11.2014 – UK Home Office
Informationen und Richtlinien zur Schutzgewährung für britische Asylbehörden (Hintergrundinformationen; politisches System; Exekutivorgane; Justiz; Korruption; Bewegungsfreiheit; Staatsbürgerschaft; illegale Ausreise; gefälschte Dokumente) [ID 291322]
Gutachten oder Position: Country Information and Guidance Iran: Background information, including actors of protection, internal relocation and illegal exit.
11.2014 – UK Home Office
Informationen und Richtlinien zur Schutzgewährung für britische Asylbehörden zur Orientierung (Gesetzeslage und Behandlung durch den Staat; gesellschaftliche Behandlung) [ID 291319]
Gutachten oder Position: Country Information and Guidance Iran: Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity
UK Home Office| Informationen und Richtlinien zur Schutzgewährung für britische Asylbehörden zu JournalistInnen und BloggerInnen
Let’s start with Israel. There, the consensus is that the offer from the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany (P5+1) to Iran is similar to a deal recommended by Robert Einhornof the Brookings Institution in Washington.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu believed that the current P5+1 offer, which if Tehran accepted would leave it with a limited enrichment capacity on its soil, would be a “bad” deal. He has in fact stated that such a deal would be “catastrophic,” despite the deal’s requirement that Iran’s nuclear facilities be placed under some of the most stringent inspections possible by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
This attitude ignores numerous estimates that if Iran accepted the P5+1 offer, it would take a minimum of six months to a year to make a weapon with the limited number of centrifuges left on its soil, if and when Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei decides to give the order.
Leaving Iran with limited enrichment capacity is not an ideal situation for many Israelis. Ideally, the majority of Israelis would most probably prefer that the current Iranian regime, which has repeatedly called for the elimination of Israel, be left without a nuclear program. Most would probably prefer that the current regime in Iran be toppled and replaced with a democratic government.
However, none of this is likely to happen anytime soon. It’s extremely unlikely that Iran would agree to dismantle its entire nuclear program. There is also no sign of an imminent democratic revolution in Iran.
Therefore, if the deal being proposed by the P5+1 is accepted by Iran, would the Israeli public demand war? Would it turn against its own politicians for not stopping such a deal?
Highly unlikely. One major reason is that such a deal would address major concerns of the Israeli public regarding Iran’s nuclear program. These concerns include halting the advancement of Iran’s nuclear program while making it difficult and costly for Iran’s leadership to decide to make a nuclear weapon.
The Israeli public also has other priorities. When Israelis went to the polls last time in January 2013, according to a poll conducted and published by The Times of Israel, only 12% saw Iran as the most urgent issue. The biggest group, 43%, cited economic concerns as its top priority. There is no evidence to suggest that these priorities have changed since then.
The same applies to Iran. Its most powerful figure, and the person with the last word regarding the nuclear program, has publicly set out his 11 red lines regarding the nuclear negotiations.
One of the most notable of these holds that an agreement must enable Iran to ultimately expand its enrichment capacity to 190,000 separative work units. This means that instead of its 9,000 currentfunctioning centrifuges, Iran should be allowed to add approximately 180,000 next-generation centrifuges.
Therefore, anything less would be considered a “bad deal” for him.
So what would happen if Iran accepted the P5+1’s offer to recognize Iran’s right to enrich uranium on its soil in return for Iran halving the number of its operating centrifuges and agreeing to tougher inspections? Would the people of Iran revolt against their government? Would they insist their government reject such an offer at the cost of living under continued sanctions and isolation?
Highly unlikely. We have to remember that when it comes to the nuclear program, the voice and opinion of the people of Iran have a minuscule if any impact on the regime’s elite that designs the country’s nuclear strategy.
It’s not that the people of Iran don’t want to have an impact; they do. In most cases, they are prevented from doing so by the ruling elite.
There are several cases that prove this point.
First and foremost, calls for a referendum over the nuclear program have been rejected. Then there is the fact that the regime does not even allow any debate in the press, especially any that presents ideas that run counter to the establishment’s narrative regarding the nuclear program. When Tehran University professor Sadegh Zibakalam did counter the narrative by publicly stating that he does not see any benefit in Iran’s current nuclear program, he received a suspended sentence of 18 months in prison.
If the Iranian nuclear program belonged to the people of Iran, it would be they who would set the negotiations’ red lines, and not an unelected official such as Ayatollah Khamenei. But this is not the case.
If the leaders of the Islamic Republic are confident of the public’s backing when it comes to their current nuclear strategy, why do they prevent public debate? Why do they sentence to jail those who dispute their narrative? Why not allow a referendum? Iran would not be the first country to hold a referendum regarding its civilian nuclear program. The answer seems clear: Iran’s leadership does not believe that it has the public’s backing for its current nuclear strategy.
Although there have been a number of polls inside Iran, including a July survey by the University of Tehran and University of Maryland that showed public support for the current nuclear strategy of the Iranian government, there is reason to be skeptical of such polls.
In Iran, people can be sentenced to jail for countering the government narrative regarding the nuclear program, especially to an unknown stranger over the phone who has their contact details. In such an atmosphere, the fear factor could affect poll results.
Hassan Rouhani was elected on the platform of improving Iran’s economy and the welfare of Iranian citizens. One of his main campaign slogans regarding the nuclear program was that not only the nuclear program but the economy should also function and thrive.
Although Iran’s economy has improved somewhat since Rouhani entered office, numerous major problems still remain. Inflation is at 20%. Subsidies have been cut. Iran’s economy is still very much suffering because of sanctions, and a historic drought is on the way that will need many billions of dollars to manage.
Much as in the Israeli public, there are no indications that the priorities of the people of Iran have changed since the last legislative elections in the country. Again, like the people of Israel, economic issues seem as if not more important than the nuclear program to the Iranian public. Both populations want the situation to de-escalate, and for their leaders to address other important domestic issues.
The people of both Iran and Israel could live with the P5+1’s current offer to Iran. It’s now up to their leaders, especially the supreme leader of Iran, who has the last word on Iran’s nuclear program.
An exploration and critique of the use of mental health information within refugee status determination proceedings in the United Kingdom
by Jennifer Barrett, Ilim Baturalp, Nath Gbikpi, Katherine Rehberg
This study seeks to understand the composition, use and cultural orientation of mental health evidence within the UK’s refugee status determination (RSD) process, focusing specifically on mental health evidence provided in the form of a medico-legal report (MLR). By exploring those themes, this paper also strives to provide insight into what constitutes “valid” medical evidence in the context of RSD. Employing a constructivist paradigm, the study is based on 14 interviews with individuals involved in the production of mental health evidence, analysis of documents providing guidance about the production of MLRs, and analysis of MLRs themselves. It is argued that the “validity” of an MLR is based on the one hand on the perceived credibility of MLRs, and on the other hand on the perceived veracity of the mental health information it contains. The perception that evidence is “valid” can be seen as proportionate to the extent to which the report author is considered to be credible and able to frame and articulate information in a “neutral and objective way”. However, this “objectivity” is an expression of a particular, culturally specific conception of mental health; one that is framed within a Western, biomedical paradigm. As such, the MLR author has a de facto role of structuring and channelling a range of cross-cultural information into a particular, culturally specific model.
Trotz verbesserter Beziehungen Teherans zur internationalen Gemeinschaft sieht Großbritannien kaum Fortschritte bei der Einhaltung der Menschenrechte in dem Land. Es gebe „ernsthafte“ Bedenken bei der Religionsfreiheit und beim Umgang mit Journalisten, hieß es in einem am Montag veröffentlichten Bericht des britischen Außenministeriums. Zwischen Oktober und Dezember 2013 habe es „keine substanzielle Verbesserung“ der Menschenrechtssituation gegeben, hieß es darin.
There was no substantive improvement in the human rights situation in Iran between October and December 2013. .
Latest Update: 31 December 2013
There was no substantive improvement in the human rights situation in Iran between October and December 2013. The Iranian government continued to make positive public statements on civil rights issues, but there has been no sign of institutional change to improve the human rights situation, including for minority religious and ethnic groups, journalists and human rights defenders, prisoners and women.
Iran continues to have the second highest execution rate per capita in the world. On 26 October, 16 convicted prisoners were executed in retaliation for the killing of 14 Iranian border guards the day before. It is reported that the prisoners were not connected to the deaths of the border guards and were executed without due process. The UK opposes the use of the death penalty as a matter of principle. On 28 October, Minister for the Middle East, Hugh Robertson, released a statementurging Iran to place a moratorium on the death penalty. Lies den Rest dieses Beitrags
Im Interview mit der Regisseurin von „I Am Nasrine“
Zur Zeit läuft „I Am Nasrine“, das Spielfilmdebüt der iranischstämmigen Regisseurin Tina Gharavi, auf Festivals weltweit, im Februar soll er auf DVD erscheinen. Beim Brooklyn Film Festival wurde er für das Beste Drehbuch ausgezeichnet, war außerdem für einen BAFTA Award nominiert. Ben Kingsley bezeichnete ihn als „wichtigen und sehr notwendigen Film“. Gharavi zeichnet darin das einfühlsame Portrait einer jungen Iranerin, die nach England flüchtet und dort zwischen allen Stühlen sitzt auf der Suche nach einer neuen Identität. Ein Film, der nicht nur ein Schlaglicht auf die heutigen Verhältnisse in Iran wirft, sondern auch das Dilemma von Flüchtlingen in den Mittelpunkt stellt, die sich mit einer neuen Kultur arrangieren wollen, ohne die eigene aufzugeben oder zu verleugnen. Gharavi drehte Teile des Films ohne Drehgenehmigung in Teheran – ein gefährliches Unterfangen. Auf dem Höhepunkt der Zusammenstöße zwischen Opposition und Regierungskräften nach den Wahlfälschungen im Juni 2009 schmuggelte sie das Material außer Landes…
Frau Gharavi, nach der Islamischen Revolution gingen Sie ins Exil nach England und kehrten zwei Jahrzehnte später zurück. Was war der Anlass?
Gharavi: Nach dreiundzwanzig Jahren im Exil kehrte ich nach Iran zurück, um meine Mutter zu treffen. Für den britischen Channel 4 drehte ich eine Film mit dem Titel „Mother / Country“. Das war ein besonders emotionale Erfahrung: ich dachte darüber nach, wie ich diese faszinierende Kultur verlassen hatte und dass Kinder von Migranten in gewisser Weise Kinder einer dritten Kultur sind. Diese Kinder sind weder „östlich“ noch „westlich“, sondern irgendwie beides. Ich wollte die Geschichte der ersten Migrantengeneration erzählen. 2001 lud ich Einwanderer zu mir nach Hause in England ein und sprach mit ihnen über ihre Erfahrungen. Die meisten hatten einen Flucht-Hintergrund, hatten hier Asyl gesucht. Die Exilerfahrung hat auf viele Menschen großen Einfluss, vor allem was die Themen Identität und Zugehörigkeit betrifft.
Und daraus entstand dann Ihr Film „I Am Nasrine“… Lies den Rest dieses Beitrags
THE GOLHA PROJECT WEBSITE: Online Portal for Researching Persian Music and Poetry
Der britische Ableger von Standard Chartered soll die Identität iranischer Geschäftspartner verschleiert und damit das US-Geldwäschegesetz gebrochen haben. Auf einen Hinweis der US-Mutter reagierten die Londoner Banker deftig.
IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMME
After Talks Falter, Iran Says It Won’t Halt Uranium Work
Iran’s nuclear chief, reversing the country’s previous statements, said on state television on Sunday that the country would not halt its production of higher-grade uranium, suggesting that the Iranian government was veering back to a much harder line after talks in Baghdad with the West last week ended badly.
U.N. inspectors find high-grade uranium traces in Iran
The IAEA report said environmental samples taken in February at Iran’s Fordow facility – buried deep beneath rock and soil to protect it from air strikes – showed the presence of particles with enrichment levels of up to 27 percent. That is above the 20 percent enrichment level Iran has declared at the site, and takes it across the line from low-enriched to high-enriched uranium.
Iran has enough uranium for five nuclear weapons, claims US thinktank
Iran had produced almost 6.2 tonnes of uranium enriched to a level of 3.5% since it began the work in 2007 – some of which has subsequently been further processed into higher-grade material. This equates to nearly 750 kg more than in the previous IAEA report issued in February, and the thinktank said Iran’s monthly production had risen by roughly a third. Lies den Rest dieses Beitrags