Archiv für den Tag 9. Juli 2014

Pendeln zwischen Frust und Hoffnung auf ein besseres Leben

Junge Iraner haben trotz guter Ausbildung in der Heimat oftmals schlechte Jobchancen / Die Flucht ins Ausland garantiert ihnen nicht immer ein besseres Leben

Iranische Jugendliche feiern nach der Stimmabgabe bei der Präsidentschaftswahl im Juni 2013. Sie erhofften sich durch Ruhani, der Ahmadinedschad als Präsident ablöste, bessere Chancen – vergeblich.

Keine Arbeit, politische Zwänge, kaum Perspektiven: Viele Jugendliche aus dem Iran verlassen ihre Heimat – und kommen unter anderem nach Deutschland. Azadeh Oveis Gharani lebt seit vier Jahren in Worms.

Nomen est omen, besagt eine lateinische Redensart. Sie bedeutet: Der Name ist ein Zeichen. Bei der Iranerin Azadeh Oveis Gharani trifft das wohl zu: Ihr persischer Vorname „Azadeh“ bedeutet so viel wie „Freidenker“. „Meine Eltern haben für mich den passenden Namen gewählt“, bestätigt Gharani und lächelt. Die 29-Jährige hat ihre Heimat hinter sich gelassen, um sich von den politischen und wirtschaftlichen Zwängen zu befreien. Außerdem war sie neugierig auf das Leben in Europa.

Seit vier Jahren lebt die Studentin in Worms, rund 4700 Kilometer von ihrer Familie entfernt. „Ich war im Iran unzufrieden“, sagt sie. Es sei schwer, dort Arbeit zu finden. Vor allem für Frauen sei die Situation im Iran nicht gerecht. Wenn ein Arbeitgeber die Wahl zwischen einem Mann und einer Frau habe, falle die Entscheidung meist zugunsten des männlichen Bewerbers. Personaler seien davon überzeugt, dass bei weiblichen Bewerbern die Prioritäten häufig bei der Familie lägen. „Viele Frauen denken auch: ,Es ist okay, wenn ich schlechter bezahlt werde‘.“ Das sei nicht fair.

Viele studieren im Ausland

Oveis Gharani ist nur eine von vielen jungen Iranern, die ihr Glück fern von der Heimat suchen. „Ich habe Freunde, die im Ausland studiert und dort geheiratet haben oder ausgewandert sind“, sagt sie. „Es gibt aber viele, die im Iran geblieben sind. Sie sind inzwischen verheiratet und haben Kinder.“

Azadeh Oveis Gharani dagegen ist noch ungebunden. Sie wurde von ihren Eltern dazu erzogen, finanziell unabhängig zu sein und ihr eigenes Geld zu verdienen, erzählt sie. Nach dem Abitur beginnt sie ein Studium der Politikwissenschaften in Teheran. „Ich war in der Politik aktiv“, erzählt sie. So nimmt sie etwa 2009 an einer Demonstration teil, als die Menschen auf die Straße gehen, um gegen die manipulierte Präsidentschaftswahl zu protestieren. Nach eineinhalb Jahren legt sie ihr Politikstudium auf Eis – und kehrt nie wieder an die Universität dort zurück. „Es gibt viele politische Gegner im Gefängnis. Zum Teil ist es gefährlich, seine Meinung zu sagen“, erzählt sie. „Das war auch einer der Gründe, warum ich mein Politikstudium nicht beendet habe.“

Vollständiger Artikel

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Iran-Atomgespräche: Pokern, Feilschen, Drohen… | BR

Was läuft hinter verschlossenen Türen ab bei den Atomgesprächen mit dem Iran in Wien? Der BR berichtet.

Iran student protests, July 1999

Iranian Student Protests of July, 1999 (Also known as 18th of Tir and Kuye Daneshgah Disaster (Persian: فاجعه کوی دانشگاه‎) in Iran) (7–13 July)[1] were, before the 2009 Iranian election protests, the most widespread and violent public protests to occur inIran since the early years of the Iranian Revolution.[2]

The protests began on 8 July with peaceful demonstrations in Tehran against the closure of the reformist newspaper, Salam. Following the demonstrations, a student dormitory was raided by riot police that night during which a student was killed. The raid sparked six days of demonstrations and rioting throughout the country, during which at least three other people were killed and more than 200 injured.[1]

In the aftermath of these incidents, more than seventy students disappeared. In addition to an estimated 1,200–1,400 detainees, the „whereabouts and condition“ of five students named by Human Rights Watch who are believed to be detained by Islamic authorities remain unknown.[3]

Overview

The evening of the protests „about 400 plainclothes paramilitaries descended on a university dormitory, whispering into short-wave radios and wielding green sticks.“ The paramilitaries, thought to be Ansar-e-Hezbollah and possibly Basij began attacking students, kicking down doors and smashing through halls, grabbing female students by the hair and setting fire to rooms. Several students were thrown off of third story balconies „onto pavement below, their bones crushed,“ and one student paralyzed. According to students‘ accounts, uniformed police stood by and did nothing.[4] „Witnesses reported that at least one student was killed, 300 wounded, and thousands detained in the days that followed.“[5]The protests began on the eve of 9 July 1999 after a peaceful demonstration by a group of students of Tehran University against the closure of the reformist newspaper, Salam, by the press court. Salam newspaper (Persian: روزنامه سلام) was operated by the Association of Combatant Clerics, the reformist political party to which the then President,Mohammad Khatami belonged. The student groups, which at the time were considered one of the major supporters of Khatami and his reform programs, were protesting in support of Khatami against the closure of the newspaper by the judiciary, which was controlled by the hardline opponents of President Khatami.

The next day unrest began in earnest, spreading through Tehran and to other cities and continuing for almost a week, with unemployed youths joining the students. Basijis are reported to have disguised themselves as students (wearing jeans, T-shirts, and shaving their faces) and thrown bricks into shop windows to discredit the student demonstrators.[6] The five days of rioting „turned Tehran into a battlefield,“ and was „inarguably the worst mass disturbance“ the Islamic Republican system had seen in its 20-years of existence. Running street battles left downtown Tehran „gutted,“ with burned-out buses, and smashed storefronts.[7]

There were many arrests and injuries, and at least one confirmed fatal shooting, namely that of Ezzat Ebrahim-Nejad. The death of Ebrahim-Nejad was the only one acknowledged by the state-controlled Iranian television, however, major student groups and the foreign media have claimed more than 17 dead during the week of violent protests. Another student Saeed Zeinali has been disappeared after his arrest by security forces.

Major Iranian cities such as Tabriz, Mashhad, Shiraz and Esfahan were scenes of violent and widespread demonstrations as well. The protests continued at Tabriz University on 11 July 1999 (20th of Tir) and police and hardliners responded similarly in Tabriz universities and schools, entering the universities and brutally attacked students. Four students died in the unrest and many were beaten while in custody.[8]

According to the Economist magazine, the demonstrations „took a more violent turn on 13 July, when some of the students, deeply dissatisfied with the official response, tried to storm the Ministry of the Interior, the perceived seat of their troubles.“[9] On July 13 President Khatami issued a statement „disowning“ the demonstrators, stating that continued defiance of the ban on demonstrations was „an attack on the foundations of the régime.“[10]

The next day, 14 July, „Tens of thousands of supporters“ of Supreme Leader Khamenei rallied in Tehran in a demonstration called by the Organization for Islamic Propagation (Keesing’s July 1999). „Reports characterize the demonstration as the régime’s counterattack, claiming that the demonstrators include tens of thousands government employees who have been brought to Tehran by bus.“[11]

Student Protest: July 1999

The Iranian student protest that took place on July 1999, demonstrate the struggle for basic freedoms during Iran’s path toward democratization. The underlying cause of the protest was the desire to possess freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and association with society.

Election of 1997

The presidential election of Mohammad Khatami on 23 May 1997 is symbolic of Iran’s desire for reform. The elections resulted in higher voter turnout as a result of Khatami’s liberalist views that attracted large number of youth and women specifically. In fact, “Iran’s youth…reportedly made up a large part of the 20 million who gave Khatami his victory. They were joined by large numbers of women.” The election of Khatami brought hope of economic, political and societal reform to Iranian citizens. One of the ways that Khatami appealed to woman what by stating his belief that, “women should be active in all social, political and economic activities, and said he would welcome qualified women in his cabinet if he should win the presidency. Efforts should be made to do away with male supremacy”. By holding such liberal ideas, Khatami sets himself up for battle against conservative ideology within the judicial sector of the government. In addition, “the Islamic Republic in 1997 was still an oligarchy, controlled by a network of Shi’ite clerics who were disciples of Ayatollah Khomeini” and loyal followers of Islam. Therefore, the liberalistic views of Khatami did not coincide with those of the clerics. Still, it seems as if Khatami strategically attracts votes from youth and women through his liberalistic views. In fact he “distanced himself from the faltering and unpopular campaign to ‚Islamize‘ the universities, a goal of the conservative faction”. This quote indicates that Khatami noticed the dissatisfaction with the conservative’s agenda and consequently used this to his advantage. As a result the election of Khatami publicizes the Iranian citizens need for reform, especially in regards to freedoms of the press.

Government and the Press

The control of the press that the Iranian government had was a result of the “dysfunctional dualism of political and ideological institutions”. The struggle between conservative and moderate reform administration resulted in restriction the press. During this time period, Iran experienced an apparent struggle of power between reformist president Muhammad Khatami and the conservative leader of the Islamic republic, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. In efforts to decrease support for the president’s liberalization agenda, the judiciary closed down newspapers that expressed reformative views. The judiciary justified the closure of several publications on the basis of “factional issues …The hardline judiciary close[d] reformist publications, while hardline ones that commit[ed] similar violations [were] rarely punished”. The judiciary used press policies as a tool to promote conservative views. The judiciary was able to do this because press policies were vague and used to their benefit. Consequently, on 7 July 1999 the Salam daily was closed. The basis of the closure was because of a report revealing plans by the Ministry of Intelligence and Security to restrict the press. The editor of the newspaper faced “charges of spreading fabrications, disturbing public opinion, and publishing classified documents”. The judicial sector of the Iranian government had clear objectives to eradicate the spread of reformative views by closing down publications that spread truth to the public however the judiciary distorted the information to enable their control of the press. The press in Iran, within the boundaries of the established order which consist of the president and the clerics has reflected throughout history intergovernmental debates. These debates are dictated by the structure of governance in the Islamic Republic and who holds power. The press under the Islamic Republic in Iran has never been free. The basis of the Islamic Republic ipso facto was established upon the forceful closure of nearly all the existing free press, in the mid-summer of 1980. The only period that the press was free was from February through July 1980. In addition, since the establishment of the Islamic Republic, the many publications have been connected ideologically to the political sectors that exist in the regime. Still publications that are considered to be pro-reform have been endured consequences of closure. Although liberal publications face opposition by law, “they have remained resilient beneath the political undercurrents of the society, as the advocates of freedom of the press, freedom of speech, etc”. Nevertheless liberal independent publications were under the risk of extinction due to the marginalization inflicted by the Islamic Republic in Iran.

Press and the July 1999 Protest

In Iran, there has been a history of ideological and governmental conflicts that are revealed in the sphere of politics. Since the election of Khatami this issue where belief and government come into contact has become more and more apparent. The internal struggle and basic factional disputes within the state is reflected by the management of the press in general and the control of those publications that spoke on behalf of the controlled sects within the government.

The student protest of July 1999 occurred as a result of these restrictions of freedom of the press. Prior to the protest, the publisher of the Daily Saleem was “arrested, put on trial, and convicted for printing” false information. In the Daily Saleem, communication between Saeed Emami, former Deputy Minister of Intelligence of the Islamic Republic to his boss, Intelligence Ministry Chief Qorban-Ali Dorri-Najafabadi was revealed to the public. The Daily Saleem published information about governmental plans to further restrict and control freedom of the press.

In response to the closure of the newspaper, hundreds of students from Tehran University participated in a demonstration on 8 July. This demonstration has been deemed to be peaceful. The day following the demonstration, security force this included police and the Ansar-e-Hezbollah invaded student dormitories and resulted in injuries, arrest and extensive damages to the student dormitories. Following the invasion of student dormitories, intense pro-democracy demonstrations took place on 12 and 13 July. In response to the pro-democratic protest, Ali Khamenei and his conservative supporters organized a counter-demonstration rally which occurred on 14 July. Consequently, it is estimated that over 1500 student protesters were arrested. Some scholars recognize the regimes “overreaction to both its own reform counterparts and the opposition forces reveal[s], how weak and insecure the ruling conservatives are”. The reasoning behind this idea is that if the government was confident in it laws and policies, it would not demonstrate fear. In the Journal of Iranian Research and Analysis, Cyrus Bina indicates that fear is demonstrated when: “two dozen high-ranking Pasdar commanders President Khatarni an official letter of ultimatum, telling him that they have no choice except to seize power if he fails to crush the student rebellion soon…commanders, who are under direct authority of Khamenei, threatened the President that their patience is running thin and that they can no longer stand on the sideline”. The fact that the clerics and judicial sector felt the urgency to immediately stop the student’s protests is an indication of the fear they had and the amount of influence the protestors could have on Iranian society if their voices were not silenced. Therefore, it is clear that the initial student protest was prompted by the closure of the daily Saleem which occurred on 7 July. The protesters expressed strong objection to the restriction of freedom of the press by the judicial sector. The protest reflects the collective resentment of the public against the suppression of the press and restriction of basic freedoms and universal rights.

Student demands during protest

The end results that the students were expecting from the protest are reflected in the slogans that they chanted during the protest. After researching the popular slogans used during the protest, it is evident that the student had multitude of demands as a result of the six-day demonstrations in Tehran. Still, it is important that the slogans are analyzed in relation the objective of the overall protest. From all the slogans used throughout the protest there is one common theme that ties all of them together, opposition to Ali Khamenei, the „Supreme Leader“ as referenced in the slogans, his Ansar-e Hezbollah, and the state-supported terrorism. In nearly one-third of the slogans used during the protest in 1999, students demonstrated opposition to Khamenei directly. For example the slogan „Khamenei! Shame on You, Leadership Is Not for You“ is one a very daring statement and is considered one of the “boldest yet to be found in any demonstration in the last decade in Iran”. These straight forward criticisms toward Khamenei, combined with slogans against the cleric rule and the „20-year“ repression under the Islamic order, reflect the failed velayat-e faghih as a model of government in Iran.

In addition students involved in the protest revealed resentment toward the Ansar-e Hezbollah. This resentment deriving from violent intervention, disruption of political meetings, peaceful demonstrations and university lectures in support of the cleric and the supreme leader. According to Cyrus Bina, these type of „pressure groups are kept on the government’s payroll and that their violence is often coordinated with the uniformed law enforcement forces against the public”. Consequently it is evident that during this time period conservatives constantly made efforts against liberals even through infliction of violence. The Iranian student demonstrations of July 1999 reveal the desperate need for reform. From research it is evident that the protest against the closure of the Daily Saleem resulted in a 6 day protest. That was motivated by a limited group. The demonstrations of July 1999 engaged students in politics, protesting against government corruption, political repression, the clerical rule and Khamenei. In the bigger picture, the students were protesting against the system of the Islamic Republic in Iran. In the end the protest was an act upon their needs for reform that was fueled during the election on May 23, 1997 in Iran.

Aftermath

A crackdown on reformists and reform policies followed the riots.

  • A “long-negotiated compromise” that would have weakened the Council of Guardians to screening candidates for parliament and president was vetoed, giving the guardians “absolute vetting power”.
  • A “thought crime” law was passed prohibiting “any violent or peaceful act by a person or group against the regime” including speech, and punishing such criticism with stiff sentences.
  • Another law prohibited “any contact or exchange of information, interviews or collusion with foreign embassies, organization, parties or media at whatever level which could be judged harmful to Iran’s independence, national unity or the interests of the Islamic republic.”[12]

As of 31 July 2006, several students involved in the demonstration such as Manouchehr Mohammadi, Ahmad Batebi, Farokh Shafiei, Hassan Zarezadeh Ardeshir, were still in jail. Of those students, Akbar Mohammadi died during a hunger strike while protesting against his prison sentence;[13] Human Rights Watch called his death „suspicious“ and demanded an investigation.[14] Heshmat Tabarzadi, viewed by the Iranian government as one of the leaders of the protests, was arrested and spent nine years in Evin Prison, including two in solitary confinement.[15]

2009 anniversary protests

July 9, 2009 protest march inTehran.

On 9 July 2009, „18 Tir“ anniversary protests were scheduled for many cities in Iran and other cities worldwide.[16][17][18][19] Time reported that thousands marched through the central districts of Tehran to commemorate the July 1999 student protests, and to protest the June 2009 presidential election.[20]

Early on during the protest, Amnesty International reported: „At least 200 demonstrators are reported to have gathered along Enghlab Avenue, around the gates of Tehran University, only to be confronted by a large presence of anti-riot police and plain-clothed security officials, possibly including members of the notorious Basij militia, who used baton charges and tear gas to disperse them.“[21]

After dark clashes continued, and rubbish was set ablaze.[22]

„The demonstrators made a moral point. They told the government in no uncertain terms they are still there and not going away,“ said an Iranian analyst who witnessed the mayhem.[22]

The Australian reported: „The millions of Iranians who no longer dare to demonstrate have not gone away either. They are channelling their anger into a campaign of civil disobedience. Apart from shouting ‚God is great‘ from their rooftops every night, they have started writing Mr Mousavi’s name on banknotes,boycotting government banks and goods advertised on state television and turning on all their electrical appliances at the same time to try to overload the electricity grid.“[22]

References and notes

    1.  Six days that shook Iran BBC News 11 July 2000
    2. Ebadi, Shirin, Iran Awakening, by Shirin Ebadi with Azadeh Moaveni, Random House New York, 2006, p. 149
    3. „New Arrests and „Disappearances“ of Iranian Students“. Human Rights Watch. 1 February 2013. Retrieved 25 February 2013.
    4. The armed forces, (including the police force), in Iran, is not controlled by the president or his cabinet, but by the hardline faction of the Iranian political establishment, (SeePolitics of Iran).
    5. Ebadi, Iran Awakening, (2006), p. 149
    6.  Molavi, Afshin, The Soul of Iran, Norton, 2005, p. 202
    7.  Ebadi, Iran Awakening, (2006), p. 149
    8.  Molavi, The Soul of Iran, (2005), p. 203
    9.  quoting the Economist 17 July 1999
    10.  quoting Keesings July 1999 and AFP 13 July 1999)
    11.  quoting The Iran Brief 8 September 1999; JIRA November 1999
    12. Wright, Robin, The Last Great Revolution, c2000, pp. 268–72
    13. Robert Tait (1 August 2006). „Outcry after dissident dies in Iranian jail“The Guardian. Retrieved 29 December 2009.
    14.  „Iran: Imprisoned Dissident Dies in Custody; Investigate Mohammadi’s Suspicious Death“ Human Rights Watch 3 August 2006
    15.  „Dissident Iran Rises“The Wall Street Journal. 30 December 2009. Retrieved 29 December 2009.
    16.  Iran Protest Schedule (Worldwide). YekIran.com. Below the map pick July 2009, and then click on the arrows and/or scroll within the agenda tab to get to July 9, 2009 to see the full list of cities holding events that day.
  1. Jason Rezian (5 July 2009). „The significance of 18 Tir“Tehran Bureau. Retrieved 9 July 2009.
  2. David S. Morgan (8 July 2009). „Widespread Protests Anticipated in Iran“CBS News. Retrieved 9 July 2009.
  3.  „On Scene: Tehran’s Protests Surge — and the Basij Respond“Time. 9 July 2009. Retrieved 9 July 2009.
  4.  „Amnesty International Charges That Iran Used Tear Gas Against Demonstrators Marking 18 Tir Anniversary.“ (Press release). Amnesty International. 9 July 2009. Retrieved 9 July 2009.
  5. „Britain offers N-deal as Tehran burns“The Australian. 11 July 2009.

External links

Frankfurt| Uraufführung: Goethes „Hegire“ – gesungen in persischer Sprache

Zum Abschluss der Ausstellung „Goethes Hidschra. Reisen in den Orient. Reisen in Texte“ findet am Freitag (11. Juli) um 18 Uhr in der Rotunde des IG-Farben-Hauses ein ungewöhnliches persisches Konzert statt: Auf dem Programm der öffentlichen Finissage steht die Uraufführung von Goethes ‚Hegire’, gesungen in persischer Sprache und begleitet von persischen Instrumenten.

Außerdem hält Dr. Saeid Edalatnejad, der in Teheran lehrt und auch Fellow am Wissenschaftskolleg in Berlin war, einen Vortrag über Dialogformen auf dem Gebiet der Enzyklopädie: „The Dialogue between West and East: The Phenomenon of Enzyclopaedia“. Dabei geht es um die Systematisierung des Wissens über islamische Kulturen und die Besonderheiten der neuen Enzyklopädie über den schiitischen Islam und iranische Studien, die in Teheran derzeit erarbeitet wird.

Das persische Orchester ‚Saba’ tritt unter der Leitung von Firouz Mizani auf; außerdem wirken mit: Mahyar Bahrami (Tombak – Trommel), Sadegh Naee (Ney – Flöte aus Bambus), Farhad Anusch (Oud – Laute und Gesang), Aref Ebrahimpour (Kamanche – Kniegeige), Farhad Danai (Santur – eine Art Zither). Neben Goethes „Hegire“ sind auch Werke der persischen Dichtkunst und Mystik zu hören. Die Hamburger Musiker werden zudem ihre Instrumente vorstellen und einige Erklärungen zu den Besonderheiten der Vertonungen und der Aufführungspraxis geben.

Goethe schrieb das Gedicht „Hegire“ 1814, also genau vor zweihundert Jahren. Er wählte die französische Übersetzung des arabischen Wortes „Hidschra“, das auf die Auswanderung des Propheten Muhammads von Mekka nach Medina weist, zur Eröffnung für seinen West-östlichen Divan. Goethe eignete sich den Orient durch Texte, Dichtung, aber auch kalligrafische Übungen an. Das Projekt „Goethes Hidschra“ unter Leitung der Frankfurter Religionswissenschaftlerin Prof. Dr. Catherina Wenzel stellt Goethes Beschäftigung mit den Religionen und das interkulturelle Potenzial des Divans zum „Doppeljubiläum“ von Hegire (1814) und Gründung der Goethe-Universität (1914) in den Mittelpunkt.

Die Schriftkunstausstellung, die zunächst im Frankfurter Goethe-Haus und seit dem 22. Juni in der Rotunde auf dem Campus Westend zu sehen ist, zeigt sowohl die schriftkünstlerische Auseinandersetzung der Gruppe „lettera“ mit Texten von Goethe und Hafis als auch Arbeiten des iranischen Kalligrafen Jamshid Sharabi zur persischen Übersetzung von Goethes „Hegire“. Die Übersetzung, die auch als Grundlage für die Uraufführung am Freitag verwandt wird, stammt von Dr. Hossein Khadjeh Zadeh, der auch am Freitag anwesend ist. Er studierte in Teheran und Deutschland, lehrt gegenwärtig in Deutschland und hat sich als Übersetzer von deutscher Literatur und Dichtung ins Persische einen Namen gemacht.

Auch diese Veranstaltung wurde in Kooperation mit der Professur für Religionswissenschaften der Goethe-Universität und dem Projekt „Kunst baut Brücken – Morgenland trifft Abendland“ konzipiert und organisiert. Zu dem gesamten Veranstaltungszyklus „Goethes Hidschra“ gehören neben der Ausstellung und mit ihrem Rahmenprogramm auch Seminare und Vorlesungen: So hielt im letzten Wintersemester die Literaturwissenschaftlerin und Direktorin des Frankfurter Goethe-Hauses, Prof. Dr. Anne Bohnenkamp-Renken ein Seminar zu Goethes „West-östlicher Divan“; Prof. Dr. Catherina Wenzel eine Vorlesung zu „Christlich-islamische Begegnungen in Europa, Konflikte, Apologetik, Dialoge“. In diesem Sommersemester haben Prof. Dr. Fateme Rahmati, Zentrum für Islamische Studien, und Prof. Dr. Catherina Wenzel gemeinsam ein Seminar zu „Goethes Beschäftigung mit dem Islam und der Religion Zarathustras“ angeboten.

Die Ausstellung und die Veranstaltungsreihe werden überwiegend finanziert aus den zentralen Mitteln für das Universitätsjubiläum, weitere Sponsoren und Kooperationspartner sind die Kulturabteilung der iranischen Botschaft in Deutschland, die Hafis-Gesellschaft Verein für Kulturdialog, das Frankfurter Goethe-Haus und die Freunde und Förderer der Universität.

Informationen: Prof. Dr. Catherina Wenzel, Professur für Religionswissenschaften, Fachbereich Evangelische Theologie, Campus Westend, ca.wenzel@em.uni-frankfurt.de, (069) 798-32755

Quelle: idw

Iranische Erpressung der Regierung in Wien – Hintergrund der Kurden-Morde 1989 (Wien)

Der Noricum-Skandal bzw. die Noricum-Affäre ist der Sammelbegriff für illegale, später von der Justiz und einem parlamentarischen Untersuchungsausschusses untersuchte Waffenlieferungen des österreichischen VOEST-Tochterunternehmens Noricum Anfang der 1980er Jahre. Empfänger der Artilleriegeschütze vom Typ GHN-45 waren die – sich damals im Krieg miteinander befindlichen – Staaten Irak und Iran.

Illegale Waffenexporte in kriegführende Länder

Zwischen 1981 und 1983 belieferte Noricum den Irak über das getarnte Empfängerland Jordanien mit Artilleriegeschützen des Typs Gun Howitzer Noricum (GHN-45). Dies war, ebenso wie die späteren Waffenlieferungen an den Iran über Libyen, ein klarer Verstoß gegen ein gerade erst verschärftes Bundesgesetz, das Waffenlieferungen an kriegführende Staaten untersagte, und in der Folge auch gegen das Strafrecht.

Die beiden Golfkriegsparteien Iran und Irak sollen mit 340 Geschütze GHN-45 beliefert worden sein, wovon an den Iran 140 gegangen sein sollen.[1]

Verdacht und Aufdeckung

Schon Anfang Juli 1985, hatte der österreichische Botschafter in Athen, Herbert Amry, mit Fernschreiben und Telegrammen das österreichische Außenministerium wiederholt über Hinweise auf illegale österreichische Waffenexporte in den Iran informiert. Er hatte bei einer internationalen Waffenmesse in Griechenland Noricum-Manager bei Verhandlungen mit Kunden aus kriegführenden Staaten beobachtet.

Am 12. Juli 1985 starb der 46-jährige Amry unter mysteriösen Umständen, nachdem er zuvor seinen Presseattaché Ferdinand Hennerbichler gewarnt hatte, dass man sie beide umbringen wolle, weil sie illegale Waffengeschäfte aufgedeckt und an das österreichische Außenministerium gemeldet hatten. [2]

Amrys plötzlicher Tod verhinderte sein für 13. Juli geplantes Treffen mit jenem Waffenhändler, der Amry über die illegalen Geschäfte informiert hatte. [3]

„Offizielle Todesursache in der Causa Amry: Herzversagen. Rasch wurde die Leiche eingeäschert, bis heute ist der wahre Hergang nicht aufgeklärt. Amry hatte mehrmals das Außenamt in Wien über seinen Verdacht informiert, aber bis heute ist ungeklärt, ob die Fernschreiben überhaupt je bis zum damaligen AußenministerLeopold Gratz gelangt waren. Das vierte – und entscheidende – Amry-Telegramm verschwand irgendwo im Innenministerium. Die Buchautoren Kurt Tozzer und Günther Kallinger fanden erst 1999 im Zuge von Recherchen für ihr Buch Todesfalle Politik einen Amry-Verschlussakt im Außenamt.“

– Die Presse: Die Super-Kanone aus Liezen [4]

Am 30. August 1985 konnten von Reportern der Zeitschrift Basta in einem jugoslawischen Mittelmeerhafen Fotografien von einer Ladung Kanonen, die für den Iran bestimmt waren, angefertigt werden.[5] Ende 1985 veröffentlichte Basta schließlich ihr vorliegende Informationen, und machte damit den Noricum-Skandal einer breiten Öffentlichkeit bekannt.[6]

Politische und juristische Folgen

Im Zusammenhang mit der Lucona-Affäre, aber auch wegen des Noricum-Skandals trat Innenminister Karl Blecha im Februar 1989 zurück.[7]

Die rechtswidrigen Waffenverkäufe, und der Verdacht auf eine einhergehende Beteiligung von führenden österreichischen Politikern, führten am 27. September 1989 zur Einsetzung eines parlamentarischen Untersuchungsausschusses gegen die Stimmen der SPÖ.

Die verantwortlichen Manager wurden wegen Neutralitätsgefährdung 1993 verurteilt. Von den involvierten Politikern wurden Bundeskanzler Fred Sinowatz und AußenministerLeopold Gratz freigesprochen. Innenminister Karl Blecha wurde verurteilt und erhielt unter anderem wegen Urkundenunterdrückung eine bedingte neunmonatige Haftstrafe, die für drei Jahre zur Bewährung ausgesetzt wurde.[8]

Literatur

  • Fast Hochverrat. In: Der Spiegel. Nr. 39, 1987, S. 149–150 (21. September 1987, online).
  • Schweres Geschütz. In: Der Spiegel. Nr. 11, 1989, S. 187–190 (13. März 1989, online).

Weblinks

Einzelnachweise

  1. Eintrag über Noricum-Skandal im Weblexikon der Wiener Sozialdemokratie
  2. Die PresseDie Super-Kanone aus Liezen (Artikel vom 29. Dezember 2005).
  3. Amry-Witwe ist nicht sicher, ob ihr Mann eines natürlichen Todes starbOberösterreichische Nachrichten vom 23. April 1993. S.2.
  4. Die PresseDie Super-Kanone aus Liezen (Artikel vom 29. Dezember 2005).
  5. Jubiläum ohne Jubel: Noricum, burkhartlist.de
  6. Die ZeitWenn Spatzen Kanonen exportieren (Artikel vom 9. April 1993)
  7. Die PresseNoricums Kanone brachte den Tod
  8. Der StandardInterview mit Karl Blecha: „Vergessen können hält jung“

Quelle: APA /Kurier /Der Spiegel/ Parlament Österreich/Wikipedia

Wiener Kurdenmorde erschütterten Österreich: 25 Jahre nach der Tat – Ahmadinejad beteiligt

Die Wiener Kurdenmorde erschütterten vor 25 Jahren ÖsterreichDie Wiener Kurdenmorde erschütterten vor 25 Jahren Österreich – © APA (Archiv)
Am 13. Juli 1989 wurden in einer Wiener Privatwohnung der Chef der Kurdischen Demokratischen Partei/Iran, Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou, sein Stellvertreter Abdullah Ghaderi-Azar und der in Österreich eingebürgerte Kurde Fadel Rasoul bei einem Geheimtreffen mit Emissären der Teheraner Führung ermordet.

Die Tatverdächtigen tauchten in der iranischen Botschaft unter und konnten nach Interventionen der iranischen Regierung unbehelligt ausreisen; einer von ihnen wurde sogar unter Polizeischutz zum Schwechater Flughafen geleitet.

Wiener Kurdenmorde vor 25 Jahren

Nach Darstellung des grünen Parlamentariers Peter Pilz, der sich jahrelang mit dem Fall beschäftigte, saß zumindest ein Akteur von damals in höchster Position: Der frühere iranische Präsident Mahmoud Ahmadinejad höchstpersönlich sei “dringend verdächtig”, an der Ermordung der drei Kurdenführer in Wien beteiligt gewesen zu sein. Möglicherweise habe er selbst geschossen, dies lasse sich allerdings nicht mehr eindeutig eruieren.

Laut Aussage eines deutschen Waffenhändlers aus dem Jahr 2006, so Pilz, habe es in der ersten Juliwoche 1989 ein Treffen in der iranischen Botschaft gegeben. Bei diesem Treffen sei auch ein “gewisser Mohammad”, welcher “später Präsident der iranischen Republik wurde”, anwesend gewesen. Zweck dieses Treffens seien laut Protokoll illegale Waffenlieferungen gewesen.

Erschütterung in Österreich

In Österreich war die Empörung über die Morde groß. Der damalige Außenminister Alois Mock (V) sprach im Zusammenhang mit den Tötungen von einer “Schweinerei”, am Ballhausplatz war von “erpresserischen Methoden der Iraner” die Rede. Der damalige Chef der Politischen Sektion des Außenamts, Botschafter Erich Maximilian Schmid, sagte im April 1997 nach seiner Pensionierung in einem TV-Interview, der iranische Botschafter habe “mit ziemlicher Klarheit” zu verstehen gegeben, dass “es gefährlich werden könnte für die Österreicher im Iran”, sollten die Tatverdächtigen in Österreich vor Gericht gestellt werden. Über die iranischen Drohungen war nach Angaben Mocks auch der damalige Außenamts-Generalsekretär und spätere Bundespräsident Thomas Klestil informiert.

Druckmittel gegen Österreich

Am 30. November 1989 sagte Innenminister Franz Löschnak (S) nach einem Treffen mit dem Chef der Terrorbekämpfungsabteilung im US-Außenamt, Morris Busby, dass Haftbefehle gegen die Tatverdächtigen erlassen worden seien. Allerdings hatte der Generaldirektor für die Öffentliche Sicherheit, Robert Danzinger, am Vortag per Weisung die Überwachung der iranischen Botschaft “reduzieren” lassen.

Im August 1991 erklärte der in Frankreich im Exil lebende Ex-Präsident Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, Teheran besitze ein Druckmittel gegen Österreich, nämlich die Unterlagen über die illegalen österreichischen Waffenlieferungen im irakisch-iranischen Golfkrieg. In der Noricum-Affäre war eine Woche vor dem Attentat eine Voruntersuchung gegen die SPÖ-Politiker Altbundeskanzler Fred Sinowatz, Ex-Außenminister Leopold Gratz und Ex-Innenminister Karl Blecha eingeleitet worden.

Das “Mykonos”-Urteil

Am 17. August 1992 wurde Ghassemlous Nachfolger Sadegh Charafkandi nach einer Tagung der Sozialistischen Internationale (SI) mit drei Mitarbeitern im Restaurant “Mykonos” in Berlin ermordet, der Lokalbesitzer lebensgefährlich verletzt. Charafkandi hätte am darauffolgenden Tag nach Wien kommen sollen. Österreichische Beamte sagten im deutschen “Mykonos”-Prozess aus, dass sich der Iran für die mutmaßlichen Attentäter von Wien eingesetzt hatte. Die deutsche Justiz warf dem Iran Staatsterrorismus vor. Nach ihren Erkenntnissen wurden auch die Wiener Morde von der obersten iranischen Führung angeordnet. Das “Mykonos”-Urteil veranlasste die EU-Staaten, ihre Botschafter 1997 vorübergehend aus Teheran abzuziehen.

Rede von “bösen, brutalen Verbrechen”

Im November 1992 wurde die Amtshaftungsklage der Ghassemlou-Witwe in Wien in dritter Instanz abgewiesen; die Republik Österreich bescheinigte ihren Organen, dass es “keinerlei schuldhaftes und rechtswidriges Verhalten” gegeben habe. Grüne und Liberale scheiterten 1997 mit ihrer Forderung nach einem parlamentarischen Untersuchungsausschuss zur Aufklärung möglicher Vertuschungsversuche am Widerstand der Koalitionsparteien SPÖ und ÖVP.

Von einem “bösen, brutalen und vorbereiteten Verbrechen” sprach der damalige Nationalratspräsident und heutige Bundespräsident Heinz Fischer bei einer Gedenkfeier zu Ehren von Ghassemlou. Es sei “bitter und traurig”, dass die Aufklärung im Einzelnen und die Bestrafung der Täter nicht zustande gekommen seien.

 

Hintergrund zu dem Opfer:

QĀSEMLU, ʿABD-AL-RAḤMĀN

Qāsemlu became interested in politics in the early 1940s, when the Allied forces invaded Iran and the nascent Kurdish nationalist movement was revived during the occupation of the two Azerbaijan provinces by the Soviet forces.

QĀSEMLU (Ghassemlou), ʿABD-AL-RAḤMĀN (b. Urmia, 22 December 1930; d. Vienna, 13 July 1989; Figure 1), Kurdish political leader, who as secretary general of the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran (KDPI), led the Kurdish nationalist struggle for autonomy and democracy in Iran. (The original name of the party was Kurdish Democratic Party [KDP]. The word “Iran” was added to the title in parentheses during the party’s third congress in 1973.)

Early life. Qāsemlu’s father, Moḥammad Qāsemlu, was a well-known Kurdish nationalist feudal lord from the Šekāk tribe. At the end of the 19th century, the shah gave him the title of Woṯuq-e divān (Krulich, p. 21). Qāsemlu’s mother, the third wife, was a Christian Assyrian converted to Islam. ʿAbd-al-Raḥmān Qāsemlu received his early education in Urmia, and by the time he was a teenager, he could speak several languages, including Sorani Kurdish, Persian, Azeri Turkish, Arabic, and Assyrian (Randal, 1986, apud, Prunhuber, pp. 141, 143). Later on he would learn French, Russian, Czech, and English.

Qāsemlu became interested in politics in the early 1940s, when the Allied forces invaded Iran and the nascent Kurdish nationalist movement was revived during the occupation of the two Azerbaijan provinces by the Soviet forces.

The Kurdistan Democratic Party was founded on 16 August 1945 by Qāżi Moḥammed (1893-1947; Eagleton, pp. 62-63; Roosevelt, pp. 245-55, 260-63) and attracted many young people to its ranks. On 22 January 1946, the short-lived Republic of Mahabad was publicly announced (Roosevelt, p. 257; Ghassemlou, pp. 118-22) with Qāżi Moḥammed as president. But the Soviet troops retreated from northwestern Iran in the fall of 1946, leaving him without military and economic aid. Border conflicts with neighboring Azerbaijan and growing internal dissension further weakened the republic (van Bruinessen, p. 176). In December, the Iranian army regained the region, and the Republic of Mahabad fell (Roosevelt, pp. 266-67). When the repression against the Kurds intensified following the fall of the republic, Qāsemlu was sent to Tehran to finish school. In 1947, Qāsemlu left for France.

Student in Europe. After an assassination attempt against Moḥammad-Reżā Shah in 1949 at the University of Tehran, Iranian students in Paris organized a demonstration against the shah. Qāsemlu gave a speech at the event. The Iranian embassy put him under surveillance. His father was not allowed to send him any more funding, so Qāsemlu, through his contacts with the International Students Union, which was controlled by the communists, received a scholarship to study in Czechoslovakia (Randal, 1986, apud Prunhuber, p. 167; Krulich, p. 27).

In 1949 Qāsemlu entered the School of Political and Economic Science of Prague. It was the beginning of the Cold War, and the Stalinist regime was now gripping the country. As a young student and dogmatic Marxist-Leninist, Qāsemlu considered himself a Stalinist. He was elected president of the student union and participated in youth festivals in the International Congress of Students of Prague in 1950, and later in Berlin in 1951 (Randal, 1986, apud Prunhuber, pp. 167-68). He also met Helene Krulich, whom he would marry in 1952. They had two daughters Mina (1953) and Hiva (1955).

Political life. Qāsemlu returned to Iran in 1952 when he graduated from the School of Economics and Political Science (Krulich, p. 27). He started his clandestine political activities in the country by revitalizing the Democratic Party of Kurdistan (KDP), which was then an appendage of the Tudeh party (McDowall, pp. 249-50). According to Qāsemlu (pp. 128-29), the Tudeh communists would neither support nor defend the aspirations of the Kurdish nationalist party in Iran. After the collapse of the Republic of Mahabad, the party’s organization was in such disorder that the KDP “became reliant upon its relationship with the Tudeh Party” (Ahmadzadeh and Stansfield, p. 15). In 1955, the KDP cut organizational ties with the Tudeh.

In 1959, Qāsemlu stayed to Iraq for a year. Back in Prague, he completed his doctorate in economics and political science in 1962. He also taught the theory of economic growth and long-term planning at the School of Economics at the University of Prague (Randal, 1986, apud Prunhuber, p. 179). He publishedKurdistan and the Kurds in Slovak, depicting the Kurdish world from a Marxist-Leninist perspective. The book was later translated into four languages.

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, which led to purges, witch-hunts, and sentences, ended Qāsemlu’s identification with communism and led him towards social democracy (Prunhuber, pp. 94-95, 158-59. He returned to Iraq in 1970, where he worked as an advisor to the Ministry of Economic Planning (Chris Kutschera, in Prunhuber, p. 181). In 1973 he was elected secretary general of the KDP (Iran), a position he held until his assassination in 1989 (McDowell, p. 254).  During his leadership, he initiated the modernization of the party, drafted a new political program, and established its core political concept: “democracy for Iran, autonomy for Kurdistan” (Ghassemlou, p. 132).

Qāsemlu and the Kurdish problem in Iraq. Qāsemlu followed closely the politics of the Iraqi Kurds (Korn, 1994; Kissinger, pp. 576-92). Following negotiations over Kurdish autonomy, the Iraqi Kurds and Ṣaddām Ḥosayn signed their first agreement on 11 March 1970. Talks continued for another four years with no agreement on the situation in Kirkuk and other oil-producing areas (McDowall, pp. 327-35). Qāsemlu, whose presence had been requested by the Iraqi authorities, attended the last meeting between the Kurdish delegation, headed by Edris Bārzāni, and the state representatives (Randal, 1986, apud Prunhuber, p. 184).

Qāsemlu left Iraq and returned to Prague in 1974. Two years later he was deported from Czechoslovakia, presumably due to the Tudeh party interference. In 1968, at an unscheduled meeting of the party, Qāsemlu had not approved the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia; moreover, the party disapproved of Qāsemlu’s views regarding the Kurdish issue (personal communication with Krulich, February 2012). In 1976 he left Czechoslovakia to reside in Paris, where he worked as an assistant professor of Kurdish at the School of Oriental Languages (Blau, 1991, apud Prunhuber, p. 187). While in Paris, he developed relationships with politicians and journalists, which augmented public interest on the Kurdish question.

Qāsemlu returned to Iran in 1978 as the revolution unfolded. He went to visit Ayatollah Ḵomeyni in Neauphle-le-Château, but the Ayatollah did not receive him (Hélène Krulich-Qāsemlu, in Prunhuber, p. 36). He, however, supported Ayatollah Ḵomeyni, because he believed that the Ayatollah, the symbol of opposition, would eventually overthrow the shah (Randal, 1986, apud, Prunhuber, p. 36). In Iran, he surreptitiously began to rejuvenate the debilitated party, many members of which were in prison, exiled, or had been executed. He set the ideological and practical foundation of the party, created secret committees, updated the cadres, and incorporated younger activist members (Šarafkandi, apud Prunhuber, p. 40).

In March 1979, the KDP (Iran) officially announced the resumption of its political activities, putting an end to thirty years of clandestine functions. At the end of that month, Qāsemlu held his first political meeting in Mahabad. During this first celebratory political demonstration of the KDP (Iran), Qāsemlu “declared that his party was ready to cooperate with the new regime if the rights of the Kurds were guaranteed” (Ahmadzadeh and Stansfield, p. 17). He announced the political agenda of the KDP (Iran) and asked the Tehran government to accept the Kurds’ autonomy demands, thus emerging as the political leader of the Kurds.

During the turbulent early 1979, Qāsemlu was building the armed resistance of thepešmergas (Kurdish fighters; lit. “those who face death”) and, at the same time, working to reach an agreement with the central government. Although he was meeting with the authorities from Tehran and also went to visit Ayatollah Ḵomeyni twice, he considered that the government was biding time (Randal, 1986, apud, Prunhuber, p. 63). He publicly declared that the Kurds would support the government as long as it clearly promoted democracy for Iran and autonomy for Kurdistan (Shams, p. 175).

After his first meeting with Ḵomeyni, it was clear to Qāsemlu that the Ayatollah had no intention of respecting the Kurds’ demands (Randal, 1986, apud, Prunhuber, pp. 62-63). Elections for the Assembly of Experts (Majles-e ḵobragān) were held on 3 August 1979 with the goal of drafting a new constitution for the Islamic Republic. The Kurds participated in this election, and Qāsemlu was elected with more than 80 percent of the votes as the representative of the city of Urmia. He was one of two secular politicians elected to the Assembly who did not belong to an Islamic current (Moin, p. 219). For Qāsemlu it was imperative to attend the Assembly sessions in order to oppose the clerical monopolization of power that was certain to thwart the liberties of the Iranians (Randal, 1986, apud, Prunhuber, p. 73).

A few days prior to the opening session of the Assembly of Experts, armed Kurds defeated the regime’s troops in Kurdistan. Ḵomeyni threatened to punish “in a truly revolutionary way the incompetent and corrupt government forces” (Le Monde, 1 July 1979), if they did not crush the Kurdish revolt. Qāsemlu did not attend the opening session of the Assembly of Experts, during which Ḵomeyni publicly condemned Qāsemlu (Schriazi, p. 32) and banned the KDP (Iran) as “the party of Satan, corrupt and the agent of foreigners” (McDowall, p. 272).

Towards the end of the summer of 1979, the pešmergas controlled a part of Kurdistan. Qāsemlu’s goal was “to achieve some kind of tolerance and a national equilibrium that would permit a strengthening of the Iranian state.” He was convinced that autonomy could be negotiated, because the Kurds already had created an autonomous zone. He thought this was the moment for dialogue “for the peaceful resolution of the Kurdish issue” (Kravetz, in Prunhuber, p. 75). Several delegations of the KDP (Iran) met with Iranian authorities, trying to avoid armed conflict, but the regime launched a fierce offensive and, by the end of August, almost all the Kurdish cities held by the rebels were controlled by the government forces. Qāsemlu led the resistance in very harsh conditions from the mountains. After what is known as “Three-Month War,” Qāsemlu returned to Mahabad on 20 October 1979 and declared that the revolt would continue as a guerrilla campaign (Ghareeb, p. 19)

By December, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards had strengthened their military presence and retaken Kurdistan, while the pešmergas of the KDPI—the official name became the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran In early 1980—withdrew even further into the mountains. Between 1981 and 1982, the Kurds controlled a major portion of Iranian Kurdistan, excluding the towns. The military and political situations were propitious to them, as the KDPI had become a strong organization with clear objectives. Qāsemlu established a military administrative structure within the region. Eventually the KDPI settled in Kurdish territory on the Iraqi side of the border, where they have remained since 1984 (Prunhuber, p. 89).

Relations with the Iraqi regime. Although he had a close relationship with the Iraqi government, Qāsemlu always maintained his independence. Trapped by the geopolitical situation of Kurdistan, he lived and worked in Iraq off and on, while maintaining contact with the Iraqi regime. Yet he never collaborated militarily with Baghdad against Iran during the Iraq-Iran War (Ṭālabāni, in Prunhuber, p. 245; McDowall, pp. 273-74).

When the Iraq-Iran War (see IRAQ vii. IRAN-IRAQ WAR) began in 1980, the Iraqi government invited Qāsemlu to declare the formation of a Kurdish state in Iran and offered him money and weapons. Even the budget for the future Kurdish government would be provided by the Iraqis, who would officially recognize it. However, Qāsemlu responded that what he wanted was democracy and autonomy within the Iranian state (Ṭālabāni, in Prunhuber, p. 245). He was in a difficult position regarding Iraq. In private, he spoke about the horrors of the Iraqi regime, yet publicly he was obliged to be discreet. Nonetheless, he openly criticized the chemical bombings of the Kurds by the Iraqi regime in an interview with an Arab magazine (Hassanzadeh, in Prunhuber, p. 39).

Political vision. Even though he led an armed struggle against the Iranian regime, his party opposed popular terrorist methods (Actualités du Kurdistan, 1988, p. 5). Qāsemlu believed in equality between men and women and tried to have women’s rights implemented within the Kurdish community. This included putting an end to polygamy among party members and integrating women into the party ranks. For the first time within Kurdish society in Iran, women joined the KDPI on their own and as individuals equal to men (interview with Maryam Alipour, KDPI activist, KDPI Tishk TV [Paris], 6 July 2010).

Unity among the Kurds was of prime importance for Qāsemlu, and he was tormented to see the division among the Kurds, which often turned into violence among conflicting parties. He worked to put an end to the in-fighting among the Kurds. Komala (the Revolutionary Organization of the Toilers of Kurdistan of Iran) considered the KDPI as its main enemy in its class struggle and accused them of “collaborating with feudal elements” (van Bruinessen, p. 18) and “resented the KDPI’s presumption as representative of the Kurdish people” (McDowall, p. 265). The KDPI suffered several internal divisions (Ahmadzadeh and Stansfield, p. 15; McDowall, pp. 273, 275-76). In 1988, members of a socialist, doctrinaire faction within the party accused Qāsemlu of “turning the KDPI from socialism to social democracy” and rejected his reasoning for dialogue with the regime. This faction left the party and “attracted a substantial following of KDPI leftists and others who resented what they considered Qāsemlu’s undemocratic methods” (McDowall, p. 276). Following Qāsemlu’s death, there was another schism in the KDPI, further weakening the Kurdish cause in Iran.

Qāsemlu considered the Kurds’ desire for full independence unrealistic. His plan was pragmatic; he would consent to a federal union if the rest of the minorities wanted it. But he remained adamant about local autonomy. Recorded on tapes found by the Austrian police during his discussion with the Iranian emissaries in Vienna prior to his murder, Qāsemlu clearly stated that there were only three solutions to the national problem: independence, federalism, and autonomy (Actualités du Kurdistan, pp. 3-4).

During his ten years of leadership in the Kurdish movement following the Iranian revolution, he mainly resorted to peaceful dialogue and was mindful of the fact that the Kurdish problem in Iran cannot be exclusively resolved through military actions (Institut Kurde de Paris, pp. 11-12). In 1988, when the war between Iran and Iraq was over, Qāsemlu feared that both governments would agree to crush the Kurdish rebellions in their respective countries, as had happened in 1975 following the Algiers Agreements (Actualités du Kurdistan, p. 2). Therefore, he thought that the time was ripe for sitting down and negotiating (Gueyras, Le Monde, 6 June 1989; McDowall, p. 276)

Murder in Vienna. Through Jalāl Ṭālabāni (Iraqi Kurdish leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan [PUK]), Tehran proposed a dialogue with the KDPI. The party accepted it, and Qāsemlu traveled to Vienna to meet the Iranian representatives in December 1988 and January 1989. Ṭālabāni organized the meetings with extreme security measures. The meetings were supposed to continue in March, but the Iranians interrupted the negotiations with the excuse of Ḵomeyni’s sickness and the opposition of hardliners against these talks. They also sidelined Ṭālabāni from any future meetings, alleging that his men had broken confidentiality and spoken about the gatherings (Ṭālabāni, in Prunhuber, pp. 217-22).

According to Abu’l-Ḥasan Bani Ṣadr (in Prunhuber, p. 286), this was part of the Iranian plan to plot Qāsemlu’s murder. The first set of meetings with the Iranians was to create confidence in Qāsemlu about the negotiations (Bani Ṣadr, in Prunhuber, pp. 285-86). Once Ṭālabāni was sidelined, the Iranians found a dispensable intermediary in Fāżel Rasul, an Iraqi Kurdish intellectual with connections to the Iranian regime (Ṭālabāni, in Prunhuber, p. 204). Rasul contacted Qāsemlu and invited him to meet once more with the Iranian delegation in Vienna in July. Qāsemlu accepted and did not inform the party, which no longer believed in the negotiations (Prunhuber, pp. 8, 16, 221). He mistakenly believed that Iran, weakened by eight years of war with Iraq, needed to resolve the Kurdish problem after Ḵomeyni (Ben Bella, in Prunhuber, p. 210; McDowall, p. 276) and that Akbar Hāšemi Rafsanjāni, speaker of the Majlis and candidate for the Iranian presidency, was pragmatic enough to wish to resolve the Kurdish issue (IHRDC, 2008, p. 26).

Qāsemlu and Abdullah Gadheri-Azar KDPI’s representative in Europe, attended the first meeting in an apartment in Vienna on 12 July 1989 with Fāżel Rasul. Qāsemlu did not take any security measures. Iran’s emissaries were Moḥammed-Jaʿfar Ṣaḥrārudi, head of the Kurdish affairs section of the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence, Ḥāji Moṣṭafawi, head of the secret service for West Azerbaijan Province (Kurdistan), and Amir Manṣur Bozorgiān, bodyguard and agent of the Iranian secret police (Institut Kurde de Paris, p. 2)

On 13 July, during a second meeting with the Iranians, Qāsemlu, Ghaderi-Azar, and Rasul were mortally shot and Ṣaḥrārudi was hit in the arm by a stray bullet. Moṣṭafawi disappeared. Ṣaḥrārudi and Bozorgiān were detained by the Austrian police. Oswald Kessler, head of the Austrian Special Anti-Terrorism Unit said, “We’ve got dead Kurds and surviving Iranians. The matter is clear. The rest will be politics” (Danninger; IHRDC, 2008, p. 28).

Bozorgiān was released from police custody and allowed to return to the Iranian embassy. Ṣaḥrārudi was released from the hospital and escorted by the Austrian police to the airport to leave the country. Three months later, in November 1989, the Austrian public prosecutor issued arrest warrants for the three men. Ṣaḥrārudi was later promoted to the rank of Brigadier General in the Revolutionary Guards and became the head of the Qods Forces Intelligence Directory (IHRDC, 2008, p. 28)

The release of the only witnesses angered the Austrian public and media. The Austrian daily Arbeiter Zeitung, responding to a Foreign Ministry official’s remark that Iran had threatened reprisals if its nationals were taken into custody, wrote: “This kowtowing to Iran will protect Austria for a while from the mullahs’ wrath. But it’s an invitation saying, ‘Austria’s pretty; come here to kill’” (Randal, 1989).

In 1991, Qāsemlu’s widow, Helene Krülich, initiated legal proceedings against the Austrian state for not pursuing an investigation of the murder, releasing the assassins, and allowing them to leave the country. In 1992, the Austrian high court dismissed the case (IHRDC, 2008, p. 29).

Qāsemlu and Ghaderi-Azar were buried in Paris at the Père Lachaise cemetery. With Qāsemlu’s death, the Iranian Kurdish movement suffered a severe blow, which impacted the progress for an autonomous Kurdish nation.

 

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David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds, London, 1997.

Baqer Moin, Khomeini: Life of the Ayatollah, New York, 2000.

Carol Prunhuber, The Passion and Death of Rahman the Kurd: Dreaming Kurdistan, Bloomington, 2010, containing interviews with: Abu’l-Ḥasan Bani Ṣadr 2009 (pp. 285-86); Joyce Blau, 1991; Abdullah Hassanzadeh, 2010 (pp. 39, 220); Marc Kravetz, 2010 (p. 75); Hélène Krülich-Qāsemlu, 2008 (p. 36); Chris Kutschera, 2010 (p. 181); Šarafkandi, 1991 (see Šarafkandi); Jalāl Ṭālabāni, 1991 (pp. 204, 217-22, 245).

Carol Prunhuber and Gabriel Fernandez, interview of Ahmed Ben Bella, 1991, in Carol Prunhuber, 2010, p. 210.

Jonathan Randal, interview of ʿAbd-al-Raḥmān Qāsemlu, Paris, 1986; excerpts in Carol Prunhuber, pp. 36, 62-3, 73, 141, 167-68, 180, 184.

Idem, “The Hostage Drama; Austria Said to ‘Kowtow’ to Iran in Murder Case; Reprisal Feared in Kurdish Leader’s Death,” The Washington Post, 2 August 1989.

Idem, After Such Knowledge: What Forgiveness? My Encounters with Kurdistan,New York, 1997.

Archie Roosevelt, Jr., “The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad,” Middle East Journal, no. 1, July 1947, pp. 247-69.

Sādeq Šarafkandi interview by Bernard Granjon on behalf of Carol Prunhuber at KDPI headquarters in Iraq, 1991.

Said Shams, Nationalism, Political Islam and the Kurdish Question in Iran: Reflections on the Rise and Spread of Political Islam in Iran, Saarbrücken, 2011.

Asghar Schriazi, The Constitution of Iran: Politics and the State in the Islamic Republic, London and New York, 1997.

 

 

 

Quelle: APA/ Kurier/Wikipedia/Encyclopedia Iranica

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Iranian reporter sentenced to two years in prison and 50 lashes

Marzieh Rasouli is the latest journalist imprisoned by Islamic republic for ’spreading propaganda‘ against the government.

Marzieh Rasouli

Iranian journalist Marzieh Rasouli was charged with spreading anti-government propaganda. Photograph: Guardian

An Iranian journalist has been sentenced to 50 lashes and two years in prison over charges of spreading anti-government propaganda in the latest incident of Iran’s crackdown on the independent media.

Marzieh Rasouli reported to Evin prison in Tehran on Tuesday, where she became the latest of dozens of journalists imprisoned by the Islamic republic, which has been branded as one of the world’s worst jailer of journalists by the New York Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ).

Her arrest followed the detention in recent months of a number of other Iranian journalists, including Saba Azarpeik , who was being held incommunicado, and Reyhaneh Tabatabaei.

As president Hassan Rouhani pursues a reconciliatory foreign policy, hardliners in the country’s judiciary and the revolutionary guards appear to be tightening their grip on domestic social and cultural norms.

The young female journalist was jailed to endure her conviction on charges of „spreading propaganda“ against the ruling system and „disturbing the public order“, the Guardian has understood. On the previous day, Rasouli had also announced on her Twitter account that she had been informed of her sentence and was expected to go to jail.

Rasouli, a well-known writer on the arts and culture for a number of reformists newspapers including Shargh and Etemaad, was initially arrested in January 2012 as the authorities launched a crackdown before the parliamentary elections at the time. She was later releasedafter posting a large bail with the prison authorities.

According to the Reporters Without Borders, Rasouli and at least two other Iranian journalists, Parastoo Dokouhaki and Sahamoldin Borghani, were accused by hardliners of collaborating with the BBC, which Iran conservatives see as a tool of British espionage.

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