Archiv für den Tag 5. Februar 2013

Spiegel: Ahmadinedschad bei Mursi – Die Scheinehe

Von Raniah Salloum

Politiker Ahmadinedschad, Mursi (in Kairo): Küsschen links, Küsschen rechtsZur Großansicht

DPA

Politiker Ahmadinedschad, Mursi (in Kairo): Küsschen links, Küsschen rechts

Irans Präsident Ahmadinedschad und Ägyptens Präsident Mursi haben einiges gemeinsam: Beide sind Islamisten, in innenpolitische Machtkämpfe verstrickt, gelten als Antisemiten, beschimpfen gern den Westen. In Kairo zelebrieren sie nun ihre neue Freundschaft. Klingt harmonisch – ist es aber nicht.

Kairo – So herzlich wurde Irans Präsident Mahmud Ahmadinedschad wohl schon lange nicht mehr empfangen. Direkt vom Flughafen in Kairo hat ihn sein ägyptischer Kollege Präsident Mohammed Mursi abgeholt – mit kräftiger Umarmung und Kuss auf die Wangen.

Es ist ein besonderer Moment: Seit 1979 war kein iranischer Präsident mehr zu Besuch in Ägypten. In Teheran übernahmen US-kritische Religiöse das Sagen. Ägypten dagegen schloss Frieden mit Israel und pflegte ein enges Bündnis mit den USA. Kairo und Teheran stellten ihre diplomatischen Beziehungen ein. Nun soll alles anders werden, der Beginn einer neuen großen Freundschaft – so soll es zumindest aussehen.“Die iranische Regierung versucht, wo sie nur kann, sich mit den Ägyptern gut zu stellen“, sagt Mehrzad Boroujerdi, Iran-Experte und Leiter des Nahost-Programms an der amerikanischen Universität von Syracuse. Teheran versuche, einen Keil zwischen Kairo und Washington zu treiben.

Iran macht Kairo seit den Massenprotesten und dem Sturz von Husni Mubarak 2011 Avancen. Teheran bejubelte die ägyptische Revolution als Aufstand der Religiösen und sah Parallelen zur eigenen Geschichte. Mit Mursi steht nun ein Mann an der Spitze Ägyptens, der Teheran gefallen dürfte: ein Islamist, der in der Vergangenheit „Zionisten“ als „Blutsauger“ bezeichnete und sich vom Westen nichts gefallen lassen will.

Mursi und Ahmadinedschad stecken in Schwierigkeiten

Und Ägyptens Präsidenten wiederum kommt ein Flirt mit Teheran gerade recht. „Mursi will sich in der Außenpolitik von seinem Vorgänger Mubarak klar abheben“, sagt Nahost-Experte Adel Abdel Ghafar, der als Gastforscher derzeit an der Amerikanischen Universität von Kairo arbeitet. Mubaraks regelmäßiges Einknicken vor Israel und den USA kam bei der eigenen Bevölkerung nicht gut an. „Mursi will zeigen, dass seine Außenpolitik nicht von den USA diktiert wird“, sagt Abdel Ghafar.

Vollständiger Artikel

 

Prospects for Progress at New Talks

Bruce Riedel

The world’s six major powers and Iran are due to hold the fourth round of talks in Kazakhstan on February 25. What has to happen to make these talks a success—even if it just means enough to hold a fifth round?
 
            Iran would need to announce a tangible reversal of its enrichment program for the talks to be a success. But, for those who believe like Churchill that “to jaw, jaw” is always better than “to war, war,” agreeing to a fifth round of talks would be good enough.
 

How important is Iran in John Kerry’s first year as secretary of stateand why?

      Iran is certain to be a central issue on Secretary of State Kerry’s agenda. The United States is reaching the moment of truth–one way or another–on Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. Iran’s technological capacity is getting to a critical point.
      On the other hand, Kerry is likely to face a large number of burning crises when he takes office. The conflict in Syria will be a pressing one. There are serious security issues in Afghanistan and Pakistan as well. Tensions between North and South Korea could boil over. The territorial dispute between China and Japan could intensify. So Kerry’s hands will be more than full. But Iran will be high on his agenda.
What factors might encourage a meaningful deal on the nuclear issue?
            The growing impact of economic sanctions is the main factor encouraging Iran to make a deal. The Iranians are clearly hurting as sanctions are causing serious distress. But the impact of sanctions may not be a deciding factor in Tehran’s final analysis. Iran has been under U.S. sanctions for three decades. It also survived high inflation and austerity during the 1980-1988 war with Iraq. Other countries have endured sanctions for long periods as well.
            Maybe the country will suffer so badly economically that the leadership has no choice but to cry uncle. Iran’s Central Bank reported that the annual inflation rate hit 27.4 percent at the end of 2012, one of the highest official levels ever reported in Iran. And the actual rate could be three or four times higher than the official figure.
What are the obstacles to diplomacy for Iran?
            The main obstacle to diplomacy is Iran’s refusal to give up, in any meaningful way, the capacity to build a nuclear weapon. The “capacity” to build a weapon is the knowledge of how to make and assemble the disparate parts and to have all the raw material—which differs from actually building a weapon.
            The kinds of deals that would be acceptable to Washington and Jerusalem–and London, Paris and others–would include inspection regimes and safekeeping mechanisms. This monitoring would make it hard—if not impossible—for Iran to acquire the capacity to build a future weapon. Such deals would have no value for the Islamic Republic.
            The intentions of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei or those around him are unknown. The U.S. intelligence community seems to have concluded that Tehran has not made the final decision to build a bomb. And I think there is serious reason to believe that they haven’t made a final irrevocable decision.
            But my estimate is the Iranians are unlikely to give up the capacity to produce a weapon in short order because they probably believe they need one. Almost any Iranian national security advisor would probably argue that a nuclear weapons capability is the only guarantor of independence and deterrence. Clearly Iran lives in a dangerous neighborhood, surrounded by many enemies prepared to act against it. So how could Iran prevent them from taking military action? The track record of the past decade is clear. If you have nuclear weapons, you have deterrence.  Pakistan has them and, they deter India. Afghanistan and Iraq did not, and America invaded. Libya gave up its nuclear capability and was invaded.
            Arguments about whether or not Tehran is prepared to stop short of building or testing a bomb are intense and important. But the Iranians may decide that the only way to ensure their retention of that capacity is to build a bomb.
What are the obstacles to diplomacy for the United States?
            In the end, war is too costly, unpredictable and dangerous to be a practical option. And diplomacy shows no signs of imminent success.
            So the real challenge is that Kerry and Obama face their own policy trap—and the absence of other alternatives. They have said that containing a nuclear Iran is not an option—and is off the table. So if diplomacy fails, war is the only alternative. That stark choice is a mistake.
            But there is a good chance that Kerry and Obama will bail themselves out of this trap by reopening the door to containment, although they would probably call it something else.
Is there a framework of a viable deal emerging?
            The United States should make every effort to find a diplomatic solution, even if chances are slim. But I am pessimistic about a viable deal emerging. I think Iran wants to have a nuclear weapons capability, which is very understandable given events of the last decade in Iran’s part of the world. Countries that do not have a nuclear weapons capability get invaded by the United States and its allies—from Afghanistan to Iraq and Libya. Countries with the capability do not get invaded, most notably Pakistan but also North Korea.
            This strategic lesson has long been apparent to the Iranians. A nuclear weapon is the only real assurance of their independence and territorial integrity. The United States cannot escape the history of the last decade. All the well-meaning promises of statesman like John Kerry and Barack Obama are unlikely to convince the Iranians that they are better off in terms of their long-term security without a nuclear weapons capability.
Bruce Riedel, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center, was special assistant to the president and senior director for Near East and South Asian Affairs at the National Security Council during the Clinton administration.
Source: iranprimer.usip.org

 

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