtow’ to Iran in Murder Case; Reprisal Feared in Kurdish Leader’s Death,” The Washington Post, 2 August 1989.

Idem, After Such Knowledge: What Forgiveness? My Encounters with Kurdistan,New York, 1997.

Archie Roosevelt, Jr., “The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad,” Middle East Journal, no. 1, July 1947, pp. 247-69.

Sādeq Šarafkandi interview by Bernard Granjon on behalf of Carol Prunhuber at KDPI headquarters in Iraq, 1991.

Said Shams, Nationalism, Political Islam and the Kurdish Question in Iran: Reflections on the Rise and Spread of Political Islam in Iran, Saarbrücken, 2011.

Asghar Schriazi, The Constitution of Iran: Politics and the State in the Islamic Republic, London and New York, 1997.

 

 

 

Quelle: APA/ Kurier/Wikipedia/Encyclopedia Iranica

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Iran authorities unnerved as World Cup brings crowds to Tehran streets

An official ban and a defeat by Argentina in the final moments didn’t stop Iranians from celebrating.

Iranians celebrate in the streets of Tehran following Iran’s loss to Argentina in the final minutes of the match on June 21. Notwithstanding the presence of plainclothes militia and riot police, the celebrations remained peaceful. Al Jazeera America

Iran, Tehran, World Cup

Iranians cheer out of their car in traffic following the match. Al Jazeera America

Iran, Tehran, World Cup

Iranians of all ages and both genders gather in the street after the match. Al Jazeera America

Iran, Tehran, World Cup

Iranian authorities attempted to block mixed-gender cinema viewings of World Cup matches. Al Jazeera America

Iran, Tehran, World Cup

Despite the loss, Iranians were proud of their team’s performance during its second match. Al Jazeera America

Iran, Tehran, World Cup

The celebrations remained peaceful. Al Jazeera America

Iran, Tehran, World Cup

A television crew interviews a fan in Tehran. Al Jazeera America

Iran, Tehran, World Cup

Men and women in Tehran cheer at the conclusion of the match on June 21. Al Jazeera America

 

Iran may have lost to Argentina thanks to a Lionel Messi strike in the dying seconds of their World Cup match on Saturday, but that didn’t stop the Tehran street party that rattled the authorities. Large numbers of Iranians converged on the streets, dancing on overpasses, overrunning major thoroughfares, chanting and blaring music out of cars, in an outpouring of popular celebration that prompted the authorities to send plainclothes security agents on motorbikes through the crowds to disperse them. Riot police had locked down thoroughfares like Tehran’s busy Parkway intersection, but young people flooded into side streets to carry on their festivities, buoyed by the Iranian national soccer team’s strong showing against top-ranked Argentina.

Most neutral commentators concurred that the Iranian team had mounted a superb effort and had been unlucky to be denied at least a draw against the two-time World Cup champions. “This dignified loss means more to us than any win,” said one young man dancing with his friends on the street.

Despite the heavy police presence across the city, the unexpected outpouring for Team Melli — as the national soccer team is known — stayed strictly in the spirit of fun. Young peopled flew the Iranian flag from their motorbikes and chanted their thanks to individual players, but their commotion carried none of the political overtones of past public celebrations around the World Cup. Instead, most seemed content to have Team Melli project a new image of Iran to the world, that of a moderate, soccer-loving nation, progressive enough to have an endangered species, the Asian cheetah, on its team uniform. “The national team and their fans can both improve Iran’s reputation, and if the government cooperates and doesn’t crack down, that will boost people’s sense of hope,” said Ali, a 28-year-old event manager. “Iranians are more depressed today than any other time, so a little bit of happiness can make it better.”

It’s precisely that prospect of hopefulness, though, that some say led the Iranian regime to deliberately stanch public excitement in advance of the World Cup. Security authorities took the unprecedented step of banning the broadcast of matches in public cinemas and cafés, effectively barring Iranians from experiencing the matches as collective events.

In 2010 authorities had allowed crowds of men and women to watch the World Cup in cinemas across the country, just months after the country’s Green movement uprising. At that delicate time, some Iranian players wore green armbands on the field to show solidarity with protesters, and young people chanted political slogans in those packed cinemas in support of jailed opposition leaders.

But today, with the national mood one of malaise and little prospect of political unrest, the banning of public screenings seems to reflect Iranian hard-liners’ determination to undermine the government of President Hassan Rouhani. “The security forces are trying to disillusion the pro-Rouhani electorate,” said one political analyst who asked to remain anonymous because of his strong political connections inside Iran. “It makes it seem as though nothing has changed under him, that basic things like watching football are being rolled back.”

Slide show: Watching the World Cup in Tehran

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Culture| An Iranian dissident returns home

Popular filmmaker Mohammad Rasoulof has returned to Tehran from exile. In an exclusive interview, he explains why.

by 

Iranian director Mohammad Rasoulof

Iranian director Mohammad Rasoulof shows his green scarf — a sign of support for the country’s opposition movement — in 2009.

Rafa Rivas / AFP / Getty Images

TEHRAN — Friends and family warned Mohammad Rasoulof not to return to Tehran. The award-winning director still had a prison sentence looming over his head after being arrested during a shoot in 2010, charged with threatening national security and making propaganda against Iran’s Islamic state.

Rasoulof’s friend and collaborator, the renowned director of “White Balloon,” Jafar Panahi, who was arrested at the same time, is still under house arrest. Further, Rasoulof had just released his most uncompromising film to date. “Manuscripts Don’t Burn” — which won the International Federation of Film Critics Award at Cannes and is currentlyscreening at New York’s Museum of Modern Art — is an undisguised criticism of Iran’s feared security services, and Rasoulof’s most overtly political work yet. Still, he ignored the advice and came home.

He arrived in Tehran in September 2013, a month after the inauguration of President Hassan Rouhani. The police confiscated his passport, but have otherwise left him alone so far. Rouhani has promised to bring change to Iran, and although that change is moving slowly, things are certainly different from when Rasoulof lived here four years ago.

“When I was arrested, I was saying the exact same things as Mr. Rouhani is saying now. I wonder why nobody arrests him,” Rasoulof says with a laugh.

The 42-year-old filmmaker shuffles around his backyard in a washed-out black sweatshirt, dragging his plastic slippers along the ground with every step. When he sits back in his chair at his small working table, shaded by a tree, he can enjoy something close to silence. This is the only interview he has agreed to since his return, but he does not seem nervous. Here, sheltered from the frantic noise of Iran’s capital, Rasoulof has room to breathe. And that is exactly what many Iranian artists hope to get under Rouhani’s government.

“Of course, one has to be very stupid to think that after Rouhani’s election, the entire Islamic Republic will change,” Rasoulof says. “The important thing is that we can help move things slowly in the right direction.”

In 2010, Mohammad Rasoulof was arrested on the set of the movie he was working on about the Green Movement protests the year before. Along with his collaborator, Jafar Panahi, he was sentenced to six years in prison (later reduced to one) and a 20-year ban on filmmaking.

The two are among Iran’s most prominent directors, having won prizes at festivals in Cannes and Berlin. But whereas Panahi’s arrest was met with international outrage in the form of protest speeches and empty jury chairs at film festivals, Rasoulof did not receive the same collegial support. He is, in a sense, the forgotten martyr of the same struggle.

But he wanted it that way. Whereas Panahi smuggled movies out of the country while under house arrest, Rasoulof kept a low profile. In Iran, sentences for political prisoners are often not carried out immediately, but continue to hover menacingly over their heads indefinitely. So while waiting to serve his sentence, Rasoulof decided to go with his wife and daughter to Germany.

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Deutschland| KLAGE VOR DEM SOZIALGERICHT – Anleitung

Wer sich gegen Ungerechtigkeiten im Hartz IV System zur Wehr setzt, wird sicherlich in die Lage versetzt werden, vor einem Sozialgericht zu klagen. Die Chancen stehen hierbei nicht schlecht: Laut Auswertungen der Sozial-, und Landessozialgerichte bekommen Kläger in sog. Hartz IV Verfahren in 50 Prozent der eingereichten Klagen volles oder teilweises Recht zu gesprochen. Dieser Ratgeber zeigt Schritt für Schritt, wie eine Klage bei einem Sozialgericht eingereicht wird.

Inhaltsverzeichnis

Grundlagen
Folgende Reihenfolge gilt
Anträge
Vergleich
Aufschiebende Wirkung
Beratungshilfe und Prozesskostenhilfe (PKH)

Durch den Widerspruch wird das Vorverfahren gemäß § 83 SGG eröffnet. Wird kein oder kein fristgerechter Widerspruch eingelegt, wird der Verwaltungsakt i.d.R. rechtlich bindend (§ 77 SGG). Damit wird es notwendig, erst mit einem Überprüfungsantrag nach § 44 SGB X das Verwaltungsverfahren wieder zu eröffnen (siehe “Ratgeber Überprüfungsantrag nach SGB X § 44″). Anstatt des rechtskräftig gewordenen Bescheides tritt dann der Bescheid des Überprüfungsantrages. Dies trifft in der Praxis z.B. auf die hier unter “Anträge” in Punkt 5 und 6 genannten zu.

Die Klage im 1. und 2. Rechtszug, beim Sozialgericht und Landessozialgericht, ist jeweils ohne Anwalt möglich. Nur im 3. Rechtszug, vor dem Bundessozialgericht, gibt es Anwaltszwang. Gerichtskosten entstehen für Bezieher von ALG II oder Sozialhilfe nicht (§ 183 SGG).  Lies den Rest dieses Beitrags

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