derstandard| Ahmadinejad plant politisches Comeback im Iran

Ehemaliger Präsident soll zu Teilnahme an Parlamentswahl im Februar gedrängt werden

Teheran – Der ehemalige iranische Präsident Mahmoud Ahmadinejad will zurück auf die politische Bühne. „Es muss eine Rückkehr zu den Idealen der Revolution geben, damit diese Ideale nicht vergessen werden“, sagte Ahmadinejad in einer Rede vor ehemaligen Kabinettsmitgliedern in Teheran.

Ahmadinejad war von 2005 bis 2013 Präsident des Iran gewesen und hatte mit einer harten Haltung gegen Israel und die USA Schlagzeilen gemacht. Die Kritik richtete sich direkt gegen seinen als gemäßigt geltenden Gegenspieler, Präsident Hassan Rohani.

Noch Anfang des Monats hatte Ahmadinejad ein Comeback ausgeschlossen. Nach Angaben seines Webportals am Freitag wird er aber zu einer Teilnahme an der Parlamentswahl am 26. Februar gedrängt. Er wolle zwar nicht direkt in den Wahlkampf einsteigen, aber sich in den Provinzen zu aktuellen politischen Themen äußern.

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Iran analyst: no accountability makes Ahmadinejad return likely

Iran’s President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (C) waves near the shrine (L) of Prophet Muhammad’s grandson Hussein ibn Ali at the Al-Hussein Mosque, named after the grandson, in the old part of Cairo, Feb. 5, 2013. (photo by REUTERS/Amr Abdallah Dalsh)

At the funeral ceremony of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s mother in the city of Qom on Feb. 22, supporters of the former Iranian president chanted, “On the life of any real man, Ahmadinejad will return.” The return of Ahmadinejad, whether in the 2016 parliamentary elections or back in the president’s seat in 2017, is always a hot topic in Iranian media and leads to wild speculation and analysis.

Sadegh Zibakalam, an outspoken Tehran University professor who is a supporter of President Hassan Rouhani’s negotiations with the West and a target of Iran’s hard-liners, wrote an interesting column in Shargh daily about the likelihood of Ahmadinejad’s return to politics. Rather than focusing on whether or not Ahmadinejad has the political clout or the blessing of the supreme leader to return to politics, he focused on some of the institutional problems within the Iranian executive branch.

Zibakalam wrote that anyone who chants “on the life of any real man, Ahmadinejad will return” has “an incorrect understanding of the world of politics in Iran” because there is no need for such chants. He explained, “Our executive system has two characteristics that make the return of Ahmadinejad likely; first, accountability is not taken very seriously in our executive system.”

Because of the lack of accountability in the executive office, according to Zibakalam, the view of Ahmadinejad’s supporters is that whatever the former president did during his eight years in office was “right and necessary,” and whatever was not done was “also right and necessary.” Given this criteria, no one should expect that Ahmadinejad and his followers would not want his return.

The second characteristic of Iran’s executive system that makes Ahmadinejad’s return likely, according to Zibakalam, is “the element of looking to the future, or to be more correct, the lack of it.” He wrote that the managers within the executive system “primarily live in the moment and from day to day. What results or consequences their policies today will have in 10 years or even five years is not much of an issue.”

As an example of this lack of planning and foresight, Zibakalam referenced Ahmadinejad’s subsidy policy in which he decided to give Iran’s population of roughly 79 million a specific monthly payment without considering “where this money will be attained, and more important, in the long term what damages this will cause for the development of the country … was not important.”

Iran’s economy relies in large part on the government and the policies adopted and administered by the executive branch. Whether during the presidency of Reformist Mohammad Khatami or the hard-liner Ahmadinejad, many groups and institutions see their fortunes rise and fall with the change of the administration. While Rouhani has attempted to eliminate some of the subsidy policies and seek private investment, it is too early to tell if he will avoid the same temptations of his predecessors.

As for Ahmadinejad, he has been unusually taciturn since leaving office in August 2013 and has only made a handful of appearances. Before his mother’s funeral, Ahmadinejad’s last public appearance was Feb. 8 at the Almahdi Mosque in Iran’s old city of Shahre-Rey for the 36th anniversary of the Islamic Revolution.

In his short speech, Ahmadinejad said, “For now I do not have an intention to speak or give speeches but I see the invitation of the Friday prayer leader of Almahdi Mosque as an obligation to accept.” According to reporters, when Ahmadinejad was asked about his return to politics, he only smiled.

Source: AI-Monitor

Analyse: Die Angst der Saudis vor einem Erstarken des Iran

Bild: (c) REUTERS (POOL) 

Die Golfstaaten plagt die Horrorvision einer iranischen A-Bombe. Doch auch ein Frieden Teherans mit den USA ist nicht in ihrem Interesse.

24.11.2014 | 18:10 |  VON WIELAND SCHNEIDER  (Die Presse)

Mit Argusaugen verfolgte man in den arabischen Golfstaaten die Verhandlungen in Wien. Der saudiarabische Außenminister, Prinz Saud al-Faisal, reiste extra an, um auf dem Flughafen Schwechat direkt von US-Außenminister John Kerry über den Fortgang der Atomgespräche mit dem Iran unterrichtet zu werden. Und Kerry hielt auch die anderen Außenminister der Golfmonarchien auf dem Laufenden. Die Strategen am Golf plagt nämlich eine Horrorvision, die sie mit Israel teilen: Der Iran könnte zu einer nuklear bewaffneten Regionalmacht aufsteigen.

Laut geheimen Dokumenten, die die Online-Aufdeckerplattform WikiLeaks veröffentlicht hat, soll das saudische Königshaus schon vor Jahren die USA zu Luftschlägen gegen das iranische Atomprogramm gedrängt haben. Denn die Golfmonarchien, allen voran Saudiarabien, Kuwait und die Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate, sehen im Nachbarn Iran den großen Konkurrenten im Spiel um Einfluss in der Region. Sie haben nicht nur Angst vor einer iranischen Atombombe. Ihnen ist alles, was Teherans Position stärken könnte, ein Dorn im Auge.

Ärger über Atomgespräche

So stellte etwa der kuwaitische Stratege und Regierungsberater Sami al-Faraj in einem „Presse“-Interview unumwunden klar, jedes Abkommen abzulehnen, das dem Iran die Weiterführung eines Atomprogramms erlaubt: „Heute gibt es noch eine Balance der Kräfte zwischen Teheran und den arabischen Golfstaaten: Der Iran hat eine große Zahl an Menschen, wir haben die bessere Technologie“, meinte al-Faraj. Sollte aber der Iran – zusätzlich zu seiner größeren Bevölkerungszahl – auch moderne Atomtechnologie in die Hände bekommen, würde das eine drastische Verschiebung der Kräfteverhältnisse bedeuten. „Das bedroht die Balance am Golf, das ist inakzeptabel.“ Die Golfmonarchien zeigten sich erbost darüber, dass, ohne auf ihre Interessen Rücksicht zu nehmen – wie al-Faraj sagte – , überhaupt die jüngsten Nukleargespräche mit Teheran begonnen worden waren.

Dabei geht es um mehr als die Sorge, ein „schlechter Deal“ könnte dem Iran zu große Freiheiten in der Atomfrage zugestehen. Die Golfmonarchien fürchten auch, eine Annäherung Washingtons an Teheran würde ihre privilegierte Stellung als US-Verbündete in der Region unterminieren. Dann könnte der Westen nämlich auch auf die Ölreserven des Iran zurückgreifen. Und Teheran könnte als Partner in den Kampf gegen die Extremisten des Islamischen Staats (IS) und bei einer Lösung des Syrien-Konflikts miteinbezogen werden. Das widerspricht den strategischen Interessen der Saudis und Kuwaitis.

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„Rosewater“: Peiniger hören zu, wenn sie Erotisches erfahren

FRANK HERRMANN AUS WASHINGTON

Jon Stewart, legendärer Gastgeber der Fernsehsendung „The Daily Show“ in Amerika, hat einen Film gedreht. In „Rosewater“ erzählt er die wahre Geschichte des iranisch-kanadischen Journalisten Maziar Bahari, der 2009 von den Wahlen in Teheran berichten soll

Den einen Seitenhieb kann Jon Stewart sich nicht verkneifen. „Was?“, fragt er entgeistert zurück, mit theatralisch aufgerissenen Augen, als die Moderatorin im Newseum, dem Journalismusmuseum Washingtons, eine Frage stellt, mit der er nichts anfangen kann. Im Comedy-Studio sitze er ja immer vor der Kamera, bei seiner Premiere als Filmemacher sei er nun dahinter gestanden – „erfordert das nicht eine komplette Neuordnung in Ihrem Kopf?“ „Whaaat?“, antwortet Stewart und amüsiert sich über das Wort Neuordnung, so wie er Politiker zerpflückt, wenn sie eine Sprechblase an die andere reihen.

Der Kultsatiriker des liberalen Amerika, dessen bissige TheDaily Show manchem die eher seichten Abendnachrichten der Kabelsender ersetzt, hat einen Kinofilm gedreht, seinen ersten. Erzählt wird die wahre Geschichte Maziar Baharis, eines iranisch-kanadischen Journalisten, der im Juni 2009 nach Teheran fliegt, um über eine Wahl zu berichten, über das Duell zwischen dem Hardliner Mahmud Ahmadi-Nejad und seinem flexibleren Herausforderer Mir Hossein Mussawi.

vergrößern (800×568foto: ap

Die schwierige Arbeit eines westlichen Journalisten im Iran: Gael García Bernal spielt in „Rosewater“ den kanadisch-iranischen Reporter Maziar Bahari, der als Spion verdächtigt und eingesperrt wird.

Als Ahmadi-Nejad zum Sieger erklärt wird, was den Verdacht massiver Fälschung aufkommen lässt, gehen in Teheran Zehntausende auf die Straße. Bahari ist dabei, er filmt, wie Demonstranten über die Mauern einer Kaserne der Revolutionswächter zu klettern versuchen, wie Schüsse fallen und der leblose Körper eines Getroffenen im Stacheldraht hängt. Bald darauf klingeln Geheimpolizisten an der Wohnungstür seiner Mutter, um ihn abzuholen. Bahari soll bekennen, dass er spioniert, für die Amerikaner, die Briten, die Israelis, für das Magazin Newsweek, für wen auch immer.

Im Evin-Gefängnis, Teherans berüchtigtem Knast, wird er geschlagen und erniedrigt und zur Abwechslung mit Aprikosen gelockt von seinem Peiniger, der nach Rosenwasser duftet, weshalb er ihn Rosewater nennt. Es beginnt damit, dass der Mann seine Kontakte durchgeht. „Wer ist Anton Tschechow?“ „Anton Tschechow? Der Dramatiker?“ „Du sollst mir das sagen, deshalb frage ich dich. Schließlich bist du es, der sich bei diesem Facebook für ihn interessiert.“

Am Originalschauplatz konnte Stewart natürlich nicht arbeiten, sodass Amman als Alternative herhalten musste, die jordanische Hauptstadt, wo man ihn in einer Haftanstalt drehen ließ. Es war Sommer, vierzig Grad, obendrein Ramadan, Fastenmonat. „Idealbedingungen“, witzelt Stewart.

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Is Ahmadinejad making a comeback?

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (C) meets with Iraqi Vice President Khudair al-Khuzaie (not seen) during a visit in Baghdad when Ahmadinejad was still president of Iran, July 18, 2013. (photo by REUTERS/Hadi Mizban)

A three-story building in a quiet one-way alley in northern Tehran is the headquarters of an unlikely campaign that opposes both the administration of President Hassan Rouhani and many of the Islamic Republic’s establishment figures.

The Velenjak building is the base of activities for former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who has his offices on its third floor.

Ahmadinejad has been relatively quiet since the ascendance of the moderate Rouhani, but the Iranian Labor News Agency (ILNA) is only one ofmany outlets that have reported on his desire to make a comeback.

According to Amir Mohebbian, a leading political analyst, Ahmadinejad’s attempt to return to poweris obvious as he „quietly awaits favorable conditions and occasionally tests the waters.“

The provincial trips that the former hard-line president makes are one indication.

In addition to making many trips to southern and northern Iran, Ahmadinejad celebrated the end of Ramadan by visiting Taleqan with the family members of four celebrated Iran-Iraq war „martyrs“ in a trip that, according to ILNA, was coordinated by the Quds Force, the formidable international arm of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps.

In April, Ahmadinejad ruled out a return to politics but many of his supporters beg to differ.

They are tirelessly organizing and insist on his return. These are an unlikely bunch. Their young cadre runsmany blogs and social media accounts. They draw controversy by their occasionally unconventional mixing of Islamism with an anti-wealthy and anti-establishment discourse, and many have spent time in jail for their activities. Their targets are not only the Reformists but many of the traditional conservatives.

Take Ahmad Shariat, who heads the Internet committee of an Ahmadinejad organization. In his blog, he attacked the policy of backing Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, called for a boycott of the last Majles elections in 2012 (because many Ahmadinejad forces were barred), attacked establishment religious figures such as Ayatollah Mesbah Yazdi and, finally, dared to criticize Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei himself (the latter, in early 2013, led to the closing of Shariat’s blog and his arrest).

These supporters leave no doubt as to their allegiance to the ex-president. One name they go by is „Homa,“ a Persian acronym for „Supporters of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.“ An online newspaper with the same name (Homa Daily) opened last week on the occasion of Ahmadinejad’s 58th birthday. („Square 72“ is another outlet, named after Ahmadinejad’s neighborhood in northeastern Tehran).

Abdolreza Davari — who was a vice-president of IRNA, the national news agency for the administration under Ahmadinejad — is a leading organizer of Homa. A controversial figure who was fired from a teaching post for „political activities,“ Davari was reported by ILNA as one of the top three media campaigners attempting an Ahmadinejad comeback.

„As an Iranian, I hope for the return of Mr. Ahmadinejad to politics,“ Davari told Al-Monitor, before adding that he thinks the ex-president is currently focused on „scientific“ activities.

To my question about the regular meetings of Homa in the Velenjak building, Davari says that such meetings are not organized but that „all kinds of people, commentators, students or ordinary people come to meet and talk to Dr. Ahmadinejad.“

Davari also denies that Homa is attempting to organize for next year’s Majles elections. Ahmadinejad’s return to power needs no less than „changes in the current relation of forces,“ Davari says, seeming to imply that many of the establishment figures wouldn’t want the ex-president back. Many such figures are especially opposed to Ahmadinejad’s entourage.

Enter Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, Ahmadinejad’s chief of staff, who was openly rebuked by Khamenei for his maverick mixing of Shiite millennialism, Persian nationalism and leftist language. Despite Khamenei’s personal rejection and the sustained attacks of many who accused Mashaei of leading a „deviationist current,“ the ex-president has continued backing his close friend (whose daughter married Ahmadinejad’s eldest son) even after the Guardian Council rejected Mashaei’s candidacy in last year’s presidential elections.

Mashaei’s offices are on the second level of the Velenjak building, and he is known to take part in Homa meetings.

Homa Daily ran Mashaei’s picture in the first page of its first issue, while reprinting his most controversial interview, where he had defended the necessity of „friendship with the Israeli people“ — an interview personally criticized and attacked by Khamenei.

Davari says Mashaei doesn’t want to return to politics due to his „cultural and spiritual sentiment.“ Taking a note from Mashaei’s book, he says Ahmadinejad’s concept of the Islamic Revolution and his belief in the coming of the hidden Imam is not „meant for a specific geography or religion as the hidden Imam’s global message is aimed at all nations and groups.“

„Freedom-loving and justice-seeking fighters“ like Fidel Castro, Che Guevara, Djamila Boupacha, Bobby Sands, Hassan Nasrallah and Hugo Chavez belong to the same global front as Ahmadinejad, Davari insists.

Acolytes of Mashaei seem to have especially targeted Iran’s nuclear negotiations. A group called the „the National Movement for Iran’s Independence“ (NAMA, for its Persian acronym) was formed with the declared goal of fighting any compromise with the West. Its unusual name (not mentioning Islam) has the Mashaie imprint.

Mashaei’s presence has always driven away many of Ahmadinejad’s backers. One of them is Mohammadreza Etemadian, a trade adviser to the ex-president. Etemadian told Al-Monitor that he would like to see Ahmadinejad back, but he has always told him to keep Mashaei away since „he is not on good terms with the supreme leader and is a deviant.“

Etemadian is a leading member of the Islamic Coalition Party, the traditional organization of Bazari Islamists and an important part of the establishment. Its leaders seem to detest the populist excesses of Ahmadinejad.

Sensing this, the ever-adventurous Ahmadinejad has been trying to find new allies, even if among the Reformists. He met with Hassan Khomeini, the 40-year-old grandson of the founder of the Islamic Republic, known for his proximity to the Reformists. The ex-president boldly asked Khomeini to lead a group of young clerics to contest the next year’s election of the Assembly of Experts, the body that chooses the supreme leader.

He has also reportedly tried to meet the Reformist ex-President Mohammad Khatami and Ambassador Sadeq Kharazi, an influential diplomat from a key political family.

Meanwhile, it was reported that Gholam-Hossein Elham, the spokesman of Ahmadinejad’s government, has started campaigning for the ex-president and last week met with the governors-generals of the previous government to organize. Elham, however, spoke with the pro-Ahmadinejad „Square 72“ website to deny this news.

Unceremoniously bowing out after the disqualification of the candidate he supported in the 2013 presidential elections, Ahmadinejad seems to be busy plotting a comeback.

Source: AL-Monitor

Video Witness Statement of Majid Abedinzadeh Moghaddam: A Prisoner in Kahrizak during the 2009 Post-Election Protests

Majid Abedinzadeh Moghadam was imprisoned in Kahrizak Detention Center for participating in the protests following the 2009 elections. There, he and over a hundred other detainees were subjected to systematic physical and psychological torture, including beatings and imprisonment in a hot and crowded warehouse. Following several days of violent mistreatment, Moghaddam witnessed the death of one of his fellow detainees.

Iran’s Political Future Uncertain as Top Official Dies

The race to fill one of Iran’s top political jobs is underway, a week on from the death of Assembly of Experts leader Ayatollah Kani.

Kani’s successor will be decided by election in February 2015, when all 86 members of the assembly are elected or re-elected. Because the job commands such influence within Iran — and impacts on how Iran engages with the international community — hardline politicians have taken steps to ensure the right candidates are pushed to the fore. The election coincides with national parliamentary elections.

Over the last week, hardliner assembly member Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami said in two separate interviews that Ayatollah Hashemi Shahroudi, pictured above, the assembly’s interim chairman, should succeed Ayatollah Kani, who died on October 21 after being in a coma for several months. Known for both his pragmatism and his hardline affiliation, Kani lead the assembly for three years.

The Assembly of Experts commands huge influence, but its most important task is to select the Supreme Leader, an opportunity that arises very rarely — the last time being in 1989, when Ayatollah Khamenei won the vote to succeed the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Khomeini. With Khamenei rapidly ageing and his health uncertain, the assembly chairman job is potentially even more important than it has been in recent years. Though there has been much speculation as to who will lead the assembly, discussions about who will be the next Supreme Leader are even more widespread.

The next assembly chairman will have a decisive influence on the future of Iran, and on how it engages with the international community. The age of the chairman will matter too. Three frontrunners — Ahmad Jannati, Mohammad Yazdi and Hashemi Rafsanjani — are all in their eighties, representing knowledge and experience, but also raising concerns over how long any of them will remain in the job.

Moderates believe they are gaining influence on Iran’s political stage, bolstered by the election of Hassan Rouhani to the presidency in 2013. If they win a majority in parliamentary elections or in the Assembly of Experts — whether by winning the chairmanship or increasing their numbers in the assembly—their influence will increase considerably and add another layer of complexity to the process of deciding who will take on the mantle of Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic.

Hardliner support has mainly fallen to Ayatollahs Mohammad Yazdi and Ahmad Jannati. But Yazdi suffers from poor health, and Jannati has not expressed an interest in taking on the leadership, though he did hope to be appointed as chairman in 2011, when Mahdavi Kani was elected.

The frontrunners are:

Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, 66, interim chairman of the assembly; formerly chief justice of Iran (1999 and 2009). Shahroudi, who was born in Iraq, has close ties to Ayatollah Khamenei, both politically and in terms of their interpretation of Shia jurisprudence. A member of the Guardian and Expediency Councils, he is also the head of the Supreme Council for Resolving Conflicts and Regulating Relations between the Three Branches of Government. Before the fall of Saddam Hussein, he was the leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq and so has considerable influence among Shias there. His political and religious views chime well with hardliners, though he has worked hard not to affiliate himself with either the hardliner or reformist camp.

Shahroudi owes his political gains largely to Khameini. But in recent years his attempts to establish a more powerful organizational presence in the holy city of Qom have not been popular, and some influential figures resent his support for political figures close to former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. Furthermore, there were allegations of widespread corruption during Shahroudi’s time as chief of the judiciary. In recent years, Sadegh Larijani’s judiciary has targeted and prosecuted officials close to Shahroudi on corruption and other charges.

Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, 80, former president; former chairman of the Assembly of Experts (2007-2011); current chairman of the Expediency Council. He has also held a number of other positions since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Although Rafsanjani is the most prominent moderate candidate for the job, hostility towards him within the Assembly of Experts is considerable. After the contentious presidential election of 2009, in which he sided with reformists, hardliners set out to replace him as the chairman of the assembly. In 2011, they succeeded, and are now willing to do anything to prevent his return, though reformist media has been vocal about the possibility. Rafsanjani has yet to publicly express his desire for the candidacy. If he does run, hardliners will undoubtedly increase pressure on President Rouhani’s administration, and could even resume efforts to prosecute Rafsanjani’s brother, Mehdi Hashemi Rafsanjani, formerly arrested on bribery and other corruption charges and released from prison in 2012.

Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, 88, a member of the assembly and the chairman of the Guardian Council. Jannati told a television news program last week that he had been approached to become a candidate but declined. Aside from hardliners, he has not attracted much support among assembly members.

Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, 83, former chief justice between 1989 and 1999.

Ayatollah Ali Movahedi Kermani, 83, Khamenei’s representative in the Revolutionary Guards.

Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi, 80, member of the assembly and an ultraconservative cleric who believes that Islam and democratic elections are incompatible. Often described as the “theoretician of the radicals,” he is a member of the assembly’s council of directors. Like Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami, the assembly member who spoke to the media about his support for Shahroudi, Yazdi belongs to the second tier of politicians, popular with hardliners but without enough political weight to become chairman.

Elections will determine assembly membership for the next eight years, and with it, the future political landscape and its various power struggles. The current frontrunners are all hampered in some way, whether it be ill health, controversy or isolation. And other figures can influence the political tide, too, such as Chief Justice Larijani.

Most believe Shahroudi has the best chance, not least because he has avoided being pulled into factional in-fighting. But he is also at a disadvantage, held back by a lack of grassroots support despite his ties to the Supreme Leader. In the 1970s, Shahroudi dreamt of toppling Saddam Hussein. Thirty years on, he may be able to realize another dream: deciding who succeeds Ayatollah Khamenei as the Supreme Leader of Iran.

“Many people are imagining that it will the Fifth Assembly of Experts [the one that will be elected in February] that will be responsible for choosing the [next] Supreme Leader,” Ahmad Khatami said in one recent interview. Whether this is true remains to be seen: if Khamenei lives into his mid-eighties, the next assembly will not hold the deciding vote. But recent speculation has once again revealed the evident fault lines in Iranian politics — and society. Without a doubt, they will be further pronounced in the run up to February’s election.

Source_ IranWire

oe24| Iran: Machtkampf in Führungsriege

Hardliner mobilisieren um Besetzungen in Parlament und Expertenrat.

Im Iran geht ein tiefer Riss durch die Führungsriege. Nach dem Tod des einflussreichen Expertenratchefs Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Mahdavi-Kani in der vergangenen Woche beginnen die Hardliner hinter den Kulissen für zwei wichtige Wahlen 2015 zu mobilisieren: Das Parlament und der Expertenrat müssen neu besetzt werden.

Im Expertenrat, jenem 86-köpfigen Gremium aus Geistlichen, das die Arbeit des Obersten Geistlichen Führers Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei beurteilen, und ihn (ab-)wählen können, brodelt es hinter den Kulissen der Führung gewaltig. Schon im vergangenen Monat wurde die Wahl eines Nachfolgers für Mahdavi-Kani, der seit Juni im Koma lag, überraschend verschoben.

Furcht vor moderatem Kandidaten
„Es war so, dass sich die Hardliner im Expertenrat davor gefürchtet haben, dass ein moderater Kandidat als Nachfolger bestimmt wird und somit ihre eigene Macht beschneidet und den Einfluss des als moderat geltenden Präsidenten Hassan Rohani forciert hätte. Daher wurde diese Variante eines Interimschefs gewählt“, analysiert ein Teheraner Politologe.

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Shahroudi nominated to head Assembly of Experts

Iran’s then-judiciary head Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi speaks during President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s swearing-in ceremony in Tehran, Aug. 5, 2009. (photo by REUTERS/Raheb Homavandi)

Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi Shahroudi, who has been named as a possible successor to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, has been nominated to take over the Assembly of Experts, the body that elects and supervises the supreme leader of Iran.

According to Ayatollah Ahmad Khatami, a member of the Assembly of Experts and on its board of directors, other possibilities include Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi, the former head of the judiciary and second deputy chairman of the Assembly; Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, chairman of the Guardian Council; and Ayatollah Ali Movahedi-Kermani, Tehran’s temporary Friday prayer leader.

Many Iranian and foreign-based Persian-language websites reported “Shahroudi as candidate for Assembly of Experts,” suggesting they consider him the most likely to take over the position after the death of late chairman Ayatollah Mohammad Reza Mahdavi Kani Oct. 21.

On the likelihood of Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani retaking the position he held from 2007 to 2011, Ahmad Khatami said, “From what I have heard, in some of the meetings, Mr. Rafsanjani has said that he has no desire for the chairmanship.” He said Rafsanjani could change his mind but at the moment, he is not being discussed for the chairmanship in the meetings.

Ahmad Khatami also dismissed his own candidacy, saying, “Foreign [news] networks have presented my name,” but he called the reports “malicious” and rejected some foreign media outlets‘ portrayal of him as “quickly climbing the stairs of promotion.”

Ahmad Khatami described the Assembly of Experts as “reinforcing the supreme leader” and said the assembly will continued to be the “base of velayat-e faqih,” or guardianship of the jurist, Iran’s system of governance.

Since 2012, Ayatollah Shahroudi has appeared in the Western media as Iran’s favored potential candidate to take over Ayatollah Ali Sistani’s role as the marja of Iraq. While this speculation ignores the complex and unofficial process by which marja are elevated and promoted in Najaf, it does shed some light on Iraqi-born Shahroudi’s growing clout in Iran.

Shahroudi is also one of the top figures mentioned as a possible successor to Ayatollah Khamenei. The 66-year-old marja has strong religious credentials and is the deputy chairman of the Assembly of Experts. After Mahdavi Kani fell into a coma in June, he became the interim chairman. He was also the former head of the judiciary, serving from 1999 to 2009.

Within the Islamic Republic, Shahroudi could be considered a conservative figure but not a hard-liner like Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah Yazdi or Ahmad Khatami. Neither is he overly close to Reformists the way Ayatollah Rafsanjani or Hassan Khomeini are. This neutrality makes him a candidate with which many of the power centers within the Islamic Republic could possibly work.

Ahmad Khatami explained that the next chairman must have a “stronger jurisprudence reputation than a political reputation” and described Shahroudi as “accepted by everyone.” He added that in a recent meeting, Shahroudi gave a speech about velayat-e faqih that “received considerable attention.”

The chairman will be elected the next time the assembly meets, which, according to Ahmad Khatami, will be in Iranian month of Esfand, which lasts from Feb. 20 to March 20, 2015.

Source: AL-Monitor

Irans Expertenrat sucht neuen Chef

AMIR LOGHMANY AUS TEHERAN

Nach Tod von Mahdavi-Kani könnte Einfluss von Expräsident Rafsanjani wachsen

Ein gutes Jahr vor zwei wichtigen Wahlen im Iran sind bis heute alle Versuche der konservativen Opposition, eine einheitliche Front zu bilden, fehlgeschlagen. In zwei lange vorbereiteten Konferenzen sollte ein neues Strategiepapier fertiggestellt und die Kluft zwischen den verschiedenen konservativen Kräften überwunden werden. Es war ein Fehlstart ohnegleichen. Die meisten namhaften Konservativen blieben fern und waren nicht bereit, sich mit dem alten Kader der früheren Regierung an einen Tisch zu setzen. Sie machen kein Hehl daraus, dass sie sich zur Politik von Präsident Hassan Rohani hingezogen fühlen.

Rafsanjani könnte wieder an die Spitze

Im Winter 2015/2016 stehen neben den Parlamentswahlen auch die Wahlen zur Neuzusammensetzung des Expertenrats bevor. Ein Mann steht wieder im Mittelpunkt des Interesses: Expräsident Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, der bis 2011 an der Spitze des Rats stand. Die Ultrakonservativen haben ihn als denjenigen ausgemacht, der die gemäßigten konservativen Kräfte im Iran um sich gesammelt und ermuntert hat, Hassan Rohani zu unterstützen.

Ein wichtiger Pfeiler der Konservativen, Ayatollah Mohammed Reza Mahdavi-Kani, Chef des Expertenrats nach Rafsanjani, verstarb am Dienstag nach langer Krankheit. Die Ultrakonservativen haben die Befürchtung, dass nun Rafsanjani wieder an die Spitze kommen könnte.

Der Expertenrat ist deshalb so wichtig, weil ihm die Aufgabe zukommt, beim Tod des religiösen Führers dessen Nachfolger zu wählen. Seit Monaten wird im Iran hinter vorgehaltener Hand darüber diskutiert und verschiedene Varianten einer neuen Führung durchgedacht.

Ob wie bisher, die Macht in einer Person, oder vielleicht in einem Gremium konzentriert sein soll, ist eine Frage, die wahrscheinlich der Expertenrat in den kommenden Jahren zu beantworten hat. Rafsanjani wird zugetraut, dass er, wie bei der Wahl Ali Khameneis vor 25 Jahren, eine große Rolle spielen kann. Damals setzte er gegen viele Bedenken Khamenei als Nachfolger Ayatollah Khomeinis durch.

Gegen die „Unmoral“

Ihre Schwäche hindert die Ultrakonserativen aber nicht daran, im Parlament einen Feldzug gegen die Verwestlichung der Gesellschaft und „Unmoral“ zu führen. Satellitenempfänger sollen verboten und die islamischen Vorschriften bei Frauen und Jugendlichen strenger durchgesetzt werden. Das ermutigt Extremisten: In Isfahan gibt es derzeit eine Welle von Säureattacken gegen Frauen, die ihr Haar „schlecht“ bedecken.

Quelle: (Amir Loghmany aus Teheran, DER STANDARD, 23.10.2014)