Archiv für den Tag 28. Juli 2014

Verwaltungsgliederung des Iran

(Persisch: , Plural ) genannt werden, unterteilt. Jeder Provinzverwaltung steht ein Gouverneur, der (Persisch: ) genannt wird, vor. Dieser wird vom Innenminister mit Zustimmung des Kabinetts ernannt.

Provinzen untergliedern sich weiter in Verwaltungsbezirke, die, Plural: ) genannt werden.

Verwaltungsbezirke wiederum werden in Distrikte, die , Plural:) genannt werden, unterteilt.

Im Jahr 2006 gab es in Iran 30 , 336 , 889 , 1016 Städte und 2400 Dörfer. Am 23. Juni 2010 wurde die Provinz Alborz durch Abtrennung eines Teils der Provinz Tehrān gegründet.

 

Provinzen

 

Nr. Provinz(Persisch) Einwohner(Okt. 2006) Fläche
(März 2004)
Ew./
km²)</small>
Hauptstadt(Persisch)
31 Alborz Karadsch
6 Ardabīl 1.225.348 17.800 69 Ardabīl
9 Āzārbāyjān-e Gharbī 2.873.459 37.437 77 Orūmīyeh
8 Āzārbāyjān-e Sharqī 3.603.456 45.650 79 Tabrīz
17 Kohkīlūyeh va Boyer Ahmad 634.299 15.504 41 Yāsūj
18 Būshehr 886.267 22.743 39 Bandar-e Būshehr
16 Chahār Mahāl va Bakhtīārī 857.910 16.332 53 Shahr-e Kord
24 Esfahān 4.559.256 107.029 43 Esfahān
19 Fārs 4.336.878 122.608 35 Shīrāz
2 Ghom 1.040.681 11.526 90 Ghom
5 Gilān 2.404.861 14.042 171 Rasht
27 Golestan 1.617.087 20.195 80 Gorgān
11 Hamadān 1.703.267 19.368 88 Hamadān
20 Hormozgān 1.403.674 70.669 20 Bandar-e ‚Abbās
13 Īlām 545.787 20.133 27 Īlām
22 Kermān 2.652.413 180.836 15 Kermān
12 Kermānschāh 1.879.385 24.998 75 Kermānschāh
30 Khorāsān-e Junoubi 636.420 88.404 7 Bīrjand
29 Khorāsān-e Razavi 5.593.079 125.832 44 Mashhad
28 Khorāsān-e Shomali 811.572 28.434 29 Bojnūrd
15 Khūzestān 4.274.979 64.055 67 Ahvāz
10 Kordestān 1.438.543 29.137 49 Sanandaj
14 Lorestān 1.716.527 28.294 61 Khorramābād
3 Markazī 1.349.590 29.130 46 Arak
26 Māzandarān 2.920.657 23.701 123 Sārī
4 Qazvīn 1.143.200 15.549 74 Qazvīn
25 Semnān 589.742 97.491 6 Semnān
21 Sīstān va Balūchestān 2.405.742 181.785 13 Zāhedān
1 Tehrān 13.413.348 18.814 713 Tehrān
23 Yazd 990.818 129.285 8 Yazd
7 Zanjān 964.601 21.773 41 Zanjān
Iran 70.472.846 1.628.554 43 Tehrān

 

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IRAN| Der Supermarkt des Todes

Informationen westlicher Geheimdienste zufolge decken sich militante Gruppen am Flughafen in Teheran mit Waffen ein

Waffen der Hisbollah-Miliz

Waffen der Hisbollah-Miliz. Diese kommen auch aus dem Iran

 

Am Flughafen in Teheran kann man fast alles kaufen, was sich zum Töten eignet: Kurzstreckenraketen, Flug- und Panzerabwehrgeschosse, Mörsergranaten, Kleinwaffen und Munition.

Dieser Supermarkt des Todes ist ein beliebtes Shopping-Ziel von allerlei finsteren Gestalten aus dem Nahen Osten: Assads Schergen decken sich hier mit Waffen ein für den blutigen Kampf gegen die eigene Bevölkerung. Und auch die Hisbollah und die Hamas beziehen sehr wahrscheinlich Kriegsausrüstung aus Teheran.

Das berichtet die Süddeutsche Zeitung. Die Hauptquelle für den Artikel ist „ein westlicher Diplomat, der Zugang zu Geheimdienstinformationen hat.“

Seit einigen Monaten sollen die Quds-Brigaden, eine Eliteeinheit des Iran für Operationen im Ausland, einen ganzen Hangar im Osten des Flughafen übernommen haben. Dieser dient ihnen jetzt als Logistikzentrum und Waffenlager.

Von hier aus wird das Kriegsgerät für das Gemetzel in Syrien verladen – nicht nur auf Militärtransporter, sondern auch an Bord von zivilen Fracht- und Passagiermaschinen.

Vollständiger Artikel

Iran: Rückkehr der Frauen in die Musik

Zu den großen „Errungenschaften“ der islamischen Revolution im Iran gehörte es unter anderem, den weiblichen Gesang in der Öffentlichkeit zu verbieten, und es dauerte lange, bis die ersten Frauenstimmen wieder in den iranischen Medien zu hören waren.
Madschid Darachschani, der einige Zeit in Deutschland in Köln gelebt hatte und hier als Musiklehrer tätig war und in Europa Konzerte gab, kehrte vor ca. 10 Jahren in den Iran zurück, wo er privaten Musikunterricht auch für Frauen gab und auch eine Musikgruppe namens „Mahbanu“ gründete, die von Frauen gebildet wird. Die Frauen spielen traditionelle iranische Instrumente, traditionelle Musik und singen alte Texte. In diesem youtube-Video stammt der Text von Dschalal ad-Din Muhammad Rumi (bekannt als Moulana Rumi), der 1273 in Konya starb. Die Lieder von Rumi werden von den Derwischen gesungen, die heute im Iran ebenfalls verfolgt und inhaftiert werden.

Who will be Iran’s next supreme leader?

Senior Iranian officials (L to R) Ali Larijani, Hassan Khomeini, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Gholamali Haddadadel, Mahmoud Shahroudi and Hashemi Rafsanjani listen to a speech by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, June 4, 2006.  (photo by REUTERS/Raheb Homavandi)

Who will be Iran’s next supreme leader?

“May God preserve the supreme leader and give him a long life,” said Hojat al-Islam Ghorbanali Dorri-Najafabadi. “However, we need to prepare for when he is gone.”

These comments, which were picked up by Shia Online, went largely unnoticed when they were made May 20. However, this is one of the most candid comments made by a member of the Assembly of Experts about their constitutional role of both choosing the next supreme leader and supervising him after Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s reign ends. The topic came up while he was talking to reporters about the importance of the next Assembly of Experts election in February 2016.

By physical appearances, the 75-year-old Ayatollah Khamenei appears healthy. Iranian TV often shows him hiking in the mountains. He is capable of delivering long sermons and does not appear to be suffering from any mental fatigue or age-related illness. But the issue of succession is still very important for political groups in Iran.

Once the Assembly of Experts hold their election, the winners will hold the position for eight years. When that term comes to an end, the supreme leader will be 83 years old. Therefore, the possibility exists that the next elected Assembly of Experts might have to choose, or at the very least plan, a successor for Ayatollah Khamenei.

As of now, there is no official successor in place. While the previous supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, was alive, Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri was chosen as deputy supreme leader. However, Montazeri eventually opposed the direction taken by the revolution and wrote a letter to Ayatollah Khomeini criticizing the mass executions in 1988. This letter angered the supreme leader and eventually Ayatollah Montazeri was removed from his position.

No one has appointed a deputy supreme leader since, and for good reason. It appears that the practice of choosing a successor while the supreme leader is alive has not been a positive experience, with some describing it as too much like “having two kings in one kingdom.”

The quest for succession will be difficult and many groups with conflicting interests will attempt to sway the elections of the Assembly of Experts in their favor, especially the chairmanship. The official chairman of the Assembly of Experts, Mohammad Reza Mahdavi Kani, recently suffered a heart attack and is in critical condition with no hope of returning to the political arena.

Some have speculated that Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani wants to retake the chairmanship. He was replaced by Mahdavi Kani in 2011 in what was viewed as a demotion for his support of the Reformists after the contested 2009 elections. Ayatollah Mahmoud Shahroudi, a prominent cleric with close ties to Ayatollah Khamenei, has been appointed acting chairman and will remain in the position until the fate of Mahdavi Kani becomes clear, or perhaps the elections.

Despite the importance of the position, there is doubt about how much weight it actually carries anymore.

Mohammad Noorizad, one of the most outspoken political dissidents in Iran, said of the election of the future supreme leader, “Neither the Assembly of Experts nor the parliament is independent. The supreme leader, the security organizations and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps all interfere in the decisions of the assembly. There is no hope that the Assembly of Experts can choose the future supreme leader without the interference of the Guard and the intelligence organizations.”

Noorizad believes that the Revolutionary Guard will attempt to put forward a candidate who has general popularity in society but who is also loyal to the corps and its financial and foreign policy interests.

A cleric in Qom who spoke to Al-Monitor on condition of anonymity said that Ayatollah Shahroudi is someone the security organizations in Iran would accept as supreme leader. Shahroudi, who served as the chief justice of Iran for 10 years, is an influential Shiite marja. He was born in Iraq and is an Iraqi citizen. Shahroudi once led the Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq and was also a member of the Dawa Party in Iraq.

But the cleric believes that Shahroudi does not have the necessary charisma and oratory skills to be the supreme leader. Noorizad also believes that the supreme leader needs to be an internationally acceptable figure, while Shahroudi is not popular inside Iran and has no international prestige, either.

The Qom cleric believes that after the supreme leader’s death, politicians close to Rafsanjani, who is currently the chairman of the Expediency Discernment Council, will push for electing Hassan Khomeini, the grandson of Ayatollah Khomeini, as the next supreme leader of Iran. He said, “The seminary in Qom has accepted the religious authority of Hassan Khomeini. He has shown flexibility toward the Revolutionary Guard and therefore it is possible that members of the Revolutionary Guard and the Assembly of Experts would view his candidacy in a positive manner.”

Hassan Khomeini, a middle-aged cleric, is more popular than the older, more traditional clerics. He is a soccer fan and has stated in a TV program that he follows the European soccer league. He is a relative of Mohammad Khatami, the popular former Reformist president of Iran, and after the start of the Green Movement, maintained his relationship with its leaders, Mir-Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi.

But his closeness with Reformists, which makes him popular among some in society, will pose a problem for the Revolutionary Guard, which views Reformists with suspicion. Noorizad believes that the promotion of Khomeini is not possible because he has not been able to stand on his own on issues that matter. “The political system has not facilitated the growth of independent individuals,” he said. “Throughout the years, Hassan Khomeini has been unable to protest against the hardships inflicted on people and thus has not been able to gain people’s trust.”

There is of course the possibility that a replacement may not be appointed immediately. Analyst Mohammad Javad Akbarein told Al-Monitor in an interview that it will be difficult for any individual to be picked to become the next supreme leader. “I predict that members of a council will take over the duties of the supreme leader” until the factions settle their differences, he said.

According to the constitution, the supreme leader should be a high-ranking jurist who can also manage political affairs. A very limited number of grand ayatollahs with the status of marja can manage the political affairs of the country. Others have tried to use the model of Ayatollah Khamenei’s own promotion to discern how the next one will be chosen, but many believe that his selection took place in a unique era in Iran, with the ending of a devastating eight-year war with Iraq and the passing of the Islamic Republic’s founder. That time, they say, is not comparable to the relatively stable conditions which Iran finds itself in today.

On concerns that the next supreme leader could be one of the more hard-line figures, Akbarein believes that when necessary, the Principlist members of the Assembly of Experts will support a supreme leader who is close Rafsanjani or other moderates. “Members of this faction believe that the actions of the radical Principlists, such as [Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi] Mesbah Yazdi, are not beneficial for the country and might result in the destruction of the religious government in Iran,” he said.

He believes that the members of the Assembly of Experts will not succumb to the Revolutionary Guard’s pressure due to their own desire for self-preservation — unless, of course, the Revolutionary Guard finds a cleric with the necessary charisma and general approval of various institutions.

Source: AL-Monitor

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