Blog-Archive
MIGAZIN| Zur Karriere und Funktion abschätziger Begriffe in der deutschen Asylpolitik
In der politischen Polemik gegen „Asylmissbrauch“ haben gefährliche Kampfbegriffe Karriere gemacht: von der Prägung in denunziatorischer Absicht über den Alltagsgebrauch bis zur Bestätigung durch lexikalische Festschreibungen. Von Prof. Klaus J. Bade
Will Qasem Soleimani enter politics?
On the Iranian Students’ News Agency (ISNA), Zahra Asghari took a closer look at the man who competed head to head in polls for Iran’s Person of the Year with the popular nuclear negotiator Mohammad Javad Zarif.
Asghari wrote that when pictures of Soleimani in Iraq first appeared on social media, ISNA chose not to republish the pictures assuming that the images were accidentally leaked online. But as more images of Soleimani appeared in Iraq, on the front line among Iraqi forces and leaders, it became clear the pictures were being released intentionally.
Asghari wrote that while a number of IRGC commanders are advising the Iraqi forces and the Popular Mobilization Units fighting IS, it is clear that Soleimani’s role goes beyond that. Asghari continued that the pictures of Soleimani across various provinces in Iraq have raised questions domestically, regionally and internationally. And since there seems to be no desire by Iranian officials to answer these questions, it has only fueled more rumors and speculation.
Despite Soleimani being the head of the Quds Force, before June 2014, there were few pictures, videos or speeches available of him to the point that Asghari wrote that before this point “interviewing him or writing a report about him was not possible for Iranian media.” Interestingly, even in this long profile of Soleimani, none of the sources Asghari interviewed were willing to speak on the record. The sources of course all had high praise for Soleimani, telling Asghari that they believe that the only other figure who has the same attributes and success record as Soleimani is Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah.
Despite the popularity of his pictures in Iraq, Asghari noted that Soleimani pictures in Tehran, at the funeral of commanders and fighters killed in Syria and Iraq, or at IRGC ceremonies, have become popular as well. Asghari also wrote that Soleimani was at a funeral ceremony for Jihad Mughniyeh, son of former Hezbollah commander Imad Mughniyeh who was assassinated in 2008 by Israeli and US intelligence. Jihad was killed by an Israel strike in the Golan Heights in January 2015. The article says that Jihad was the nephew of Soleimani. Though it’s not confirmed anywhere else, Iranian media before have reported that Imad Mughniyeh was married to Soleimani’s sister.
The central question that Asghari asks is: “Has the 59-year-old unrivaled commander of the battlefield outside of Iran’s borders ever thought about the world of politics?” Asghari, naturally, does not have an exact answer, but she has ideas.
When a source close to Soleimani was asked about claims that Soleimani is “Iran’s foreign minister in the region,” he responded “the stature of Soleimani is higher than that of a foreign minister.” The source continued that Soleimani “is not a partisan” figure and that his experiences in the Balkans, the Middle East and eastern Iran have made him a “military specialist.”
Asghari wrote that “despite access to precise information, the pictures of Soleimani speak for themselves.” The article argued that in none of the pictures of Soleimani in Iraq was he wearing an IRGC uniform or even an Iraqi uniform and is not even wearing military boots, suggesting that the pictures reveal desires for a nonmilitary role.
It’s impossible to know what Soleimani’s next steps are. At the moment, the commander who appears to prefer to spend his time in the trenches at the front line in Iraq may not be tempted by the monotony and bureaucracy that comes with public office. But given his popularity and closeness to Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Soleimani has a wide range of options.
Source: ALMonitor
Iran’s new military policy could boost birthrates
Military service has been a point of conflict between the youth and the establishment over the past three decades, ever since the 1979 revolution. All Iranian males are required to report for military service at age 18. However, college students can receive a temporary educational exemption, while others can seek exemption for medical reasons or if they need to care for elderly parents.
According to statistics, each year about 2 million students graduate from universities in Iran. Unless they have obtained a temporary or permanent exemption, they are required to report to a military service center within a year after graduation. Failure to do so results in an additional three to six months of service.
Leaving an academic environment for a military garrison is a point of stress and anxiety for many young students. “I seriously thought I was going to go mad when I heard that they have added three more months to the compulsory service,” said Adel, a graduate student of electronics at the Khajeh Nasir Toosi University of Technology. “If I am supposed to end up in a military garrison, then I should have gone for it after I finished high school when I was 18. The service time was shorter back then. It’s going to be two years of my life!”
In 2009, the army shortened military service to 18 months. Service time was further shortened for men with bachelor’s, master’s or doctoral degrees to one to three months. In 2012, however, military service was set at 21 months for all citizens. Now, from 2015, it will increase to 24 months.
Mehdi Karroubi, a candidate in the 2009 presidential elections and a Green Movement leader, said that reforming the military service law would be a priority if he were to be elected. According to his proposed plan, military service would be made into a profession in Iran. Those who abstain from service would be required to pay a fee and take part in a 60-day training program.
In 1999, the Iranian parliament passed a proposal allowing Iranian men to pay a fee to exempt themselves from military service. The amount, depending on the applicant’s education level, ranged from 1.3 to 2.5 million tomans ($1,600 to $3,100). The conservative faction criticized this proposal, calling it discriminatory against the less affluent. By the end of the year, the proposal was completely dismissed.
After the West imposed sanctions on Iran, the country’s income level, which mostly comes from the oil industry, radically decreased. As a result, the army’s allocated budget has subsequently decreased over the past three years — a reality that has affected soldiers’ salaries and living conditions in the garrisons.
In April, Brig. Gen. Hamid Sadr Sadat, the head of the Military Service Organization, announced, “The proposal that was confirmed by the parliament regarding the increase in the salaries of soldiers is still within the agenda of the organization.”
Yet, last October, Tehran member of parliament and former Sepah commander Esmaeil Kowsari told Tasnim News that there was no budget allocated for this issue.
According to officials in the Military Service Organization, soldiers’ salaries range from 100,000 to 110,000 tomans per month ($30 to $35). Aside from this, soldiers do not have suitable living standards.
Alireza completed his military service after receiving his doctorate in pharmaceuticals. He talked to Al-Monitor about his two-month training program in a military garrison in Tehran, saying that the soldiers faced malnutrition. “Vegetables, fruit, dairy products and other sources of calcium and vitamins were nonexistent. The quality of food was disastrous, but this was not the only problem. The other problem was the quantity of rice and meat. For example, they would put only 20 grams of meat in a stew. Everyone was constantly hungry.”
In February 2014, Esmaeil Ahmadi Moghaddam, head of the Law Enforcement Forces, confirmed thatsoldiers faced malnutrition, saying, “Our low budget is preventing us from distributing protein-rich and vitamin-rich foods among the soldiers.”
A member of the Islamic Iran Participation Front (Mosharekat) told Al-Monitor, on the condition of anonymity, “This compulsory service is partly about expanding the policy of force and control. It is similar to the mandatory hijab. The establishment wants to keep its authority over the country’s youth. When highly educated young men spend a lot of time in the military garrisons, their mental and physical health declines. It is hard to understand why a government would do this to its own human and social capital.”
He added, “What I don’t understand, however, is why they are increasing the duration of the compulsory service given our current situation and the economic crisis. When we don’t have a [sufficient] budget for the armed forces, why are we adding three more months to the compulsory military service?”
Some believe the service-extension decision was made in relation to the Iranian government’s recent policy of encouraging parents to have more children.
During Brig. Gen. Kamali’s Sept. 30 announcement regarding the new law, he said, “Married soldiers will have their service time shortened by three months. Also, for each child, another three months is subtracted. In other words, if a soldier is married and has one child, his service time will be shortened by six months.”
A military official working in the Military Service Organization in Tehran told Al-Monitor, “We couldn’t really figure out why they added three more months to the compulsory service, unless it really is about encouraging young people to have children.”
The official believes it could also be related to the rise in unemployment and the current economic decline. “Well, this way, each of these young men have to spend three more months in the garrison, which is better than staying home and being unemployed.”
Source: AL-Monitor
What do the Iranians really want?
Trying to understand what Iran wants in its nuclear program can be exasperating and even futile.
Obviously, the world doesn’t really know what the chiefs in Tehran want nor can we take their denials at militarizing their program at face value because a) Tehran has a history of breaking the rules, b) Tehran’s nuclear program is far from transparent and c) Tehran might have a lot to gain regionally from a nuclear bomb.
The message to Iran – don’t build a bomb!
Iran with a nuclear bomb will put the P5+1 and the UN in a position in which they will have to demilitarize Iran’s nuclear power by force which might lead to a war that will make the Gulf War look like a neighborhood squabble.
The US is desperate for Iran to sign a deal because the immediate alternative is to increase sanctions against Iran which might cause a further fall-out of support from countries who are hungry to capitalize on Iran’s wealth of natural energy. Increasing sanctions and watching them being circumvented by its own partners would be a real slap in the face which the US would have to answer with military aggression.
So what does the US, the P5+1 and the UN want from Iran? To maintain a transparent nuclear program that includes a longer break-out time for it to build a bomb if it decided to do so.
The messages from Iran – maybe, maybe not
Since Rouhani was elected president, the signals from Tehran were decidedly mixed: Rouhani called for a change that will bring a rapprochement with the West, end the burden of sanctions and allow Iranians to prosper.
But at the same time, the mullahs in Tehran wanted to maintain the nuclear program “as is” regardless of the fact that much of it was based on clear digressions from IAEA rules and regulations over the years and that the amount of uranium being enriched went way beyond the domestic electric needs.
And since Khamenei is the supreme power, it is enough to view his mixed signals to get the picture: Initially, Khamenei supported the Iranian negotiators encouraging them to practice “heroic flexibility” in regards to giving up parts of the program. But once the P5+1 negotiators tried to block the holes in the initial deal (the heavy water plant in Arak, topping Uranium enrichment at 5%, opening up the Parchin military base etc…), Khamenei’s support withered and strengthened depending on his moods or the rhetoric of the US. Two months ago, he aggressively identified Iran’s red lines and last week he stated that the nuclear talks “were harmful to Iran“.
But Khamenei is relatively stable compared to Zarif. Zarif is consistently inconsistent in creating an environment of optimism mixed with pessimism. His attitude remains cordial and friendly with a “take it or leave it” attitude that may or may not be a bluff. He has constantly repeated that sanctions have not hurt Iran but requests repeatedly for all sanctions to be lifted. He has denied cooperating with the US-led coalition against ISIS but is now ready to cooperate as long as Iran will be repaid in leniency on the nuclear deal. He is quick to smile but is also quicker to blame.
Nobody really knows if there will be a deal or not.
One thing is for sure, Iran seems less desperate than the US for a deal and, as any negotiator will tell you, that gives Iran an advantage.
Although sanctions are still in force, the Iranian economy has benefitted from the negotiations themselves with hundreds of delegations flying into Tehran to sniff out the chances to business with Iran while countries like Russia, Turkey, Iraq and China simply disregard any sanctions.
The war against ISIS suddenly gave the Iranians an extra boost in their ability to make a better deal because the US feels that destroying ISIS may be more important than minimizing an Iranian nuclear break-out.
Source: Iran2407.wordpress.com
Ayatollah Khamenei, Assad spoke of reforms
Ayatollah Khamenei, Assad spoke of reforms
Hossein Sheikholeslam, Iran’s former ambassador to Syria and the current foreign policy adviser to the speaker of parliament, spoke toRamze Obour magazine about Iran’s relationship with Syria and the mistakes of the Syrian government, revealing some previously unknown information.
Though Sheikholeslam’s comments were recently picked up by Shargh Newspaper, the original interview took place in April before the Syrian elections. Some of his points in the interview are noteworthy in that they concede mistakes by the Syrian government. The interviewer was unafraid to challenge the official on a topic rarely covered from a nuanced angle in Iran, and the discussion also addressed a letter from Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to President Bashar al-Assad.
Sheikholeslam said that the best way out of Syria’s civil war, which has left over 170,000 dead and much of country destroyed, is through elections, as experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan show that people would not support extremists in elections. When asked, “Isn’t it too late for that now in Syria?” he said, “Yes, everything is too late. We should have done it earlier.”
He said, “From day one, the supreme leader took a position that Syria needs to undergo reforms.” He said that Qasem Soleimani, the head of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps‘ Quds Force, took a message to Assad written by Ayatollah Khamenei in the first days of the protests. The message said, “The killings should not take place and reforms have to be accepted.”
Sheikholeslam said, “Assad accepted [that] reforms [were needed], but he didn’t have the proper mechanisms. Assad didn’t even have police. Whatever they had, it was the army. If it had a problem with anyone, they would shoot at the crowd with automatic weapons.”
He said many of Iran’s Revolutionary Guard commanders have been in the region and “know what Bashar’s problem is. As soon as four people would gather, instead of using police, the army would use automatic weapons. … They wanted to solve it with force.”
He added that Iran had helped in this matter and also helped form groups to negotiate with the opposition. It has been well documented by now that Iran has sent fighters into Syria to support and advise Syrian troops.
When asked, „From this democracy that you suggest and that Soleimani recommended for Syria, would Bashar Assad’s name come out of the ballot box again?” Sheikholeslam said that Iran hadn’t interfered in the domestic affairs of Syria, an assertion the interviewer rejected. Sheikholeslam blamed Turkey, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and Israel for trying to make Syria’s government collapse.
The interview began by discussing modern history, most of it well known, including former President Hafez Assad’s support for Iran during the Iran-Iraq war, assistance Sheikholeslam believes prevented it from being an “Arab-Iranian” war. Syria was the only country to support Iran, while most Arab countries supported Iraqi President Saddam Hussein.
Sheikholeslam also said that with Assad’s support, Iran could not have helped form Hezbollah in Lebanon. When asked whether Iran’s support for the Syrian government is because of Syria’s support for Hezbollah, Sheikholeslam said, “No, the entire Islamic resistance, not just Hezbollah.”
This prompted a question about Hamas, which sided with Syrian rebels against Assad’s regime. “They sacrificed their relationship with Iran and Syria for a domestic Muslim Brotherhood issue,” Sheikholeslam said, calling Hamas‘ move a “vital mistake.” However, he said that Iran and Hamas “strategically have no choice but unity.” When asked if Hamas‘ relationship with Qatar could change this relationship, Sheikholeslam said, “Qatar will not give Hamas even one bullet.”
Source: AI-Monitor.com
Zeit| Der Iran wird wieder Reiseland
Seit dem Ende der Ära Ahmadinedschad reisen wieder mehr Touristen in den Iran. Vor allem Studienreisen werden häufig gebucht. Das wirft auch unbequeme Fragen auf.
Touristen in Persepolis | © John Moore/Getty Images
Karge Wüsten und Skiresorts, gletscherbedeckte Vulkane und fruchtbare Täler. Millionenmetropolen wie Teheran und unbewohnte Inseln wie Hengam, die lustvolle Poesie des persischen Dichters Hafis und ein konservativ-islamisches Regime, das den kleinsten Internetflirt kritisch beäugt. Offizielles Verbot sozialer Netzwerke und ein Präsident mit mehr als 230.000 Fans auf Twitter, in westlichen Köpfen verankerte Bilder vorbeihuschender Frauen im dunklen Tschador und ein gigantischer Markt für Mode, Schönheits-Operationen und Kosmetik: Der Iran ist ein Land, das kontrastreich wirkt und stets ein „Ja, aber“ provoziert. Seit jeher fasziniert das Land daher auch europäische Reisende. Das 1904 erschienene Buch Nach Isfahan des französischen Schriftstellers Pierre Loti etwa ist ein Klassiker der Orient-Reiseliteratur.
In diesem Jahr zieht es Touristen wieder verstärkt in den Iran. Das behauptet nicht nur die iranische Nachrichtenagentur Fars, das sagen auch Anbieter von Studienreisen. Von einem regelrechten Boom spricht Manfred Schreiber, Gebietsleiter für den Nahen Osten bei Studiosus: Seit dem Amtsantritt des alsvergleichsweise liberal geltenden Präsidenten Hassan Ruhani 2013 sei „die Nachfrage enorm gestiegen“. 2013 nahmen 500 Reisende an Studienreisen des Anbieters in den Iran teil, die Zahl der Buchungen habe sich im Vergleich dazu mehr als verdoppelt. Schon früher sei der Iran ein gut gebuchtes Reiseziel gewesen, sagt er. Während der Amtszeit des Präsidenten Ahmadinedschads sei die Nachfrage allerdings stark gesunken – schon direkt nach seiner Wahl 2005. „Als dann 2009 die Proteste gegen die Wahlmanipulation gewaltsam niedergeschlagen wurden, gingen die Buchungen noch stärker zurück.“
Auch beim Anbieter Gebeco, der das Land seit mehr als zehn Jahren im Programm hat, steigt die Nachfrage nach Studienreisen in den Iran: „Sie ist sogar so stark, dass wir in diesem Jahr Zusatztermine aufgelegt haben“, sagt Geschäftsführer Ury Steinweg.
Die Gründe dafür sieht er in der Vielzahl der kultur- und kunsthistorisch sehenswerten Orte. Tatsächlich ist die Liste der studientouristischen Ziele lang, 17 der Unesco-Weltkulturerbestätten befinden sich im Iran, etwa die Paradiesgärten von Schiras und die Ruinen von Persepolis.
Manfred Schreiber von Studiosus sagt, das große Interesse an Iran-Reisen hänge auch mit der medialen Präsenz zusammen: „Es vergeht kaum ein Tag, an dem nicht etwas über den Iran in den Medien erscheint. Unsere Gäste sind deshalb auch sehr an der Gegenwart und dem Alltag der Menschen vor Ort interessiert.“ Bei Studiosus gehören persönliche Begegnungen vor Ort zu jeder Reise – Begegnungen mit den Mitgliedern der deutschen evangelischen Gemeinde in Teheran, mit iranischen Künstlern und mit Ayatollahs.
Deutschland| Leistungen des AsylbLG auf Prüfstand
Antwort
der Bundesregierung
auf die Kleine Anfrage der Abgeordneten Luise Amtsberg, Dr. Wolfgang
Strengmann-Kuhn, Maria Klein-Schmeink, weiterer Abgeordneter und
der Fraktion BÜNDNIS 90/DIE GRÜNEN
– Drucksache 18/1934 –
Gesundheitliche Versorgung nach dem Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz
Vorbeme rkung de r F r age s t e l l e r
„Die in Art. 1 Abs. 1 GG [GG: Grundgesetz] garantierte Menschenwürde ist migrationspolitisch nicht zu relativieren.“ Dies hat das Bundesverfassungsgericht
vor zwei Jahren mit seinem Urteil vom 18. Juli 2012 (1 BvL 10/10 und 1 BvL 2/11; Rn. 121) dem deutschen Gesetzgeber ins Stammbuch geschrieben.
Damit stellt das Bundesverfassungsgericht klar, dass die durch das Asylbewerberleistungsgesetz (AsylbLG) vorgesehene Ungleichbehandlung z. B.
von Asylsuchenden bei der Gewährung sozialer Leistungen zur Sicherung des Existenzminimums unzulässig ist.
Ob eine solche Ungleichbehandlung auch beim Zugang zu Gesundheitsleistungen verfassungsrechtlich zulässig ist, bzw. inwieweit die o. g. Rechtsprechung
des Bundesverfassungsgerichts auf Gesundheitsleistungen übertragbar ist, oder nicht, darüber liegt derzeit noch keine gerichtliche Entscheidung vor.
Als starkes Indiz aber stellte das Bundesverfassungsgericht in seiner o. g. Entscheidung klar, dass die Menschenwürde auch die „physische Existenz des
Menschen“ umfassen würde.
Mit dieser Frage hat sich die Zentrale Kommission zur Wahrung ethischer Grundsätze in der Medizin und ihren Grenzgebieten (ZEKO) bei der Bundesärztekammer
im Jahr 2013 mit einer ausführlichen Stellungnahme beschäftigt (Deutsches Ärzteblatt 18/2013, S. 899 ff.). Aus Sicht der Bundesärztekammer
müssten hier „wegen der existenziellen Bedeutung von Krankheit noch strengere Maßstäbe [als bei Sozialleistungen] angewandt“ werden. Denn der Katalog
des – für die Gewährung von Gesundheitsleistungen einschlägigen Fünften Buches Sozialgesetzbuch (SGB V) – bestünde ohnehin nur aus Leistungen, die „das Maß des Notwendigen nicht überschreiten“ würden (§ 12 Absatz 1 Satz 1 SGB V). Daher besteht aus Sicht der Bundesärztekammer eine „hohe Begründungslast“,
warum eine Leistung zwar generell, aber nicht für solche Patientinnen und Patienten notwendig sein soll, die dem AsylbLG unterworfen sind.
Einen eingeschränkten Zugang zu Gesundheitsleistungen haben nach dem AsylbLG nicht nur Asylsuchende, sondern auch Geduldete, Bürgerkriegs-flüchtlinge, vollziehbar Ausreisepflichtige sowie deren Ehegatten bzw. Lebenspartner und deren minderjährige Kinder. All diese Personengruppen haben
nach § 4 AsylblG nur Anspruch auf die Behandlung akuter Erkrankungen und akuter Schmerzzustände. Die Behandlung von chronischen Erkrankungen, Beeinträchtigungen
oder Traumata wird nach § 6 AsylbLG nur im Einzelfall und dann auch nur im Ermessen zur „Sicherung des unabweisbar Unerlässlichen“ gewährt – oder eben nicht. Einen Anspruch auf diese Leistungen haben die Betroffenen nicht.
Ob bzw. in welcher Form den Personen, die dem AsylbLG unterworfen sind, medizinisch geholfen wird, darüber entscheiden nicht – wie bei sonst allen anderen Menschen – Ärztinnen und Ärzte, sondern medizinisch nicht fachkundige Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeiter in den Sozialämtern. Und dort werden seit vielen Jahren Menschen unter Hinweis auf das AsylblG
● lebensnotwendige Operationen verweigert bzw. über Monate verschleppt,
● Zahnbehandlungen abgelehnt,
● Anträge von Traumatisierten auf eine psychotherapeutische Behandlung
zurückgewiesen sowie
● Rollstühle, Hörgeräte oder Mittel zur Inkontinenzpflege als „nicht lebensnotwendig“
– vorenthalten
(vgl. die Stellungnahme des Flüchtlingsrates Berlin vom 7. Januar 2012 zur
„Novellierung der verfassungswidrigen Regelungen des Asylbewerberleistungsgesetzes“,
Anhang I, S. 32 ff.). Lies den Rest dieses Beitrags
Amnesty kritisiert Lage der Journalisten im Iran
Die Menschenrechtsorganisation Amnesty International hat einen deutlichen Anstieg von Festnahmen und Inhaftierungen unabhängiger Journalisten im Iran kritisiert. Die Behörden machten damit Hoffnungen zunichte, die der Amtsantritt des iranischen Präsidenten Hassan Rohani am 3. August 2013 geweckt habe, erklärte die Organisation.
Nach Angaben von Hassiba Hadj Sahraoui, der stellvertretenden Direktorin der Amnesty-Abteilung für den Mittleren Osten und Nordafrika, gibt es zunehmend ein Klima der Einschüchterung und Furcht. Was der offiziellen Staatsideologie zuwiderlaufe, drohe mit Gefängnis bestraft zu werden.
In den vergangenen Monaten habe die Repression gegen die Medienschaffenden noch zugenommen. Betroffen seien unter anderen iranische Journalisten, ausländische Korrespondenten und Filmemacher. Festnahmen erfolgten vielfach gemäß der islamischen Strafgesetzgebung. Darin würden „Verbreitung von Lügen oder Propaganda“ sowie „Erzeugung von Unruhe in der öffentlichen Meinung“ als Verbrechen definiert. In Wirklichkeit werde damit eine große Zahl friedlicher Aktivitäten kriminalisiert. Kritische Journalisten würden mit verschiedenen Methoden drangsaliert und zur Selbstzensur gezwungen.
Der Verbleib des Korrespondenten der „Washington Post“ im Iran und dessen ebenfalls als Journalistin arbeitende Ehefrau sei nach wie vor nicht bekannt. Jason Rezaian und Yeganeh Salehi wurden am 22. Juli in Teheran festgenommen. Ebenfalls an einem unbekannten Ort festgehalten wurde die am 28. Mai festgenommene Saba Azarpeik. Erst am vergangenen Sonntag wurde der Journalist Serajeddin Mirdamadi wegen „regierungsfeindlicher Propaganda“ und „Verstoßes gegen die nationale Sicherheit“ zu sechs Jahren Haft verurteilt – laut Amnesty ein Beispiel von vielen.
Verwaltungsgliederung des Iran
(Persisch: , Plural ) genannt werden, unterteilt. Jeder Provinzverwaltung steht ein Gouverneur, der (Persisch: ) genannt wird, vor. Dieser wird vom Innenminister mit Zustimmung des Kabinetts ernannt.
Provinzen untergliedern sich weiter in Verwaltungsbezirke, die, Plural: ) genannt werden.
Verwaltungsbezirke wiederum werden in Distrikte, die , Plural:) genannt werden, unterteilt.
Im Jahr 2006 gab es in Iran 30 , 336 , 889 , 1016 Städte und 2400 Dörfer. Am 23. Juni 2010 wurde die Provinz Alborz durch Abtrennung eines Teils der Provinz Tehrān gegründet.
Provinzen
| Nr. | Provinz(Persisch) | Einwohner(Okt. 2006) | Fläche (März 2004) |
Ew./ km²)</small> |
Hauptstadt(Persisch) |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 31 | Alborz | Karadsch | |||
| 6 | Ardabīl | 1.225.348 | 17.800 | 69 | Ardabīl |
| 9 | Āzārbāyjān-e Gharbī | 2.873.459 | 37.437 | 77 | Orūmīyeh |
| 8 | Āzārbāyjān-e Sharqī | 3.603.456 | 45.650 | 79 | Tabrīz |
| 17 | Kohkīlūyeh va Boyer Ahmad | 634.299 | 15.504 | 41 | Yāsūj |
| 18 | Būshehr | 886.267 | 22.743 | 39 | Bandar-e Būshehr |
| 16 | Chahār Mahāl va Bakhtīārī | 857.910 | 16.332 | 53 | Shahr-e Kord |
| 24 | Esfahān | 4.559.256 | 107.029 | 43 | Esfahān |
| 19 | Fārs | 4.336.878 | 122.608 | 35 | Shīrāz |
| 2 | Ghom | 1.040.681 | 11.526 | 90 | Ghom |
| 5 | Gilān | 2.404.861 | 14.042 | 171 | Rasht |
| 27 | Golestan | 1.617.087 | 20.195 | 80 | Gorgān |
| 11 | Hamadān | 1.703.267 | 19.368 | 88 | Hamadān |
| 20 | Hormozgān | 1.403.674 | 70.669 | 20 | Bandar-e ‚Abbās |
| 13 | Īlām | 545.787 | 20.133 | 27 | Īlām |
| 22 | Kermān | 2.652.413 | 180.836 | 15 | Kermān |
| 12 | Kermānschāh | 1.879.385 | 24.998 | 75 | Kermānschāh |
| 30 | Khorāsān-e Junoubi | 636.420 | 88.404 | 7 | Bīrjand |
| 29 | Khorāsān-e Razavi | 5.593.079 | 125.832 | 44 | Mashhad |
| 28 | Khorāsān-e Shomali | 811.572 | 28.434 | 29 | Bojnūrd |
| 15 | Khūzestān | 4.274.979 | 64.055 | 67 | Ahvāz |
| 10 | Kordestān | 1.438.543 | 29.137 | 49 | Sanandaj |
| 14 | Lorestān | 1.716.527 | 28.294 | 61 | Khorramābād |
| 3 | Markazī | 1.349.590 | 29.130 | 46 | Arak |
| 26 | Māzandarān | 2.920.657 | 23.701 | 123 | Sārī |
| 4 | Qazvīn | 1.143.200 | 15.549 | 74 | Qazvīn |
| 25 | Semnān | 589.742 | 97.491 | 6 | Semnān |
| 21 | Sīstān va Balūchestān | 2.405.742 | 181.785 | 13 | Zāhedān |
| 1 | Tehrān | 13.413.348 | 18.814 | 713 | Tehrān |
| 23 | Yazd | 990.818 | 129.285 | 8 | Yazd |
| 7 | Zanjān | 964.601 | 21.773 | 41 | Zanjān |
| Iran | 70.472.846 | 1.628.554 | 43 | Tehrān |
IRAN| Der Supermarkt des Todes
Informationen westlicher Geheimdienste zufolge decken sich militante Gruppen am Flughafen in Teheran mit Waffen ein
Waffen der Hisbollah-Miliz. Diese kommen auch aus dem Iran
Am Flughafen in Teheran kann man fast alles kaufen, was sich zum Töten eignet: Kurzstreckenraketen, Flug- und Panzerabwehrgeschosse, Mörsergranaten, Kleinwaffen und Munition.
Dieser Supermarkt des Todes ist ein beliebtes Shopping-Ziel von allerlei finsteren Gestalten aus dem Nahen Osten: Assads Schergen decken sich hier mit Waffen ein für den blutigen Kampf gegen die eigene Bevölkerung. Und auch die Hisbollah und die Hamas beziehen sehr wahrscheinlich Kriegsausrüstung aus Teheran.
Das berichtet die Süddeutsche Zeitung. Die Hauptquelle für den Artikel ist „ein westlicher Diplomat, der Zugang zu Geheimdienstinformationen hat.“
Seit einigen Monaten sollen die Quds-Brigaden, eine Eliteeinheit des Iran für Operationen im Ausland, einen ganzen Hangar im Osten des Flughafen übernommen haben. Dieser dient ihnen jetzt als Logistikzentrum und Waffenlager.
Von hier aus wird das Kriegsgerät für das Gemetzel in Syrien verladen – nicht nur auf Militärtransporter, sondern auch an Bord von zivilen Fracht- und Passagiermaschinen.
Flüchtlingshilfe Iran e.V. 2010 