Recent publications from IHRDC on changes in Iran’s Islamic Penal Code

Following the approval of legislation by Iran’s Guardian Council for a revised Islamic Penal Code, the Iran Human Rights Documentation Center (IHRDC) has become increasingly concerned by the circulation of false and misleading claims about the nature of these changes in Farsi language media and social networks.  Some of these claims include assertions that the new Code abolishes the death penalty for juveniles and eliminates the punishment of stoning to death for the crime of adultery. Over the course of the last month, in an effort to provide accurate information about the nature of these changes, IHRDC has published several legal essays from Iranian lawyers and commentators that analyze the limitations in the revisions to the Code.

UANI Statement on Amnesty International’s New Iran Report

United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) President, Ambassador Mark D. Wallace, issued the following statement today regarding Amnesty International’s new report, „‚WE ARE ORDERED TO CRUSH YOU‘: Expanding Repression of Dissent in Iran:“

 

Amnesty International’s latest report details the sheer brutality and lawlessness of the Iranian regime, as well as the gruesome actions it takes to stifle dissent. To prevent the Arab Spring from spreading to Iran, the regime last year intensified its efforts to repress human rights defenders, and conducted four times as many public executions as in the previous year. Amnesty also confirms that the regime executes juveniles and homosexuals, burns and rapes prisoners, taps phone lines, and shuts off SMS services during times of political protest.

Iran News Round Up (Feb. 28)

Iran hails constitutional referendum in Syria; Iranian diplomat warns of Israel’s ‘creeping infiltration into South Caucasus’; Defense Minister Vahidi says Iran has military secrets for difficult times; Supreme Leader’s aide warns of internal, external plots to undermine upcoming parliamentary polls; IRGC urges people to vote for revolutionary candidates

Politics Hojjat al-Eslam Rasaei and Sadeq Zibakalam debate elections in an event in Tehran: Zibakalam: „The election issue in Iran is fundamentally not about change. It is in reality some kind of a show and a political maneuver showing the society that large popular participation is a sign of happiness with the government…“ Rasaei: „The people may be unhappy with the performance of a single person, but they are happy with the regime in general…“

Eye on Iran: Amnesty International: Iran Publicly Executed 4 times as Many People in a Year of Crackdown

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AP: „Iran put to death more than twice as many people in 2011 as it did the year before, Amnesty International said Monday in a new report. The rights group said that the rate of executions in public increased even more dramatically, in an apparent bid to suppress political dissent and promote a climate of fear among those who might defy harsh Iranian law. ‚Casting a shadow over all those who fall foul of Iran’s unjust justice system is the mounting toll of people sentenced to death and executed,‘ said the 70-page report, released in the run-up to Iran’s parliamentary elections on March 2. ‚There were around four times as many public executions in 2011 than in 2010, and hundreds of people are believed to have been sentenced to death in the past year,‘ it said. In Iran, prisoners are usually executed by hanging. The report said the heightened pace of executions ‚may be a strategy to spread fear among the population and to deter protests. As the repression of dissenters widens, the risk of further death sentences and executions cannot be excluded.'“ http://t.uani.com/xeLAzT

What does Iran want? A short analysis of the February 2012 IAEA report

By Bruno Tertrais

Since the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) published its last report on 8 November 2011, detailing the military dimensions of the Iranian nuclear program, the parameters of the Iranian crisis have significantly changed. The United States and Europe have adopted and are progressively implementing unprecedented financial and oil sanctions against Iran. Tehran acknowledges that sanctions are hurting its economy but denies that the nuclear program is being negatively impacted. For its part, Tehran has embarked on a new campaign of terrorism against Israeli interests in Asia, further intensifying the debate over a possible Israeli strike against Iran.

The latest IAEA report, dated 24 February, is a mix of both good and bad news.

The good news is that after more than a decade of work, Iran is still operating old-technology, IR-1 centrifuges, and has not been able to switch to experimental, next generation machines. [1] Although the number of IR-1 centrifuges in operation continues to increase, the fact that there has been no noticeable upgrade in technology implies that sanctions, which target (among other items) the material and spare parts needed to transition to next generation machines, are working. Absent the sanctions, Iran would almost certainly have a rapid “break out” capability.

The bad news is twofold.

In the past four months, Iran has nearly tripled its production of 20% enriched uranium. Iran’s official justification is that the increase is necessary to meet the demands of fueling the Tehran Research Reactor. However, as Iran has already produced enough fuel for the next twenty years, this explanation is, at best, dubious.  This inconsistency is compounded by the fact that Iran’s rationale for the new, underground Fordow enrichment facility has changed twice in the past three years.

Additionally, Iran refuses to provide information regarding its weaponization activities. After the November 2011 report, two IAEA missions were sent to Tehran in January and February to obtain information regarding what the Agency calls the “possible military dimensions” of Iran’s nuclear program. Unfortunately, these missions ended in failure. In particular, the IAEA delegates were refused access to Parchin, a key military facility at which it is believed significant weaponization-related activities take place. (According to David Sanger and William Broad of The New York Times, British and Israeli intelligence believe that Tehran may already have made the decision to build the bomb.) [2]

At the same time, just days before the November report was issued, Tehran replied positively to a letter sent months earlier by the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Germany). The letter was particularly noteworthy as it did not contain Tehran’s usual preconditions and vague demands for the restarting of talks.  This could be an indication that, as a result of the sanctions, Iran is genuinely interested in negotiations.

So what does Iran want?

There are at least two possibilities:

Iran may be deliberately trying to divide and confuse the international community by making an apparent diplomatic concession while it simultaneously escalates the violence abroad and accelerates its production of enriched uranium.  Some might be tempted to view Tehran’s approach as mimicking that of the P5+1, but this would be incorrect. The P5+1 have not engaged in the deliberate killing of Iranians and, though the assassinations of Iranian scientists are widely attributed to Israel, there are other credible hypotheses.

It is also possible that Iran’s leadership is deeply divided over the appropriate course of action and these divisions may be amplified by the sanctions and the upcoming elections on March 2. The faction backing Ahmadinejad may be pressing for a resumption of negotiations, fearing that further sanctions – or a possible military action against the country – could destabilize the regime. The Quds force , on the other hand, may have decided on its own or with the approval of the Supreme Leader, to target Israeli interests.

While the answer is important for diplomatic purposes, it does not alter the fact that Iran is gradually moving closer to a nuclear capability. No other currently non-nuclear member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty has invested as much in a nuclear military option.

In sum, there is probably still time for a non-violent resolution to Iran’s nuclear ambitions, but the time is growing shorter by the minute.  

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References

[1] For details see David Albright et al., ISIS Analysis of IAEA Iran Safeguards Report, Institute for Science and International Security, 24 February 2012.

[2] David E. Sanger & William J. Broad, « Iran’s output of nuclear fuel tripled », New York Times, 25-26 February 2012.

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Dr. Bruno Tertrais 
Dr. Bruno Tertrais is a Senior Research Fellow at the FONDATION POUR LA RECHERCHE STRATEGIQUE (FRS). He formerly was Special Assistant to the Director of Strategic Affairs at the French Ministry of Defense. Dr. Tertrais graduated from the Institut d’Etudes Politiques (IEP) de Paris. He also holds a Master’s degree in Public law and a DEA in Comparative Politics from the University of Paris, as well as a Doctorate in Political Science from the IEP Paris. His fields of expertise include international relations, strategic and military affairs, nuclear issues (proliferation, deterrence, disarmament), US strategy and transatlantic relations. Dr. Tertrais has published several books and studies on these questions.

 

Contact:

+33-1-4313-7767 +33-6-7291-7166 (mob) b.tertrais@frstrategie.org

AI: IRAN: ‘WE ARE ORDERED TO CRUSH YOU’: EXPANDING REPRESSION OF DISSENT IN IRAN

Iran: ‘We are ordered to crush you’: Expanding repression of dissent in Iran

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Index Number: MDE 13/002/2012
Date Published: 28 February 2012
Categories: Iran

The net of repression is widening in Iran. The authorities are arresting filmmakers, bloggers, human rights defenders, women’s rights activists, lawyers, students, journalists, political activists, religious and ethnic minorities – simply for speaking out against the government or expressing views with which the authorities do not agree. This report shows the lengths to which the Iranian authorities are prepared to go to isolate people in Iran from the rest of the world, and to try to hide information on human rights violations.