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Bundestag| Iran darf nicht die Fähigkeit zur nuklearen Bewaffnung erlangen

Staatengemeinschaft sollte sich nicht alleine auf Zusicherungen Irans verlassen

Der Bundestag debattiert am heutigen Donnerstag über das vorläufige Atomabkommen mit dem Iran. Dazu erklärt der außenpolitische Sprecher der CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion, Philipp Mißfelder:
„Die CDU/CSU-Bundestagsfraktion nimmt die Besorgnisse Israels hinsichtlich des Genfer Abkommens über das iranische Atomprogramm sehr ernst. Deshalb muss die Islamische Republik Iran jetzt die Gelegenheit nutzen, jeden Zweifel an ihrer Behauptung auszuräumen, die Urananreicherung diene ausschließlich der friedlichen Nutzung. Als eines der erdölreichsten Länder der Welt betont das Land bei jeder Gelegenheit, es brauche diese Atomanlagen zur Energiegewinnung. Diese Argumentation ist äußerst widersprüchlich.

Trotz des Kompromisses, den Iran mit den Vetomächten des UN-Sicherheitsrates und Deutschland gefunden hat, prägt die Feindschaft zu Amerika und zum jüdischen Staat Israel weiterhin das Denken der Teheraner Führung. So erklärte der oberste religiöse Führer des Irans, Ajatollah Ali Khamenei, noch während die Atomverhandlungen in Genf liefen, dass Israel seinen Untergang nicht vermeiden könne. Diese Aussagen stehen in einer langen Reihe von offiziellen iranischen Äußerungen, die von einer maßlosen Vernichtungsrhetorik gegenüber Israel geprägt sind.

Der Iran war in der Vergangenheit sehr geschickt darin, seine wahren Absichten zu verschleiern und die Welt zu täuschen. Deshalb darf die internationale Staatengemeinschaft nicht den Fehler machen, sich alleine auf seine Zusicherungen zu verlassen. In den kommenden Wochen und Monaten wird es darauf ankommen, dass die Einhaltung der Zusagen nachprüfbar ist. Der Iran darf nicht die Fähigkeit haben, sich nuklear zu bewaffnen. Daher muss der Druck auf den Iran aufrecht erhalten werden.“

 

Hintergrund:

Nach dem in Genf gefundenen Kompromiss muss der Iran die bislang gebauten Atomreaktoren zunächst nicht zurückbauen, sondern darf sie weiter betreiben. Das Uran darf aber nur zu einem geringen Prozentsatz angereichert werden, so dass es nicht waffenfähig ist. Das Abkommen gilt zunächst für ein halbes Jahr.

Quelle: CDU/CSU-Fraktion im Deutschen Bundestag

 

IAEA and Iran – DOKUMENTATION

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Statement by IAEA and Iran Following Technical Talks in Tehran
11 November 2013 | Following technical talks between IAEA and Iranian experts in Tehran today, here is the text of a joint statement read by Tero Varjoranta, IAEA Deputy Director General and Head of the Department of Safeguards, and H.E. Ambassador Reza Najafi of the Islamic Republic of Iran. More →

Additional News Resources

 

Diplomats: Earthquakes Damage Iranian Nuclear Power Plant

Source: VOA

Two diplomats say Iran’s only nuclear power plant, which already has raised safety concerns, has been damaged by recent earthquakes. The unidentified diplomats told the Associated Press that international monitors believe large cracks have developed in one part of the Bushehr plant.


Destruction near the city of Bushehr, Iran, after a 6.1 magnitude earthquake struck on April 9, 2012.

Iran has refused to join a global treaty on nuclear plant safety and Bushehr has been shut down several times since it opened in 2011.

Iran’s neighbors, including Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, have said they are concerned about the safety of the Russian-built nuclear reactor.

Iran has insisted Bushehr is safe and says it was built to hold up in all but the most powerful of earthquakes.

Several earthquakes struck Iran in April and May, including a 7.7-magnitude quake. Bushehr was built to generate power and the West is not concerned that it could contribute to Iran’s suspected nuclear weapons program.

 

Iran Today: Presidential Election — The Significance of Funerals and Football

Iran’s Presidential candidates seized the opportunity on Tuesday to make political capital from two important events — the ceremony commemorating the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and Iran’s victory over Qatar in a World Cup qualifying match.

Candidates Saeed Jalili and Mohammad-Baqer Qalibaf at Tuesday’s ceremony on the anniversary of the death of Ayatollah Khomeini

A Jalili supporter outside the ceremony

Moderate candidate Hassan Rouhani did not attend the Khomeini ceremony. Instead, he grabbed headlines by travelling to Isfahan to attend the funeral of Grand Ayatollah Jalaleddin Taheri. Lies den Rest dieses Beitrags

Atombehörde kritisiert Iran – Verhandlungen ‚drehen sich im Kreis‘

Die internationale Atomenergiebehörde IAEA hat ungewöhnlich direkte Kritik an der Führung in Teheran geübt – zehn Verhandlungsrunden über das umstrittene Atomprogramm haben bisher zu keinem Ergebnis geführt. ‚Um ehrlich zu sein, wir drehen uns jetzt schon seit einiger Zeit im Kreis‘, sagte IAEA-Chef Yukiya Amano zum Auftakt der Sitzung des Gouverneursrates am Montag in Wien. Dies sei nicht der richtige Weg, um solche Themen mit weltweiter Bedeutung zu besprechen.

‚Wir brauchen ohne weitere Verzögerung konkrete Ergebnisse, um das internationale Vertrauen in den friedlichen Charakter des iranischen Atomprogramms wiederherzustellen‘, sagte der japanische Atomchef. Solange sich der Iran nicht bewege, könne seine Behörde eine militärische Dimension des Nuklearprogramms nicht ausschließen.

Viele Länder verdächtigen die Teheraner Führung, unter dem Deckmantel eines zivilen Atomprogramms heimlich Atombomben entwickeln zu lassen. Weil der Iran nicht ausreichend mit den IAEA-Kontrolleuren zusammenarbeitet, kann die UN-Behörde das auch nicht mehr ausschließen.

Zuletzt waren mehrere Verhandlungsrunden auf internationaler und IAEA-Ebene ergebnislos geblieben. Dem Gouverneursrat gehören Vertreter aus 35 Staaten an. Von der Konferenz des Leitungsgremiums werden aber keine neuen Entwicklungen erwartet.

Einer der offenen Punkte zwischen der IAEA und dem Iran ist der Zugang zu einer Militäranlage in Parchin: Dort vermuten westliche Geheimdienste Atomexperimente, was der Iran bestreitet. Bisher ließ das Land trotz wiederholter Forderung keine Atomkontrolleure in die Anlage und führte dort in den vergangenen Monaten umfangreiche Um- und Abbauarbeiten durch. ‚Selbst wenn wir nun Zugang zu Parchin bekommen, könnte man dort möglicherweise nichts mehr finden‘, sagte Amano am Montag. Er betonte, dass die Vorgänge dort dennoch von großem Interesse für die IAEA seien.

 

U.S. Policy Toward Iran

Wendy Sherman
Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Chairman Menendez, Ranking Member Corker, distinguished Members of the Committee: Thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the Administration’s approach to the multiple challenges posed by Iran – by its nuclear ambitions, its support for international terrorism and destabilizing activities in the region, and its human rights abuses at home. I want to use this opportunity to speak clearly about these challenges; to lay out the multi-vectored strategy we are pursuing to counter them; and to be clear about the consequential choices ahead for America and our allies, but especially for Iran, its rulers, and its people.The Nuclear Challenge

Iran’s nuclear activity – in violation of its international obligations and in defiance of the international community – is one of the greatest global concerns we face. A nuclear-armed Iran would pose a threat to the region, to the world, and to the future of the global nuclear proliferation regime. It would risk an arms race in a region already rife with violence and conflict. A nuclear weapon would embolden a regime that already spreads instability through its proxies and threatens chokepoints in the global economy. It would put the world’s most dangerous weapons into the hands of leaders who speak openly about wiping one of our closest allies, the state of Israel, off the map. In confronting this challenge, our policy has been clear: we are determined to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. Our preference is to resolve this through diplomacy. However, as President Obama has stated unequivocally, we will not allow Iran to obtain a nuclear weapon, and there should be no doubt that the United States will use all elements of American power to achieve that objective.

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has asked why it is that the international community does not believe that Iran’s nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only. The answer is simple: Iran has consistently concealed its nuclear activities and continues to do so, denying required access and information to the International Atomic Energy Agency. As a signatory to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran has responsibilities to the international community, and it is that blatant disregard for those responsibilities that has made Iran the subject of four UN Security Council resolutions imposing mandatory sanctions. Lies den Rest dieses Beitrags

Reuters: U.N. watchdog, EU’s Ashton to press Iran in nuclear dispute

Herman Nackaerts, head of a delegation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), speaks to journalists at the airport in Vienna after arriving from Iran January 18, 2013. REUTERS-Leonhard Foeger
European Union foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton speaks at the start of an EU foreign ministers meeting in Luxembourg April 22, 2013. REUTERS-Francois Lenoir

1 of 2. Herman Nackaerts, head of a delegation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), speaks to journalists at the airport in Vienna after arriving from Iran January 18, 2013.

Credit: Reuters/Leonhard Foeger

By Fredrik Dahl and Parisa Hafezi

VIENNA/ISTANBUL |

(Reuters) – Iran faces international pressure over its nuclear program in two separate meetings on Wednesday, but no breakthrough is expected with the Islamic state focused on next month’s presidential election.

In Vienna, the U.N. nuclear agency will once again urge Iran to stop stonewalling its inquiry into suspected atomic bomb research by Tehran, which denies any intent to make such arms.

The talks started around 10 a.m. (4 a.m. EDT) at Iran’s diplomatic mission in the Austrian capital.

„Differences remain but we … are determined to solve these issues,“ Herman Nackaerts, deputy director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), told reporters.

Later over dinner in Istanbul, the European Union’s top diplomat will meet Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator – also now a presidential candidate – to discuss a broader diplomatic effort bid to resolve a row that could ignite war in the Middle East.

The two sets of talks represent distinct diplomatic tracks but are linked because both center on suspicions that Iran may be seeking the capability to assemble nuclear bombs behind the facade of a declared civilian atomic energy program.

Any movement in the decade-old standoff will probably have to wait until after Iranians vote on June 14 for a successor to President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, analysts and diplomats say.

Even though it is Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei who decides Iran’s nuclear policy, the conservative leadership may want to tread cautiously ahead of a poll in which loyalists will be challenged by two major independents.

With the election coming up, „the Iranians will do everything to keep everything stable,“ one Western envoy said.

SPECTRE OF MILITARY ACTION

Israel and the United States have threatened possible military action if diplomacy and increasingly tough trade and energy sanctions fail to make Iran curb its nuclear program.

Tehran says its nuclear activity has only peaceful purposes and that it is Israel, widely believed to be the Middle East’s only nuclear-armed power, that threatens peace and stability.

The IAEA has been trying for more than a year to coax Iran into letting it resume an inquiry into what the U.N. watchdog calls the „possible military dimensions“ of its nuclear work.

Wednesday’s talks in Vienna will be the 10th round of negotiations between the two sides since early 2012, so far without a framework agreement that would give the IAEA the access it wants to sites, officials and documents.

Full Story

 

Neue Atomgespräche zwischen dem Iran und der IAEA am 15. Mai

Die Atomgespräche zwischen dem Iran und der Internationalen Atomenergiebehörde (IAEA) werden am 15. Mai in Wien fortgesetzt.
Das teilte die UN-Behörde am Dienstag in Wien mit. Ziel des Treffens sei es, einen Ablaufplan zur Untersuchung angeblicher Atomwaffenprojekte zu erreichen, wie die IAEA-Sprecherin Gill Tudor sagte.

Die seit über einem Jahr laufenden Atomgespräche haben bisher keine greifbaren Entwicklungen gebracht. Beim bisher letzten Treffen im Februar konnten sich die beiden Seiten auf keinen Modus für die von der IAEA verlangten Inspektionen einigen. Die IAEA-Experten fordern Zugang zur umstrittenen Militäranlage Parchin, wo wichtige Bauteile für Atomwaffen getestet worden sein sollen.

Viele Staaten verdächtigen den Iran, unter dem Deckmantel der zivilen Nutzung der Kernkraft heimlich am Bau von Atomwaffen zu arbeiten. Teheran bestreitet dies vehement.

Quelle: DPA/Reuters/IAEO

 

Part II: What Would it Take to Build a Bomb?

Interview with Colin Kahl by Garrett Nada

What steps would be necessary for Iran to build a nuclear weapon?

            President Obama has estimated that it would take Iran “over a year or so” for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon. But that device would likely be crude and too large to fit on a ballistic missile. Producing a nuclear weapon that could be launched at Israel, Europe, or the United States would take substantially longer. Iran would need to complete three key steps.
      Step 1: Produce Fissile Material
      Fissile material is the most important component of a nuclear weapon. There are two types of fissile material: weapons-grade uranium and plutonium. Tehran has worked primarily on uranium. There are three levels or enrichment to understand the controversy surrounding Iran’s program:
·90 percent enrichment: The most likely route for Iran to produce fissile material would be to enrich its growing stockpile of low-enriched uranium to 90 percent purity —or weapons-grade level. Western intelligence agencies suggest Iran has not decided to enrich uranium to 90 percent.
·3.5 percent enrichment: As of early 2013, Iran had approximately 18,000 pounds of “low-enriched uranium” enriched to the 3.5 percent level (the level used to fuel civilian nuclear power plants). This stockpile would be sufficient to produce up to seven nuclear bombs, but only if it were further enriched to weapons-grade level (above the 90 percent purity level). Experts estimate Iran would need at least four months to produce enough weapons-grade uranium for one bomb using 3.5 percent enriched uranium as the starting point.
      ·20 percent enrichment: In early 2013, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the
       U.N. watchdog group that inspects Iranian nuclear facilities, said Iran also had a stockpile of
       375 pounds of 20 percent low-enriched uranium, ostensibly to provide fuel for a medical
       research reactor. This stockpile is about two-thirds of the 551 pounds needed to produce one
       bomb’s worth of weapons-grade material if further enriched. If Iran accumulated sufficient
       quantities of 20 percent low-enriched uranium, it might be able to enrich enough
       weapons-grade uranium for a single bomb in a month or two.
            The main issue is the status of the uranium enriched to 20 percent and the two production sites—at the Fordo plant outside the northern city of Qom and the Natanz facility in central Iran. U.N. inspectors visit these sites every week or two, however, so any move to produce weapons-grade uranium in an accelerated timeframe as short as a month would be detected. Knowing this, Iran is unlikely to act.
            The speed of enrichment also depends on the centrifuges used, both their number and their quality. For a long time, Iran had used thousands of fairly slow IR-1 centrifuges to spin and then separate uranium isotopes. But since January 2013, it has started to install IR-2M centrifuges, which spin three to five times faster. In early 2013, Tehran claimed to be using about 200 IR-2Ms at the Natanz site.
           Tehran might be able to enrich enough uranium for one bomb ― from 20 percent purity to 90 percent ― in as little as two weeks if it installs large numbers of advanced IR-2M centrifuges. Iran has announced its intention to eventually install as many as 3,000.
Step 2: Develop a Warhead
           Iran would next have to build a nuclear device. It would need to build a warhead based on an “implosion” design if Iran wanted to deliver a nuclear device on a missile. It would include a core composed of weapons-grade uranium (or plutonium) and a neutron initiator surrounded by conventional high explosives designed to compress the core and set off a self-sustaining nuclear chain reaction.
           IAEA documents claim, “Iran has sufficient information to be able to design and produce a workable implosion nuclear device based upon HEU [highly enriched uranium] as the fission fuel.” The IAEA has also expressed concerns that Iran may have conducted conventional high-explosive tests at its military facility at Parchin that could be used to develop a nuclear warhead.
           There is no evidence, however, that Iran is currently working to design or construct such a warhead. Even if Iran made the decision, production of a warhead small enough, light enough, and reliable enough to mount on a ballistic missile is complicated. Iran would probably need at least a few years to accomplish this technological achievement.
Step 3: Marry the Warhead to an Effective Delivery System
           If Iran built a nuclear warhead, it would need a way to deliver it. Tehran’s medium-range Shahab-3 has a range of up to 1,200 miles, long enough to strike anywhere in the Middle East, including Israel, and possibly southeastern Europe. These missiles are highly inaccurate, but they are theoretically capable of carrying a nuclear warhead if Iran is able to design one.
           Iran’s Sajjil-2, another domestically produced medium-range ballistic missile, reportedly has a range of 1,375 miles when carrying a 1,650-pound warhead. Tehran is the only country to develop a missile with that range before a nuclear weapon. But the missile has only been tested once since 2009, which may mean it needs further fine-tuning before deployment. Iran also relies on foreign sources for a number of components for the Sajjil-2.
           Iran is probably years away from developing a missile that could hit the United States. A 2012 Department of Defense report said Iran “may be technically capable” of flight testing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) by 2015 if it receives foreign assistance. But in December 2012, a congressional report said Iran is unlikely to develop an ICBM in this timeframe, and many analysts estimate that Tehran would need until 2020.
Is the North Korean experience relevant?
           The Clinton administration confronted a similar dilemma in 1993 on North Korea’s nuclear program. The intelligence community assessed that Pyongyang had one or two bombs’ worth of weapons-grade plutonium. But the intelligence community could not tell the president with a high degree of certainty if North Korea had actually built operational nuclear weapons.
           The mere existence of a few bombs’ worth of weapons-grade plutonium seemed to have a powerful deterrent effect on the United States. Washington could not be sure where the material was stored, or if the North Koreans were close to producing a weapon.
           The same concerns could apply to Iran if it developed the capability to produce weapons-grade uranium so quickly that it avoids detection even at declared facilities― or if it was able to enrich bomb-grade material at a secret facility. Then Iran might be able to hide the fissile material, making it more difficult for a military strike to destroy. All the other parts of the program, such as weapons design, preparing the uranium core, and fabrication and assembly of other key weapon components, could potentially be done in places dispersed across the country that are easier to conceal and more difficult to target.
           Iran may be years away from being able to place a nuclear warhead on a reliable long-range missile. But many analysts are concerned that the game is up once Iran produces enough fissile material for a bomb.
Colin H. Kahl served as the deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East from 2009 to 2011. He is currently an associate professor at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security.
Source: USIP

 

Iran: Fakten

Hauptstadt: Teheran
Staatsform: Islamische Republik
Staatsoberhaupt: Oberster Rechtsgelehrter
Seyyed Ali Chamenei
Regierungschef: Staatspräsident
Mahmud Ahmadinedschad
Fläche: 1 628 750 km2
Einwohnerzahl: 71 208 000 (Stand 2007)
Bevölkerungsdichte: 42,8 Einwohner pro km2
BIP 212 Mrd. US-Dollar (2006)
BIP/Einwohner: 3045 US-Dollar (2006)

 

Lies den Rest dieses Beitrags

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