بازگشت به ایران: از وعدهها تا نگرانی ها – New Video: Iranian Expats Risk Arrest upon Return to their Homeland
Rouhani’s Promise of Right of Return Proves Hollow for Many
April 23, 2015—The International Campaign for Human Rights in Iran released a video today highlighting the plight of the thousands of Iranians who wish to return to their homeland, yet fear likely imprisonment upon arrival for the peaceful expression of their beliefs, art, or lifestyle.
Dozens of Iranian expatriates who have traveled to Iran following assurances by President Hassan Rouhani regarding their safe passage, have been arrested, interrogated, prevented from leaving by having their passports confiscated, and, in many instances, imprisoned upon their return.
The video, Iranian Expats on the Right to Return (on YouTube and on Facebook), features commentary by four prominent Iranian artists and writers, including journalist Masih Alinejad, author Roozbeh Mirebrahimi, painter Nikzad Nojoomi and singer and songwriter Melody Safavi.
“Iranians should not fear returning home because of views or lifestyles that the government disagrees with,” said Hadi Ghaemi, Executive Director of the Campaign. “The administration beckons them, and then the Judiciary imprisons them; the Government of Iran needs to address this disconnect.”
As singer and songwriter Melody Safavi laments in the video, “I am creating art. Something that should normally be appreciated but, unfortunately, I am treated in the same way as a criminal.”
During his visit to the UN General Assembly in September 2013, and shortly following his election into office, President Rouhani told a jubilant crowd of Iranian-Americans at a reception at a New York City hotel that visiting their homeland was their “incontrovertible right.”
Some Iranian exiles, like journalist Seraj Mirdamadi, took Rouhani at his word.
Today, Mirdamadi is serving a six-year prison term in Evin prison on trumped up charges of “propaganda against the state” and “conspiracy against national security.”
Other returning expatriates have met a similar fate.
Most recently, Mostafa Azizi, an author and television producer who was a longtime resident of Canada, returned to Iran in January 2015, only to be arrested shortly thereafter on February 1 and placed into solitary confinement at Evin prison.
Mirdamadi and Azizi are part of a growing group of expatriates arrested since returning to Iran following Rouhani’s election. They include political activist Kazem Barjasteh, journalist and reformist politician Hossein Nouraninejad, PhD student Hamid Babaei, and PhD student Masoumeh Gholizadeh.
Following his inauguration, President Rouhani reportedly asked Iran’s Intelligence and Foreign Ministries to facilitate the return of Iranians living abroad. In November 2013, the Deputy Foreign Minister for Consular, Parliamentary and Iranian Expatriate Affairs announced the formation of a committee to help exiled political activists return to Iran. Yet if the arrests over the past year and a half are any indication, it seems the right of safe return—as interpreted by the Iranian authorities—only applies to those who do not express any dissent against the state.
As the Spokesperson for the Iranian Judiciary, Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei, stated in 2013, “We do not ban people from entering the country or say they do not have the right to enter the country… but when they enter they will be charged and prosecuted.”
This is in violation of Article 13(2) of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states, “Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country.”
Berlin (Reuters) – Die Bundesregierung bremst Forderungen der Wirtschaft und Teherans nach einer schnellen Aufhebung der westlichen Iran-Sanktionen.
Die Sanktionen würden aufgehoben, wenn der Iran die vereinbarten Auflagen umgesetzt und die Atomenergiebehörde IAEA dies bestätigt habe, sagte die stellvertretende Sprecherin des Auswärtigen Amtes, Sawsan Chebli, am Freitag in Berlin. “An welchem Tag das ist, liegt dann in den Händen Irans.” Sie reagierte damit auf Forderungen des religiösen Führers des Iran und des Nah- und Mittelostverein der deutschen Wirtschaft (Numov), Sanktionen sofort nach der angestrebten Unterzeichnung des Atomabkommens Ende Juni zu beenden.
Vergangene Woche hatten sich die fünf UN-Vetomächte und Deutschland mit Iran auf Grundzüge eines Atomabkommens geeinigt. Umfassende Kontrollen der Internationalen Atomenergiebehörde IAEA sollen sicherstellen, dass die iranische Nutzung der Kernenergie nicht zum Bau von Atombomben in dem Land führt. Nach Abschluss des Abkommens plant der Westen eine schrittweise Aufhebung der Sanktionen. Am Donnerstag hatte der oberste geistliche Führer des Iran, Ajatollah Ali Chamenei, aber eine sofortige Aufhebung der Sanktionen nach Unterzeichnung des Atomabkommens gefordert.
Die 28-jährige Iranerin Atena Farghadani sitzt im Gefängnis – sie hat die Unterdrückung von Frauen und Minderheiten durch das Regime kritisiert
Während die UN-Vetomächte und Deutschland stolz ihr Rahmenabkommen im Atomstreit mit dem Iran präsentieren, steht das Parlament in Teheran kurz davor, zwei neue, frauenfeindliche Gesetze zu beschließen.
Damit soll die sexistische Politik des Gottesstaates zementiert werden.
Latif ist 2014 aus Bagdad in die Türkei geflohen. Er wird nun jahrelang in der Illegalität leben müssen, ohne Job, ohne Geld. Grund: Das Uno-Flüchtlingshilfswerk, das die nötigen Papiere ausstellt, ist total überlastet.
Latif, 28, staunte nicht schlecht, als er in Ankara beim Flüchtlingshilfswerk der Vereinten Nationen UNHCR um einen Termin bat, um als Flüchtling anerkannt zu werden. Der Iraker, ein schiitischer Muslim, war im vergangenen Jahr von Bagdad in die Türkei geflohen. Man teilte ihm schriftlich mit, er möge zur Feststellung seines Status persönlich vorsprechen – und zwar am 13. Februar 2020.
“Fünf Jahre soll ich mich nun in der Türkei durchschlagen, ohne Job!”, empört sich Latif. Er hat Glück, dass er von Ersparnissen leben kann. In Bagdad war er Mitglied einer Death-Metal-Band. Weil er mit seinen Liedern die Zustände in seiner Heimat kritisierte, wurde er bedroht. Einmal zwangen ihn Unbekannte, sich die Haare abzuschneiden. Aus Angst verließ er acht Monate lang seine Wohnung nicht mehr.
Latif gelang die Flucht in die Türkei, wo er als Asylbewerber registriert wurde. In einem zweiten Schritt muss die Uno-Behörde ihn nun interviewen, um ihn als Flüchtling anzuerkennen und über seine Zukunft in der Türkei zu entscheiden. Diese Aufgabe übernimmt das Flüchtlingshilfswerk in all jenen Ländern, in denen ihm diese Aufgabe vom Staat übertragen wurde.
Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action regarding the Islamic Republic ofIran’s Nuclear Progn!!!!
Parameters for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action regarding
the Islamic Republic ofIran’s Nuclear Progn!!!!
Below are the key parameters of a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) regarding the
Islamic Republic of Iran’s nuclear program that were decided in Lausanne, Switzerland. These
elements form the foundation upon which the final text of the JCPOA will be written between
now and June 30, and reflect the significant progress that has been made in discussions between
the P5+ 1, the European Union, and Iran. Important implementation details are still subject to
negotiation, and nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. We will work to conclude the
JCPOA based on these parameters over the coming months.
• Iran has agreed to reduce by approximately two-thirds its installed centrifuges. Iran will
go from having about 19,000 installed today to 6,104 installed under the deal, with only
5,060 ofthese enriching uranium for 10 years. All 6,104 centrifuges will be IR-ls, Iran’s
• Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium over 3.67 percent for at least 15 years.
• Iran has agreed to reduce its current stockpile of about 10,000 kg of low-enriched
uranium (LEU) to 300 kg of 3.67 percent LEU for 15 years.
• All excess centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure will be placed in IAEA monitored
storage and will be used only as replacements for operating centrifuges and equipment.
• Iran has agreed to not build any new facilities for the purpose of enriching uranium for 15
• Iran’s breakout timeline – the time that it would take for Iran to acquire enough fissile
material for one weapon – is currently assessed to be 2 to 3 months. That timeline will be
extended to at least one year, for a duration of at least ten years, under this framework.
Iran will convert its facility at Fordow so that it is no longer used to enrich uranium
• Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium at its Fordow facility for at least 15 years.
• Iran has agreed to convert its Fordow facility so that it is used for peaceful purposes only
– into a nuclear, physics, technology, research center.
• Iran has agreed to not conduct research and development associated with uranium
enrichment at Fordow for 15 years.
• Iran will not have any fissile material at Fordow for 15 years.
• Almost two-thirds ofFordow’s centrifuges and infrastructure will be removed .. The
remaining centrifuges will not enrich uraniurn. All centrifuges and related infrastructure
will be placed under IAEA monitoring.
Iran will only enrich uranium atthe Natanz facility, with only 5,060 IR-l first-generation
centrifuges for ten years.
• Iran has agreed to only enrich uranium using its first generation (IR-l models) centrifuges at Natanz for ten years, removing its more advanced centrifuges.
•Iran will remove the 1,000 IR-2M centrifuges currently installed at Natanz and place them in IAEA monitored storage for ten years.
•Iran will not use its IR-2, IR-4, IR-5, IR-6, or IR-8models to produce enriched uraniurn for at least ten years. Iran will engage in limited research and development with its advanced centrifuges, according to a schedule and parameters which have been agreed to by the P5+1.
•For ten years, enrichment and enrichment research and development will be limited to ensure a breakout timeline of at least 1 year. Beyond 10 years, Iran will abide by its enrichment and enrichment R&D plan submitted to the IAEA, and pursuant to the JCPOA, under the Additional ProtocoI resulting in certain !imitations on enrichment capacity.
Inspections and Transparency
•The IAEA will have regular access to all ofIran’s nuclear facilities, including to Iran’s enrichment facility at Natanz and its former enrichment facility at Fordow, and including the use of the most up-to-date, modern monitoring technologies.
•Inspectors will have access to the supply chain that supports Iran’s nuclear program. The new transparency and inspections mechanisms will closely monitor materials and/or components to prevent diversion to a secret program.
•Inspectors will have access to uraniurn mines and continuous surveillance at uranium mills, where Iran produces yellowcake, for 25 years.
•Inspectors will have continuous surveillance ofIran’s centrifuge rotors and bellows production and storage facilities for 20 years. Iran’s centrifuge manufacturing base will be frozen and under continuous surveillance.
•All centrifuges and enrichment infrastructure removed from Fordow and Natanz will be placed under continuous monitoring by the IAEA.
•A dedicated procurement channel for Iran’ s nuclear pro gram will be established to monitor and approve, on a case by case basis, the supply, sale, or transfer to Iran of certain nuc1ear-related and dual use materials and technology – an additional transparency measure.
•Iran has agreed to implement the Additional Protocol ofthe IAEA, providing the IAEA much greater access and information regarding Iran’s nuclear program, including both dec1ared and undeclared facilities.
•Iran will be required to grant access to the IAEA to investigate suspicious sites or allegations of a covert enrichment facility, conversion facility, centrifuge production facility, or yellowcake production facility anywhere in the country.
•Iran has agreed to implement Modified Code 3.1 requiring early notification of construction of new facilities.
•Iranwill implement an agreed set ofmeasures to address the IAEA’s concerns regarding the Possible Military Dimensions (PMD) of its program.
Reactors and Reprocessing
•Iran has agreed to redesign and rebuild a heavy water research reactor in Arak, based on a design that is agreed to by the P5+ 1, which will not produce weapons grade plutonium, and which will support peaceful nuclear research and radioisotope production.
•The original core ofthe reactor, which would have enabled the production of significant quantities ofweapons-grade plutonium, will be destroyed or removed from the country.
•Iran will ship all of its spent fuel from the reactor out of the country for the reactor’s lifetime.
•Iran has committed indefinitely to not conduct reprocessing or reprocessing research and development on spent nuclear fuel.
•Iran will not accumulate heavy water in excess of the needs of the modified Arak reactor, and will seIl any remaining heavy water on the international market for 15 years.
•Iran will not build any additional heavy water reactors for 15 years.
• Iran will receive sanctions relief, if it verifiably abides by its commitrnents.
• U.S. and E.u. nuclear-related sanctions will be suspended after the IAEA has verified
that Iran has taken all of its key nuclear-related steps. If at any time Iran fails to fulfill its
commitments, these sanctions will snap back into place.
• The architecture ofU.S. nuclear-related sanctions on Iran will be retained for much of
the duration of the deal and allow for snap-back of sanctions in the event of significant
• All past UN Security Council resolutions on the Iran nuclear issue will be lifted
simultaneous with the completion, by Iran, ofnuclear-related actions addressing all key
concems (enrichment, Fordow, Arak, PMD, and transparency).
• However, core provisions in the UN Security Council resolutions – those that deal with
transfers of sensitive technologies and activities – will be re-established by a new UN
Security Council resolution that will endorse the JCPOA and urge its full
implementation. It will also create the procurement channel mentioned above, which will
serve as a key transparency measure. Important restrictions on conventional arms and
ballistic missiles, as well as provisions that allow for related cargo inspections and asset
freezes, will also be incorporated by this new resolution.
• A dispute resolution process will be specified, which enables any JCPOA participant, to
seek to resolve disagreements ab out the performance of JCPOA commitments.
• If an issue of significant non-performance cannot be resolved through that process, then
all previous UN sanctions could be re-imposed.
• U.S. sanctions on Iran for terrorism, human rights abuses, and ballistic missiles will
remain in place under the deal.
• For ten years, Iran will limit domestic enrichment capacity and research and development
– ensuring a breakout timeline of at least one year. Beyond that, Iran will be bound by its
longer-term enrichment and enrichment research and development plan it shared with the
• F or fifteen years, Iran will limit additional elements of its program. F or instance, Iran will not build new enrichment facilities or heavy water reactors and will limit its stockpile of enriched uranium and accept enhanced transparency procedures.
• Important inspections and transparency measures will continue well beyond 15 years. Iran’ s adherence to the Additional Protocol of the IAEA is permanent, including its significantaccess and transparency obligations. The robust inspections ofIran’s uranium supply chain will last for 25 years.
• Even after the period ofthe most stringent limitations on Iran’s nuclear program, Iran will remain a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which prohibits Iran’s development or acquisition of nuclear weapons and requires IAEA safeguards on its nuclear program.
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader who has final say on the nuclear program, has previously said that all sanctions on Iran must be removed and that the deal will not be a multistep deal. Members of parliament and other officials have also stated this. Presumably, this means that once a deal is signed, all nuclear-related sanctions on Iran will be removed.
As with all other comments made by the supreme leader, competing sides attempt to interpret Ayatollah Khamenei’s statements through a bias that is beneficial to their own talking points. However, comments by Abbas Araghchi, one of Iran’s top negotiators, and Mehdi Mohammadi, a prominent conservative analyst whose views reflect the previous more hard-line nuclear negotiators in Iran, there appears to be a public consensus that not all sanctions will be removed at once but rather the removal of sanctions must be clearly stated.
Speaking from Lausanne to Iranian reporters April 1, Araghchi said: “We cannot have an agreement thatdoes not contain the removal of sanctions. Certainly all the sanctions must be removed but the sanctions have a wide range, both quantitatively and qualitatively. The topics and issues of sanctions are very diverse. The types of sanctions and the issuer of sanctions are diverse: the Security Council, the European Union and America. These have to be separated and it has to become clear in what order it will take place.”
Araghchi continued: “We insist that in the first step of the agreement all the financial, banking and oil sanctions be removed and find a clear framework for the removal of sanctions that are possibly associated with other parts. Either way, without a completely clear and precise outlook for the removal of sanctions, certainly we will not have an agreement.”
In a column titled “Dos and Don’ts of a Political Agreement,” Mohammadi also addressed the issue of sanctions, clarifying his views on how they should be removed. “All the sanctions have to be immediately removed after Iran implements its commitments within the framework of the final step,” he wrote. Second, “all the timing has to be in an fixed, clear and unconditional text.”
The article also referred to other instances of “final rounds” and “final steps,” implying that Iranian negotiators and analysts understand that, given the complex nature of how sanctions were applied, a very complex procedure would be required to remove them. This nuance may not be enough for some members of the six world powers, but it’s a clearer picture of what the Iranians are thinking regarding the removal of sanctions.
The official deadline for these nuclear talks is the end of June, though by the end of March there was supposed to be an announcement of a political framework agreement. There have been reports that as negotiators work around the clock there may be a press announcement rather than an announcement of a deal. Though given the confidential nature of the talks, and the conflicting information released by the various sides, this too may change.
Lausanne, Switzerland — US Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif held marathon negotiations through the night that ended after 6 a.m. on the morning of April 2, as they tried to overcome final gaps for a political accord on an Iran nuclear deal. But Iran said the issues had not been totally resolved and what was likely to be issued later today or on April 3 is a press statement.
“We have examined all the solutions, which should provide the axis of a final accord between now and the end of June,” Zarif told Iranian journalists here on the morning of April 2. “The P5+1 [the five permanent UN Security Council members plus Germany] is studying them.”
Zarif added, “There will be a statement to the press that should be announced but the text still has to be worked on.”
Negotiators and ministers from the six world powers that comprise the P5+1 held a meeting among themselves after breakfast April 2, ahead of a meeting between Zarif and European Union foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini.
Zarif, speaking ahead of those meetings, said the members of the P5+1 “have to examine among themselves the results of the negotiations” that were held overnight between him, Kerry and EU deputy negotiator Helga Schmid. “We don’t know yet the result of those discussions. … If these solutions are approved, it is expected that there will be a joint declaration made by me and Mrs. Mogherini and then we will start drawing up the text of a final agreement by the end of June.”
The White House said on April 1 that progress was being made at the talks here, but that as of yet there had not been sufficient movement from Iran on some issues to finalize the preliminary political agreement.
“The talks continue to be productive and progress is being made,” White House spokesman Josh Earnest told journalists at the White House press briefing on April 1. “While the talks have been productive, we have not yet received the specific tangible commitment that the international community seeks,” he said.
“As long as we are in a position of convening serious talks that are making progress, … we would not arbitrarily or abruptly end them,” he added. “This is a very complicated situation and we want to be sure that … we’re clear about the details. The details in the situation matter significantly.”
German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, announcing he was staying overnight in Lausanne on April 1 to continue the negotiations, said the onus was on Iran to offer ideas to close remaining gaps for an accord.
“Tonight there will be new proposals, new recommendations. I can’t predict whether that will be sufficient to enable an agreement to be reached,” Steinmeier, speaking in German, said according to a translation from Reuters. “I will remain here tonight and then tomorrow morning we will see how the situation develops.”
A collapse of the talks is possible, but so is the possibility of reaching an agreement, Steinmeier said.“Whoever negotiates has to accept the risk of collapse. But I say that in light of the convergence [of views] that we have achieved here in Switzerland, in Lausanne, it would be irresponsible to ignore possibility of reaching an agreement.”
France’s Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius returned to the Lausanne negotiations late April 1.
US and Iranian officials said the situation was still fluid, and they were not sure if the talks would end later on April 2 or possibly continue into April 3.
Source: Laura Rozen – AL-Monitor
by LANA KIRIMOGLU
Inviting Google into Iran’s filtered cyberspace
This week, the nuclear talks resumed and Iran has been signaling that the country’s potential easing of restrictions – if the negotiations succeed – will not be an easy and straightforward process. With the declining economy, Iran has been trying to balance between its desire to economically benefit from the current improvement in relations with the West, and to maintain previous levels of censorship and control over its cyber space.
This balancing game was recently seen when Iran announced that it will welcome Western IT companies, especially Google, to enter Iran’s market. According to local media outlets, Iran’s Deputy Minister of Telecommunications, Information and Technology, Nasrollah Jahangard, claimed that Iran is having talks with Google in order to bring some of company’s servers into the country. Talks were also held, he said, with various European and US internet companies. This announcement comes after earlier claims to create Iran-only search engine ‘Yooz’, that would cover Persian, and possibly later, English-language sources. “We don’t oppose all those people who are in the international market and want to provide services in Iran […] This is a normal thing in the world and it will be economical for [IT] companies to be closer to their main clients […]”. He added this would be possible if the company agreed to “accept Iran’s cultural conditions […] and be within the boundaries of Iranian law”, in an interview with Fars NA.
The Balancing Game
This apparent willingness to become not only part of international digital community, but also practical wish to participate in global IT markets comes at a time when Iranian authorities are pursuing people for ‘illegal’ internet activities, ending in arrests and interrogations. IRGC cyber expert, Mostafa Alizadeh said that, in addition to arrests earlier this month and in February, more people will be summoned for questioning. This follows the previous bloggers activists’ arrests in January and warnings by IRGC that Facebook activities will be tightly monitored under operation “spider”. Lies den Rest dieses Beitrags